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INTRODUCTION
“Uniform” is hardly a word that one would use to describe the
current law of real estate finance. Mortgage law varies enormously
from state to state and represents an often perplexing amalgam of
English legal history, common law, and legislation. This disparity
remains the reality despite numerous attempts during the past
century to achieve greater uniformity, and despite the importance of
the American mortgage market to the national economy.
In 2002, following four years of drafting, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference)
promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA).1
UNFA reflects the contributions of some of the nation’s leading real
estate finance practitioners and scholars.2 It is designed to make
American foreclosure law uniform by providing for the prompt and
efficient nonjudicial liquidation of real estate collateral while
affording substantial safeguards for defaulting borrowers. Residential
3
borrowers receive special protection under UNFA.
UNFA represents a major innovation in the foreclosure process.
Not only does it provide for conventional foreclosure by public
4
5
auction sale, it also authorizes foreclosure by appraisal, a procedure
under which the secured creditor can appraise the property, take title
to it, and credit the borrower and junior lienors with a price
acceptable to all parties. Importantly, it endorses foreclosure by
negotiated sale, a process designed to emulate the sale of real estate
1. UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT (UNFA) (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/UFBPOSA/2002final.pdf.
2. The drafting committee consisted of Carl H. Lisman, Chair; John H. Burton; Lani Liu
Ewart; Dale G. Higer; Reed L. Martineau; Robert L. McCurley, Jr.; Lisa Kelly Morgan; Willis
E. Sullivan (who regrettably died before completion of the Act); and Dale Whitman, Reporter.
Ira Waldman served as the American Bar Association Advisor and Grant Nelson as a
representative from the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
3. See infra Part III.
4. UNFA art. 2, §§ 201–210.
5. UNFA art. 5, §§ 501–505.
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6
outside the foreclosure setting. “Such a sale will be consummated in
much the same way as other real property sales; the property may be
listed with a real estate broker and advertised extensively.”7 The
negotiated sale, which land finance scholars have long advocated as
an alternative to conventional foreclosure, is designed to produce a
higher foreclosure price than the usual auction sale—a result that
would benefit both the borrower and junior lienholders.
This Article provides a comprehensive examination of UNFA.
First, we focus on the absence of uniformity in substantial areas of
8
American real estate finance law. In so doing, we describe a
hodgepodge of divergent state substantive and procedural rules
governing real estate mortgages and their foreclosure. We then
examine and evaluate foreclosure by auction sale, currently the
pervasive method of foreclosure in this country.9 Next, we provide an
overview of UNFA and its major innovation, foreclosure by
10
negotiated sale. We then comprehensively analyze UNFA’s major
provisions and the extent to which they are consistent with or diverge
11
from the dominant themes of current state law. We give special
emphasis to UNFA’s protection for residential debtors.12 Finally, the
Article endorses UNFA and assesses its likely impact,13 concluding
that there is only a remote likelihood that it will be adopted by a
14
substantial number of states. Consequently, we advocate the Act’s
ultimate adoption by Congress, a position that we defend as
15
consistent with the values of federalism and the Conference.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

UNFA art. 4, §§ 401–405.
UNFA prefatory note at 2–3.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Parts II–V.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
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I. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN THE UNITED
STATES—THE ABSENCE OF UNIFORMITY
A. State Law Divergence: An Overview
Mortgage foreclosure law is in a state of pronounced disarray. A
sizeable number of states mandate judicial foreclosure, while others
authorize a nonjudicial “power of sale” foreclosure proceeding.
Additionally, many states impose a variety of postforeclosure
restrictions, including statutory redemption and limitations on
16
deficiency judgments, whereas others provide no such protections
for debtors.
Judicial action is the sole foreclosure method in about 40 percent
of the states.17 A typical judicial foreclosure entails a lengthy series of
steps: the filing of a foreclosure complaint and lis pendens notice; the
service of process on all parties whose interests may be prejudiced by
the proceeding; a hearing before a judge or a master in chancery who
reports to the court; the entry of a decree or judgment; the notice of
sale; a public foreclosure sale, usually conducted by a sheriff; the
postsale adjudication as to the disposition of the foreclosure proceeds;
18
and, if appropriate, the entry of a deficiency judgment. An appeal
may follow in some cases. In a contested judicial foreclosure, delay is
endemic, resulting in a time-consuming and costly process.19
The remaining states utilize “power of sale” foreclosure, a
nonjudicial process that is substantially less complicated and costly
than its judicial counterpart.20 After varying degrees of notice, the
16. If a foreclosure sale yields less than the mortgage debt (plus the costs of sale), a
mortgagee traditionally has the right to obtain a “deficiency judgment” for the difference. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a (1997).
17. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558 (4th ed.
2001).
18. Id. at 559–60.
19. “The delays and inefficiency associated with foreclosure by judicial action are costly.
They increase the risks of vandalism, fire, loss, depreciation, damage, and waste. . . . They add to
the portfolio of foreclosed properties held by lenders, secondary mortgage market investors,
and government insurers and guarantors of mortgages.” UNFA prefatory note at 2.
20. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 581–82. According to a recent paper by Karen
M. Pence,
Judicial procedures are substantially more time consuming than power-of-sale
procedures. Wood (1997) finds that judicial foreclosures, on average, take 148 days
longer than nonjudicial foreclosures, while Freddie Mac’s guidelines for mortgage
servicers indicate that foreclosures in the most time-consuming state, Maine (a
judicial foreclosure state), take almost 300 days longer than in the quickest state,
Texas (a power-of-sale state).
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mortgaged property is sold at a public sale by a third party, such as a
sheriff or a trustee, or by the mortgagee. Because this process does
not normally entail a hearing, it frequently is completed in six to eight
months or less.
In almost half of the states, the foreclosure sale is not the end of
21
the road for the borrower. A concept commonly termed “statutory
redemption” allows the mortgagor-debtor—and, in many states,
junior lienholders—up to a year or longer to regain title after the
foreclosure sale by paying the foreclosure purchaser the sale price
plus accrued interest and other expenses.22 Statutory redemption may
be available after both judicial and power of sale foreclosure,
23
although some states do not authorize it in the power of sale setting.
In the vast majority of the states recognizing statutory redemption,
the mortgagor will have the right to remain in possession during this
postforeclosure period. Proponents praise statutory redemption as
“allowing time for the mortgagor to refinance and save his property,
permitting additional use of the property by a hard-pressed
mortgagor, and probably, most important, encouraging those who do
bid at the sale to bid in at a fair price,”24 because a bid below market
value is more likely to result in redemption. However, critics argue
that statutory redemption is counterproductive. In their view, the fact
that the foreclosure purchaser acquires a defeasible title probably
suppresses bidding and results in lower sale prices.25
Perhaps more troubling than the variance among state positions
on statutory redemption is the states’ varied treatment of borrower
personal liability resulting from postforeclosure deficiency judgments.
In about half of the states, a mortgage lender may first obtain a
judgment for the amount of the mortgage debt and seek to collect it
by enforcement against the borrower’s other assets. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in this manner, the lender can foreclose on the

KAREN M. PENCE, FORECLOSING ON OPPORTUNITY: STATE LAWS AND MORTGAGE CREDIT 5
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2003-16, 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200316/200316pap.pdf.
21. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 689 n.2 (identifying twenty-two state
statutes giving borrowers postforeclosure sale redemption rights).
22. Id. at 689.
23. Id. at 689–90.
24. Darryl A. Hart, Comment, The Statutory Right of Redemption in California, 52 CAL. L.
REV. 846, 848 (1964).
25. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 691. For additional discussion of this result, see
infra Part II.B.1.e.

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1405

26
mortgaged real estate for the balance. Alternatively, the lender may
choose to foreclose first and sue for a deficiency judgment after the
foreclosure sale.27 The amount of this deficiency judgment is
traditionally the difference between the foreclosure sale price and the
28
mortgage debt.
However, several states regulate personal liability and deficiency
judgments by statute, adopting a “one-action” or “security-first” rule
that requires the lender to use the second of the two options available
in common law states. Under this approach the lender must first
foreclose and obtain a deficiency judgment only after the foreclosure
29
proceeding. A few states go further and simply prohibit any
30
borrower personal liability on purchase money mortgage obligations
31
or after foreclosures by power of sale. Even among states permitting
deficiency judgments, some use “fair value” legislation to limit the
deficiency to the difference between the mortgage debt and the fair
value of the foreclosed real estate rather than the difference between
the debt and the foreclosure sale price.32
In sum, this area of mortgage law is a mosaic of divergence.
Although, at one extreme, some states impose virtually no limitation

26. Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosure in Missouri: Some
Modest Proposals, 47 MO. L. REV. 151, 152 (1982); see also, e.g., Lakeside Ventures, L.L.C. v.
Lakeside Dev. Co., 68 P.3d 516, 519 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (providing this option, or the option
to foreclose, in Colorado); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (1997)
(describing the incorporation of this option into the Restatement).
27. Nelson, supra note 26, at 152.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a; Nelson, supra note 26, at
152.
29. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 6-101
(Michie 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 40.430 (Michie
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (2002). For additional discussion of the California approach,
see infra notes 352–64 and accompanying text.
30. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, LAND TRANSACTIONS AND FINANCE 633
(4th ed. 2004) (defining a purchase money mortgage as “[a] mortgage taken by a lender, who
may be either a vendor or a third party, to finance the mortgagor’s acquisition of the mortgaged
real estate”).
31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (West 2000) (prohibiting deficiency judgments
on purchase money mortgages); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 2004) (same); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (2002) (same); see also ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (Michie 2002)
(prohibiting deficiency judgments after power of sale foreclosure), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 33814(e) (West 2000) (same); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West Supp. 2004) (same).
32. For a complete listing of such statutes, see infra note 365. See also NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 661–62 (discussing fair value legislation). The statutes use a variety
of terms to define the “value” of the property for purposes of a deficiency judgment, including
“fair value,” “true value,” “true market value,” “reasonable value,” “appraised value,” “actual
value,” and “market value.” Id. at 660–61 n.6.
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33
on deficiency judgments and personal liability, the polar opposite is
represented by California and a few other states where personal
recourse against a borrower is usually unavailable.34 Other states fall
somewhere in between these doctrinal poles.

B. The Impact of the Secondary Market for Mortgages
Traditionally, this hodgepodge of state mortgage law was only a
minor problem because most lenders, institutional or otherwise,
continued to own the mortgages that they originated. However, the
“unprecedented expansion of the secondary mortgage market” (the
purchase of mortgages from their original holders) over the past three
decades has substantially strengthened the argument for uniformity in
mortgage law.35 A variety of federally sponsored institutions—most
importantly Fannie Mae (formerly the Federal National Mortgage
Association), Freddie Mac (formerly the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation), and the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae)—purchase large blocks of mortgages from
local lenders.36 These federally sponsored enterprises (FSEs) finance
a portion of their activity by issuing bonds and equity for sale to the
investing public. However, for the most part, the mortgages they buy
are “securitized”—packaged into mortgage pools to support
mortgage-backed securities for sale to institutional and personal
investors worldwide. Because the FSEs guarantee the payment of the
principal and interest on these securities, they are especially attractive
to the investment community. The secondary mortgage market has
been a major factor in creating a vibrant national housing economy. It
expands the money available for housing purchases, allowing capital
to flow indirectly into real estate from investors who would never
consider direct mortgage lending. It permits the flow of funds from
capital-rich areas of the nation to areas in which a larger amount of
real estate investment capital is needed. It gives mortgage borrowers
access to money at highly competitive interest rates.37
33. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 653–54.
34. Id. at 658–67; see also id. at 667–88 (describing California’s antideficiency scheme).
35. Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause for the New Millenium: “Yes” to Broad
Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; “No” to Federal Legislation on Social and
Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (2003).
36. JAMES L. BOTHWELL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES:
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEVERING GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP 3–4 (1996).
37. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 864–76 (describing the
functioning and impact of the secondary mortgage market).
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However, “there can be no doubt that legal differences from
state to state act as a serious impediment to the carrying out of these
38
business arrangements.” For example, when a default occurs in a
pool mortgage, the speed and efficiency with which the mortgaged
real estate is liquidated depends on its geographic location. Thus, if
the mortgage is on Texas land, where foreclosure is by power of sale
39
and occurs quickly, the money will be returned to the pool promptly
and inexpensively. On the other hand, if the mortgaged real estate is
in Kansas, where foreclosure is by a costly and cumbersome judicial
action,40 the expense to the pool is increased.
A similar situation exists with respect to deficiency judgments. If
relatively affluent Missouri mortgagors see the value of their houses
drop substantially, they face the prospect of a deficiency judgment if a
foreclosure sale yields less than the mortgage obligation. Their
counterparts in California, however, are immune from such deficiency
41
judgments because of California’s antideficiency legislation. These
legal disparities may have a significant impact on the loan size of
individual pool mortgages and the interest yields that investors are
willing to accept when they purchase mortgage-backed securities.42
C. Efforts to Achieve Uniformity
The past eight decades have witnessed at least four major efforts
to achieve uniformity in mortgage foreclosure law. First, the
Conference promulgated three acts designed to achieve uniformity in
mortgage foreclosure, but which proved unsuccessful.43 Second, in
1997 the American Law Institute created the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Mortgages, which seeks to unify a wide variety of mortgage
law substance and procedure.44 Third, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
the two largest federally sponsored secondary market institutions,
published dozens of note and mortgage forms aimed at creating
uniformity through contract law.45 Finally, over the past three decades
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES 3 (1997).
39. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State
and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 266 (1998) (charting the time required to
complete a foreclosure).
40. Id. at 260.
41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 421–25 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part I.C.1.
44. See infra Part I.C.2.
45. See infra Part I.C.3.
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Congress has legislated on a wide variety of substantive and
46
procedural mortgage law issues. However, these attempts at
uniformity, as we demonstrate in the remainder of this section, have
at best been only modestly successful.
1. The Uniform Laws Approach. Although there have been
several attempts to achieve mortgage law uniformity through state
legislative adoption of uniform acts, such attempts have been
singularly unsuccessful. In 1927 the Conference promulgated the
Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act; in 1940 the Conference proposed
47
the Model Power of Sale Foreclosure Act. Not a single state adopted
48
either proposal. A similar fate befell more recent initiatives by the
Conference to achieve uniformity in state real estate security law,
49
such as the 1985 Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA).
Intended to be the real estate equivalent of Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) Article 9 for personalty, it received a good deal of
scholarly attention and praise.50 Under ULSIA the preferred

46.
47.

See infra Part I.C.4.
Harold L. Reeve, The New Proposal for a Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 564, 570 (Autumn 1938); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity:
Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial
Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1278 (1991); Jo Anne Bradner, Comment, The Secondary
Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J. 971, 1001 n.139
(1987). Moreover, the Central Housing Committee, a federally sponsored entity, proposed a
revised Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act in 1937 that was equally unsuccessful. See ROBERT
H. SKILTON, GOVERNMENT AND THE MORTGAGE DEBTOR (1929 TO 1939) 203–04 (1944).
48. SKILTON, supra note 47, at 204.
49. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT §§ 101–604, 7A U.L.A. 403 (1999). ULSIA was carved
out of an earlier effort of the Conference, the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA),
adopted by the Conference in 1975. Id. prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 404. As with the preceding
model acts, no state adopted ULSIA.
50. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected Party: Evolution or Revolution?, 24
CONN. L. REV. 971, 998 (1992) (“A protected party, in the event of default, enjoys several
distinct advantages under ULSIA.”); Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA’s Remedies on Default—Worth
the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1992) (“Overall . . . ULSIA did not present an easy
road map to follow.”); Marc B. Friedman, Rentals Roulette: The Mortgagee’s Rights to Rent
Under Connecticut Law and ULSIA, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1992) (“ULSIA . . . presents
a code-oriented approach that would fill many gaps that may exist in a particular state’s
common and statutory law.”); Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land
Security Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289, 292 (1995) (“ULSIA . . . holds the
promise of accomplishing for the law of real estate mortgage security what the Uniform
Commercial Code has already accomplished so well for commercial law.”); Patrick A.
Randolph, Jr., The Future of American Real Estate Law: Uniform Foreclosure Laws and
Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1996) (“The Uniform Land
Security Interest Act (ULSIA) is an idea whose time has come.”).
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51
foreclosure method was by power of sale. Only “protected parties”
(residential borrowers) were immune from deficiency judgments, and
statutory redemption was abolished for all mortgagors, protected or
otherwise.52 However, ULSIA proved to be a dismal political failure;
no state adopted it.

2. The Restatement Approach. The American Law Institute’s
recent attempt to achieve uniformity in the law of mortgages has been
marginally more successful. The Restatement (Third) of Property:
Mortgages, promulgated by the Institute in 1997, seeks to “unif[y] the
law of real property security by identifying and articulating legal rules
that will meet the legitimate needs of the lending industry while at the
53
same time providing reasonable protection for borrowers.” Indeed,
in the past several years numerous state courts have adopted various
provisions of the Restatement.54 However, because state court
adoption of Restatement provisions is voluntary and depends on
litigation, achieving national uniformity via this route is a difficult,
painfully slow, piecemeal process. Moreover, even courts that are
willing to follow the Restatement can do nothing about existing state
51. See ULSIA prefatory note & § 509, 7A U.L.A. 406, 464–65 (stating that the ULSIA will
“facilitate the sale and resale of secured real estate loans”).
52. See id. § 113, 7A U.L.A. 425–27 (defining “protected party”); id. § 511, 7A U.L.A. 468–
69 (prohibiting deficiency judgments against protected parties); id. § 513 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 471–
72 (no right of statutory redemption).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES 3 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Land Holdings (St. Thomas) Ltd. v. Mega Holdings, Inc., No. 1998-078, 1999
WL 1044836 (D.V.I. Nov. 8, 1999), aff’d, 283 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 2002) (adopting Restatement
section 8.5—merger); Krohn v. Sweetheart Props., Ltd., 52 P.3d 774, 783 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc)
(adopting Restatement section 8.3—adequacy of foreclosure price); Lamb Excavation v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.2d 542, 545–48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (adopting Restatement
section 7.6—subrogation); New Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. 1998)
(adopting Restatement section 8.6—marshaling); E. Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331,
334 (Mass. 1998) (adopting Restatement section 7.6(a)—subrogation); Cadle Co. v. Bourgeois,
821 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003) (adopting Restatement section 5.1, cmt. 1—land remains
encumbered when transferred); Westmark Commercial Mortgage Fund IV v. Teneform
Assocs., 827 A.2d 1154, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (adopting Restatement section
6.2, cmt. c—prepayment); Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665, 670 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (adopting
Restatement section 7.3—mortgage modification and subrogation). Many other courts have
cited provisions of the Restatement favorably without formally adopting them. See, e.g., Hanley
v. Pearson, 61 P.3d 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Restatement section 7.4—surplus); In re
Smink, 276 B.R. 156, 163–64 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2001) (citing Restatement section 2.4—dragnet
clauses); Burney v. McGlaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223, 231–32 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Restatement section 7.3—mortgage modification); Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d
576, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Restatement section 7.6—subrogation); Coleman v.
Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Restatement section 4.1—duty of care of
a mortgagee in possession).

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

1410

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1399

statutes that impose inefficiencies and eccentric rules on the
foreclosure process.
3. Uniformity through Contract. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac have sought to create mortgage law uniformity through the law
of contract. Both entities promulgate mortgage and note forms and
mandate their use by lenders who wish to sell their mortgage loans to
55
either of these secondary market enterprises. Although Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac use distinct forms containing language uniquely
applicable to each state, every state’s form incorporates twenty-one
uniform provisions.56 These “Uniform Mortgage and Deed of Trust
Covenants” have undeniably created a great deal of nationwide
uniformity in a variety of substantive mortgage law contexts.
For example, these forms have been highly effective in
promoting the use of nationally consistent language in the casualty
insurance context. State default rules governing whether the lender or
the mortgagor controls the disposition of insurance proceeds after a
casualty loss are in substantial conflict. Absent specific language in
the mortgage, many states give the lender the right to prepay the
57
mortgage obligation with insurance proceeds, whereas other states
generally allow the mortgagor to use the proceeds to rebuild unless
58
the lender’s security would be impaired. On the other hand, the

55. An example of such a form can be found in GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 1201 (6th ed. 2003).
56. See id. at 1204–18 (“The Uniform Covenants (clauses 1 through 21) reproduced below
are contained in all Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac single-family mortgages and deeds of trust, and
serve to foster national uniformity.”).
57. See, e.g., First State Bank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 840 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1992) (holding that insurance proceeds are payable to the lender unless the lender agreed
to use the proceeds for repairs); English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) (declining
to adopt the “novel” concept of good faith and fair dealing to diminish the lender’s contractual
right to prepay the mortgage obligation); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 168–69
(stating that a mortgagor makes a strong argument for restoration of the property because the
mortgagee’s security will be completely protected).
58. See, e.g., Schoolcraft v. Ross, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57, 58 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the
insurance proceeds should be used to rebuild because the rebuilding would not impair security,
notwithstanding mortgage language giving the mortgagee the option to prepay the mortgage
obligation); Starkman v. Sigmond, 446 A.2d 1249, 1250 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (stating
that where the mortgage is silent as to rebuilding, the mortgagor has the right to use insurance
proceeds to rebuild unless security would be impaired); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES § 4.7(b) (1997) (weighing whether or not courts should permit insurance proceeds
to be used for rebuilding); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 168–69 (noting that “the
mortgagor has a strong argument for application of the insurance proceeds to rebuild to
mortgaged premises” in the “absence of specific mortgage language governing casualty loss”).
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Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform covenant language mandates that
the insurance proceeds “shall be applied to restoration or repair of
the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and
59
Lender’s security is not lessened.” Because the use of these forms in
residential transactions is pervasive, the foregoing language has
become a national norm.
However, there are clear limits to this contract law approach.
Uniformity can be achieved only to the extent that state law permits
lenders and borrowers to vary state mortgage law by agreement. On
matters affecting foreclosure, such as method of sale, deficiency
judgments, and statutory redemption, statutes generally govern and
state courts are unwilling to permit the parties to use form language
to avoid the impact of state law.60
4. Congressional Preemption. Beginning in the late 1960s,
Congress became actively involved in promoting mortgage law
uniformity. In 1973 the Nixon administration proposed the adoption
of the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act as part of the Housing Act
61
of 1973. Under this far-reaching proposal, foreclosure by power of
sale would have been mandated for any mortgage made, owned,
62
insured, or guaranteed by any federal instrumentality. Moreover, the
proposal would have invalidated state statutory redemption rights.63
This effort failed to win congressional approval.64
During this same period, however, Congress enacted two pieces
of federal legislation that focused on specific consumer issues
affecting residential borrowers. The first of these statutes, the Truth-

59. E.g., FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3001, ALABAMA—SINGLE FAMILY—FANNIE
MAE/FREDDIE MAC UNIFORM INSTRUMENT cl. 5 (instrument rev. Jan. 2001), available at
http://www.efanniemae.com/singlefamily/pdf/3001.pdf.
60. See, e.g., DeBerard Props. v. Lim, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 293 (1999) (holding that the
statutory protection against deficiency judgments could not be waived by a contract purporting
to waive such protection as consideration for new contract terms); Freedland v. Greco, 289 P.2d
463, 467–68 (Cal. 1955) (in bank) (holding that a prohibition on purchase money mortgage
deficiency judgments could not be contractually waived in advance of or at the time that the
obligation was incurred); Brunsoman v. Scarlett, 465 N.W.2d 162, 168–69 (N.D. 1991)
(concluding that rights under antideficiency judgment statutes were not subject to contractual
waiver before default).
61. See S. 2507, 93d Cong. §§ 401–419 (1973), reprinted in ADMINISTRATION'S 1973
HOUSING PROPOSALS, HEARINGS, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, ON S. 2490, S.
2507, AND S. 2508, OCTOBER 2, 3, AND 4, 1973, at 394 (1973).
62. Id. § 404.
63. Id. § 415(d).
64. Schill, supra note 47, at 1282.
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65
in-Lending Act of 1968, mandates that lenders disclose to home
borrowers a wide variety of information including the amount of the
loan, the finance charges stated in terms of “the annual percentage
rate,” the payment schedule, delinquency charges, and prepayment
penalties.66 The second statute, the Real Estate Settlement and
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA)67 requires lenders in federally
related mortgage loans to deliver to mortgagors, prior to settlement,
forms detailing all charges that the mortgagor will incur at the
settlement or closing of the home loan transaction.68 It also regulates
the amounts that borrowers are required to pay into mortgage escrow
69
accounts. Finally, RESPA restricts the payment of fees and
“kickbacks” in connection with settlement services.70 Neither of these
statutes, however, significantly supplants state law.
In the 1980s, Congress went further, adopting three statutes that
preempt state mortgage law in a direct and forceful manner. Each
statute was the product of the extremely high interest rates and the
crisis that afflicted savings and loan associations during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The first, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
71
and Monetary Control Act, made effective in 1980, preempted state
usury laws for all federally related loans secured by first liens on
residential real estate. This law, which was aimed especially at
preempting usury limitations that were enshrined in state
constitutions and were thus impervious to legislative change, affected
interest rate ceilings and restrictions on discount points and other
finance charges.72
Second, Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain Depository
73
Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St. Germain) rendering enforceable

65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2000).
66. Id. § 1638.
67. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2000).
68. Id. §§ 2603–2604. The definition of “federally related” loan, located at section 2602(1),
is so broad that it encompasses virtually all home mortgage loan transactions. Schill, supra note
47, at 1283.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 2609.
70. Id. § 2607(a).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (2000). Regulations issued under this statute are found in 12 C.F.R.
§ 590.
72. See id. § 1735f-7a (concerning laws limiting mortgage interest, discount points, and
finance charges).
73. Id. § 1701j-3. See generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Congressional
Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35
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the due-on-sale clause—a pervasively used mortgage provision
enabling a lender to accelerate the debt and foreclose if the real
estate is transferred without the lender’s permission. Prior to the
enactment of Garn-St. Germain, conflicting state case law and
legislation had created enormous turmoil over due-on-sale
enforcement.74 Congress directly intervened to preempt (with certain
75
minor exceptions) this state law labyrinth.
76
The Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982
(AMTPA) was the third prong of this preemptive effort. It authorized
state-chartered financial institutions to make mortgage loans using
alternative formats (such as adjustable rate, graduated payment, and
reverse annuity mortgages) that were approved by federal regulatory
agencies for federally chartered lenders, even though such loans
would otherwise violate state law.77 AMTPA was designed to equalize
federal and state institutions’ powers to experiment with new
mortgage formats. Ironically, several federal decisions have gone
beyond this equalizing principle to hold that all aspects of alternative
mortgages, including features having nothing to do with their
“alternative” character, are preempted from state regulation.78
In 1995 Congress considered but, as in 1973, failed to enact a
comprehensive statute that would have authorized foreclosure by
79
power of sale for all federally owned, insured, or guaranteed loans.
Nonetheless, the 1980s and 1990s saw the enactment of two less
sweeping federal foreclosure statutes. Each provides for nonjudicial
foreclosure of residential mortgages held by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Multifamily
Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 198180 (Multifamily Act) authorizes
HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1983) (discussing mortgage transfer restrictions before and after Garn-St.
Germain).
74. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 326–27, 331–32 (describing judicial
approaches to dealing with due-on-sale clauses and state limitations on due-on-sale clauses).
75. Id. at 335–56.
76. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3806. The applicable regulations are found in 12 C.F.R. § 560.220.
77. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 905–08.
78. See Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. Face, 239 F.3d 633, 640 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a Virginia limitation on the imposition of prepayment penalties was preempted);
Shinn v. Encore Mortgage Servs., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that
AMTPA preempted a New Jersey limitation of prepayment charges). But see Glukowsky v.
Equity One, Inc., 821 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that a 1996 federal
regulation authorizing state-chartered lenders to impose prepayment charges was ultra vires).
79. See Patrick A. Randolph, The New Federal Foreclosure Laws, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 123,
123–26 (1996) (reciting the scope of the 1995 “Federal Foreclosure Bill”).
80. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3717 (2000).
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nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure for federally insured and certain
other mortgages on property other than one-to-four-family dwellings
held by the secretary of HUD. The Single Family Mortgage
81
Foreclosure Act of 1994 (Single Family Act) does the same for
HUD-held mortgages on one-to-four-family residences. The two acts
are substantially similar, and both preempt state antideficiency and
statutory redemption legislation.82 Regulations implementing both
acts were consolidated into one regulation in 1996.83
A nonjudicial foreclosure procedure employing a power of sale
may be utilized under the Multifamily Act and Single Family Act
even though the mortgage contains no express power of sale.
Following a default and an affirmative decision to foreclose, the
HUD secretary designates a commissioner to conduct the foreclosure
and sale. Foreclosure is initiated by the service of a notice of default
and foreclosure sale containing information concerning the property
84
being foreclosed, the date and place of sale, and related information.
This notice must be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks and posted on the property for at least seven days prior to the
sale.85 In addition, it must be sent by certified mail, return receipt
requested, at least twenty-one days before the date of the foreclosure
sale; delivery must be made to the original mortgagor, to those liable
on the mortgage debt, to the “owner” of the property and, at least ten
days before the sale, to all persons having liens thereon.86 Neither the
acts nor the regulations require mailed notice to lessees, holders of
easements, and others holding interests junior to the mortgage being
foreclosed. Although the acts themselves do not mandate a hearing,
the regulations require one with respect to multifamily foreclosures:
“HUD will provide to the mortgagor [and current owner] an
opportunity informally to present reasons why the mortgage should
not be foreclosed. Such opportunity may be provided before or after

81. Id. §§ 3751–3758.
82. See Randolph, supra note 79, at 126 (describing the parallels between these two
foreclosure laws for HUD loans); Stark, supra note 39, at 238–40 (summarizing the two
preemptive federal foreclosure laws and Congress’s motivations for creating them).
83. 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.1–27.123 (2004).
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3706, 3757; Nonjudicial Foreclosure of Multifamily and Single Family
Mortgages, 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.15, 27.103 (2003).
85. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3708, 3758(3).
86. Id. §§ 3708(1), 3758(1)–(2).

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1415

the designation of the foreclosure commissioner but before service of
87
the notice of default and foreclosure.”
One should not overemphasize these federal efforts to foster
uniformity. Mortgage law, and especially the rules governing
foreclosure, remains largely the province of the states. Local
divergence is still the norm. Moreover, nearly all states are saddled
with a method of property disposition that is largely ineffective and
wasteful—the auction.
II. THE FORECLOSURE SALE
In the great majority of United States jurisdictions, foreclosure—
both judicial and nonjudicial—is conducted by means of a public
auction.88 The prevalence of auctions in itself raises questions, given
that auctions are not a common way of arranging arms-length market
sales of real estate in the United States. In this Part we examine the
auction’s effectiveness as a mechanism for disposing of foreclosed
real estate. In doing so, we consider the economic theory of auctions,
the uses of auctions outside the foreclosure context, the particular
limitations on the effectiveness of auctions in the foreclosure
situation, and the results of two important empirical studies of
foreclosure auctions. All of these considerations point to the
conclusion that auctions are a relatively inefficient method of
property disposition in foreclosure.
We then turn to the methods of property disposition authorized
by UNFA, which continues to permit auction foreclosures but
introduces two new methods—foreclosure by negotiated sale and
foreclosure by appraisal. We consider the ways in which UNFA
attempts to improve the effectiveness of foreclosure auctions—
attempts that are worthwhile, but with a beneficial impact constrained
by the inherent characteristics of auctions and by political factors.
More importantly, we consider the advantages as well as the
limitations that inhere in UNFA’s two new methods of foreclosure.
We conclude that these methods have the potential to revolutionize

87. 24 C.F.R. § 27.5(b). For an analysis of the Multifamily Act and Single Family Act and
post-1994 congressional attempts to expand their coverage to other federally held mortgages,
see Randolph, supra note 79, at 123.
88. The principal exceptions are Connecticut and Vermont, where “strict foreclosure,” in
which the mortgagee simply takes title to the security property, is common. NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 555.
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foreclosure, producing higher prices and thus benefiting both lenders
and borrowers.
A. The Status Quo: The Auction Sale and Its Alternatives
1. What’s Wrong with Auctions? The traditional foreclosure
auction has two functions: first, to evaluate the property for the
purpose of determining whether the debtor and subordinate
lienholders are entitled to a surplus or whether the debtor owes a
deficiency; and second, to liquidate the property by passing title to
the highest bidder at the sale.
The sort of auction employed in foreclosure sales in the United
89
States is often termed the “English auction,” and is characterized by
the following features. Bidders physically congregate in a single
location. They call their bids orally, so that each bidder is
immediately aware of the bids of others. Bids move progressively
upward. An individual may bid multiple times, and the sale is
awarded to the highest bidder. In an English auction, the selling price
is determined by the opinion of value of the second highest bidder—
the runner-up. This follows from the fact that the second highest
bidder, by definition, has decided not to continue bidding upward,
suggesting that the penultimate bid reflects the limit of the runner-up
bidder’s opinion of the auction property’s value. The highest bidder
need bid only a nominal amount—say, one dollar—above the runnerup’s top bid to take the property, even if the highest bidder’s opinion
of the property’s value is much greater than that amount.
Selling real estate by means of an English auction has certain
undeniable advantages to both sellers and buyers. From the seller’s
viewpoint, auctions are quick, avoiding the delay in receiving the sale
proceeds that would result from a lengthy marketing period. This
rapidity can drastically reduce carrying costs—property taxes,
insurance, security, management expense, and, most significantly, the
loss of income from the seller’s capital if the property is vacant or is

89. See Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive
Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1089–90 (1982) (defining the “English auction”). The
material describing the economic aspects of auctions in this Article appeared in a somewhat
different form in Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American Perspective, 15
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35 (2001).
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90
producing only a below-market income. Moreover, if there are
numerous well-informed bidders, even a seller who is relatively
uninformed or ignorant of market conditions can expect to obtain a
reasonable price. From the buyer’s viewpoint, auctions reduce the
period of indeterminacy. Assuming that any reserve price has been
met, the seller cannot withdraw or renege on the transaction once the
bidding begins, and buyers will learn quickly whether their bids are
acceptable.
Despite these advantages, there are numerous reasons that
English auctions typically result in below-market prices. An English
auction must, by its nature, occur at a given point in time; hence its
exposure of the property to the market is inherently limited to the
91
potential buyers who are active on the date of the auction. By
contrast, a negotiated sale typically results from the marketing of the
property over some period of time—often several weeks or months.
Because prospective buyers may enter or leave the market at random
intervals, a longer marketing time is likely to result in exposure to
more potential buyers, and thus to a higher probable price.92
Moreover, in a small market or one that is already glutted by
oversupply, an auction in which a large number of properties is
offered may itself depress prices as a consequence of the increase in
supply resulting from dumping the entire auction inventory on the

90. See Alan R. Kravets, Going, Going, Gone! Real Estate Auctions in the 90s, PROB. &
PROP., May–June 1993, at 38, 40 (“Auctions produce savings . . . [that] can be dramatic and
usually exceed the marketing costs.”).
91. In recent years, there has been some experimentation with auctions of real estate by
means of the internet. See Gus G. Sentementes, Web Auctions Have Homes to Sell: Going,
Going: Several Dot-Com Companies See a Future in Selling Real Estate via Bidding Through the
Internet, BALT. SUN, Oct. 22, 2000, at L1 (“Buying items—from collectibles to cars—through an
online auction is nothing new to web surfers interested in the thrill of going against other cyber
bidders.”); Jackie Spinner, Uncle Sam Gets Web Auction Bug; GSA Finds Public Ready and
Willing to Buy Surplus Real Estate Online, WASH. POST, June 12, 2001, at E1 (“The
government . . . has added a new and potentially huge new market by advertising and even
selling [its surplus] property online, borrowing from the popularity of commercial auction sites
such as eBay.”). Examples of such on-line auction websites include Bid4Assets,
http://www.bid4assets.com (last visited May 24, 2004), and Real Auction Referral,
http://www.realauctionreferral.com/realestate.html (last visited May 24, 2004). There is some a
priori reason to expect that this approach will produce higher prices than in-person auctions,
because an on-line auction can be conducted over several days or weeks, rather than occurring
on a single day, thus exposing the properties to a larger set of prospective buyers.
92. There is evidence that, even with negotiated sales, longer periods of time on the market
are associated with higher prices paid. See John D. Benjamin et al., What Do We Know About
Real Estate Brokerage?, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 6, 14–16 (2000) (summarizing the results of
studies of the relationship between brokerage participation, time on the market, and price).
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93
market in a single day. This effect may occur in locales where all
foreclosure sales are customarily (or by law) conducted on the same
day of the week or month.
Auctions also carry an undesirably negative connotation about
the property being sold. In the United States, auctions have
historically been associated in the public mind with distress sales.
Most auctions in America result from mortgage foreclosures,
judgment sales, property tax sales, bankruptcy sales, and estate sales.
Well-publicized auctions have also been held in recent years by the
Resolution Trust Corporation, which was responsible for liquidating
the assets of insolvent savings and loan associations from 1989 to
1997,94 and by HUD, which holds an inventory of foreclosed houses
whose owners have defaulted on mortgage loans insured by the
Federal Housing Administration.95 These, too, are examples of
distress sales, and the properties involved were and (in the case of
HUD) are often of less than stellar quality.
There are exceptions, of course; auctions have occasionally been
96
used in the United States to market unique, high-value real estate,
or to market large quantities of subdivision houses or condominium

93. See Martin Ginsburg, The New Wave of Auctioning Will Not Wash in a Soft Market,
REAL EST. FIN. J., Winter 1991, at 72, 73 (“Flooding the market with a large quantity of units
when buyers are hesitant must drive down prices.”); see also Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the
Performance of Real Estate Auctions, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 41, 55 (1998) (postulating that singlesite auctions might draw lower prices than scattered-site auctions because of the concentration
of preferences in a single sale site).
94. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE 1980–94, at 1 (1998) (examining “the challenges faced by the FDIC and the RTC
in resolving troubled banks and thrifts during the financial crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s”).
For an overview of the events leading to the creation of the RTC, see Jerry W. Markham,
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 247 (2000). See generally
Edward L. Rubin, Communing with Disaster: What We Can Learn from the Jusen and the
Savings and Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 79 (1997) (discussing implications of
the savings and loan crisis).
95. See Marcus T. Allen, Discounts in Real Estate Auction Prices: Evidence from South
Florida, 69 APPRAISAL J. 38, 39 (2001) (“As a result of foreclosures, HUD frequently assumes
ownership and possession of properties pledged as collateral for FHA-insured mortgage
loans.”); Marcus T. Allen & Judith Swisher, An Analysis of the Price Formation Process at a
HUD Auction, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 279, 281 (2000) (drawing the same conclusion).
96. Larry Finley, Under the Gavel, Real Estate Auctions Play Big Role in Builder Closeouts
and Bankruptcies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 28, 2000, at N1 (describing the auction of a 5,000square-foot home, valued at $3 million and located on a private island); Jim Szymanski, Going
Once, Going Twice Real Estate: Banking on a New Trend, Edgewood Estate Is on the Auction
Block, After Six Months with a Realtor, TACOMA MORNING NEWS TRIB., Feb. 23, 2001, at D1
(describing the auction of a 17,000-square-foot estate valued at $2 million).
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units in extremely high-demand market conditions. Nonetheless,
auctions generally have the reputation in America for offering
properties that are substandard or problematic, and that may not be
of interest to a broad segment of the market. This reputation per se
may discourage some prospective buyers from participating. It is
particularly likely to be a strong factor in the minds of bidders at
foreclosure auctions, because it is well recognized that properties
being foreclosed may have been poorly maintained by their former
owners, vandalized, or gutted.
The standardization98 of the auction transaction can also
discourage potential buyers. For example, seller financing is difficult
to arrange in an auction. There is no opportunity to engage in face-toface negotiation of the financing or to tailor it to the needs and
qualifications of an individual buyer. Hence, unless the seller is
willing to negotiate and announce a prearranged financing package,
bidders will need to arrange their own financing.99
In addition, auctions usually call for the successful bidder to
100
make a substantial deposit —as much as 10 to 20 percent of the total
97. See Randyl Drummer, Real Estate & Retail: Internet Auction Set for Kaufman & Broad
Homes, CAL. BUS. PRESS, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10 (relating the sale of sixty-five new houses in
southern California by internet auction); see also Auctions are Growing in Popularity Again,
with Benefits for Both Developers and Home Buyers: Property Auctions Back in Vogue,
BANGKOK POST, Apr. 19, 2001 (describing the rising popularity of property auctions in
Bangkok); Ryland Sizzles in Bay Area Home Auctions with $10.8 Million in Sales, P.R.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 16, 2000 (describing the successful online auction of fourteen new houses in a
highly desirable location in California’s Bay Area for an average of $771,300, nearly $25,000
more than the average asking price).
98. See Kravets, supra note 90, at 41 (“What contingencies can a prospective purchaser put
into the sales contract? None. The prospective purchaser does not have the ability to
renegotiate the sales contract. This is why the sales agreement drafted by the seller has to be fair
and commercially reasonable.”). Of course, in a foreclosure auction—as opposed to a
commercially arranged auction—there are no meaningful contract “terms,” and hence much less
protection for bidders.
99. Steven L. Good & Sheldon Gottlieb, Real Estate Auctions: A Guide for the Seller’s
Lawyer, PROB. & PROP., Sept.–Oct. 1988, at 41.
100. For example, bidders purchasing at U.S. Treasury sales are usually required to make a
deposit of 20 percent of the bid at the time of sale, although some auctions require full payment
within one hour of the completion of the sale. See http://www.treas.gov/auctions/irs/index.html,
(last visited Oct. 5, 2004) (on file with the authors). Private auctioneers commonly require a 10
percent deposit on the day of sale. E.g., HIGGENBOTHAM AUCTIONEERS INT’L, LTD, INC.,
HOW TO BID, at http://www.higgenbotham.com/how-bid.asp (last visited May 24, 2004) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal); see also A.J. BILLIG & CO., UPCOMING AUCTIONS, at
http://www.ajbillig.com/upcoming_auctions.html (last visited May 24, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (listing upcoming auctions, each of which requires, payable at the time of
the auction, a specified deposit of up to 10 percent of the purchase price, payable within twentyfour hours after the auction). Mortgage foreclosure auctions may also require a substantial
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price—on the auction date, and to pay the remainder of the price
within a short time. The deposit must typically be in “good funds,”
and a personal check is unlikely to be acceptable. Thus, the bidders
must come to the auction armed with letters of credit, cashiers’
checks, or the like, and must have prearranged financing for the rest
of the price. This preparation is a considerable effort for a bidder, an
effort that may be hard to justify in light of the fact that no individual
bidder has any assurance of prevailing at the auction. Hence, only
professionals or dedicated and knowledgeable amateurs are likely to
bid.
The standardized, “cookie-cutter” nature of auctions, and
particularly foreclosure auctions, argues especially strongly against
their use for properties in which individual negotiation is desirable to
deal with idiosyncratic problems. For example, if the property is in
poor physical condition, has structural problems, or is contaminated
by hazardous waste, an auction provides no way for an individual
buyer to arrange for inspections or engineering studies, the creation
of an escrowed fund to cover the costs of remediation, or other
101
creative solutions. In these idiosyncratic situations, one would
expect foreclosure auctions to perform even worse than ordinary
auctions in terms of price maximization, because bidders must build
worst-case estimates of future expenses into their bids.
2. The Special Problems of Foreclosure Auctions. If the goal of a
sale is to achieve a market price, selling real estate by auction is, as
the previous discussion has illustrated, inherently problematic.
However, foreclosure auctions, as they operate in the United States,
introduce a new and additional set of problems and barriers, making
the realization of a market price even less likely. A comparison of

deposit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-810(A) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring a deposit of
$1,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(A)(2) (Michie 2003) (requiring a deposit of 10 percent of the
amount bid). However, a number of states require full payment of the bid at the conclusion of
the sale, a feature that further chills the interest of nonprofessional bidders. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2924h(b) (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(9) (Michie 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-1-27(1)(a) (Supp. 2004).
101. Kenneth M. Lusht, A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private
Negotiations, 24 REAL EST. ECON. 517, 527 (1996); cf. Mayer, supra note 93, at 53–58 (finding
that single-site auctions, typically involving clustered groups of new or relatively new houses,
resulted in discounts below expected negotiated sale prices—discounts that were much smaller
than those obtained in scattered-site auctions involving older, more heterogenous groups of
houses).
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foreclosure auctions with commercial auctions will illustrate these
problems.
In a commercial auction, the seller will often prearrange
financing and make it available to purchasers. This sort of
arrangement is not foolproof; the financing might not be the best
available to some bidders, and in all events the successful bidder will
need to qualify under the credit standards of the prearranged lender.
Even so, prearranged financing clearly can make the auction more
attractive for many prospective bidders. Foreclosure auctions do not
provide this advantage; bidders must arrange their own financing,
which may require a significant investment of time and effort. This
investment may be a significant barrier to bidding, given the
uncertainty of any individual’s becoming the successful buyer.
It is essential that buyers have adequate information about the
property being sold if market price is to be achieved. Sellers who use
commercial auction sales recognize this fact, and generally provide
very extensive disclosures of information, termed “bid packages,” to
prospective bidders. Such packages may include engineering and
architectural reports on the buildings and their systems, detailed plans
and surveys, environmental audits, and the like. This information
encourages higher bids because it tends to reduce the level of
uncertainty that bidders experience.
Foreclosure auctions offer no such advantage. In foreclosure
auctions, bidders often know virtually nothing about the property
102
beyond what can be seen from the public streets. Foreclosing
lenders may or may not possess additional information about the
property—appraisals and environmental audits, for example—but
they have no duty to distribute such information to prospective
bidders and may well be reluctant to do so because of concern that
they will be held liable for errors in the information. This reluctance
is understandable, particularly because the foreclosing lender is not
the owner and typically has not been in possession of the property.
Hence the lender has no simple means of verifying that the
information in its files, even if originally accurate, remains accurate at
the time of sale.
Commercial auctions are usually accompanied by ample
opportunity for prospective bidders to view the property, including
102. Occasionally, prospective bidders may be allowed to inspect a property near prior to
foreclosure, but in many cases the mortgagor will still be in possession and will have no interest
in facilitating such an inspection process.
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the interior of the buildings, and perhaps even to conduct their own
technical inspections. Furthermore, in addition to offering
information, commercial auction sellers may provide express
warranties about the condition of the property. This is particularly
true in auctions of new houses or condominium units.
Because arms-length negotiated sales of new residential
properties are commonly accompanied by express warranties of
quality, commercial auction sellers realize that they too must provide
such warranties if they are to realize market prices. Once again,
foreclosure auctions provide no similar protections. In a foreclosure
auction, the property is always offered “as is, where is,” with no
liability to the buyer on anyone’s part if the property turns out to be
defective.
The same is true with respect to the condition of the property’s
title. In a commercial auction, the “bid package” will routinely
include a copy of a title report on the property, showing existing
easements, covenants, and other encumbrances. This report will
usually serve as an advance commitment from a title insurance agency
to provide actual title insurance policies to the successful bidder and
any mortgage lender financing the purchase. In many areas of the
nation, the seller, again conforming to the practice in negotiated sales,
will pay for a title insurance policy for the successful bidder.
No similar advantages are available in foreclosure auctions.
Prudent bidders at a foreclosure auction must obtain a title report
and title insurance commitment in advance of the sale; otherwise,
they may be unaware of encumbrances that could seriously and
adversely affect the property’s value.103 Indeed, it seems that every
year a few inexperienced bidders buy real estate at foreclosure sales
without realizing that the property is subject to a mortgage or lien
senior to the mortgage being foreclosed. From the buyer’s viewpoint
this situation is an unmitigated disaster, because as a practical matter
the property’s value is reduced by the sum necessary to discharge the
prior lien. This is one reason, among many, that amateurs should and
generally do stay away from foreclosure sales, leaving them to
experienced professional speculators. As a result, however, the size of
the buyer market is limited and prices are to some extent suppressed.

103. See Carteret Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Davis, 521 A.2d 831, 835 (N.J. 1987) (“It is likely
that the low turnout of third parties who actually buy property at foreclosure sales reflects a
general conclusion that the risks of acquiring an imperfect title are often too high.”).
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In sum, it would be difficult to design a sale procedure less apt to
result in market prices than the usual foreclosure auction. The
absence of so many features that buyers in negotiated sales have
come to expect virtually ensures that below-market prices will prevail.
One might wonder why mortgage lenders have not exercised their
political power to improve the process. After all, the lender is better
off if the price is higher, at least up to the amount of the mortgage
debt. However, lenders long ago stopped viewing foreclosure sales as
a way of liquidating the properties on which they hold mortgages.
From the lender’s viewpoint, the sale’s function is, in the great bulk of
cases, simply to place the property’s title in the lender’s hands. Such
properties become “real estate owned” (“REO” in industry parlance)
to lenders, and they can then concentrate on liquidating the
properties by conventional arms-length negotiated sales using such
conventional methods as newspaper display advertisements and
listings with real estate brokers.
How does the lender get title at a foreclosure sale? In most cases,
the lender simply bids the amount of the mortgage debt (including
accrued interest, any late fees, and the costs and expenses of the
foreclosure process). If no higher bid materializes, the lender will
acquire title without expending any new money at all. Such bids,
commonly called “full credit bids,” are cost-free to lenders; the bid is
a “wash,” going out of one pocket of the lender and back into
another. If a third-party bidder outbids the lender’s full credit bid, the
lender is generally delighted, for this means that the lender’s debt will
be paid in full and the lender will be spared the trouble of liquidating
the property. However, in most cases there are no third-party bids,
and the lender acquires title.104 Occasionally the lender may believe
that the property’s value significantly exceeds the debt, so that buying
the property for a bit more than the debt seems to present an
attractive speculative opportunity. In such cases, the lender may bid
more than the full amount of the debt if there is competitive bidding.
But most lenders are not speculators, and if they can recover their full

104. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and
Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 656–57,
663 (1997) (stating that the mortgagee was the successful bidder in 88.8 percent of 1993 judicial
sales and 90.4 percent of 1994 judicial sales in Cook County, Illinois); Steven Wechsler, Through
the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure—An Empirical Study of
Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 874–75 (1985) (stating
that the mortgagee was the successful bidder in 77 percent of all sales in a sample of 118
foreclosures in Syracuse, New York in 1979).
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investment, including interest and costs, they are content to leave the
future remarketing of the property to someone else.
Thus, up to the amount of the secured debt, lenders generally do
not care whether third parties bid at foreclosure sales. In a large
majority of cases, foreclosure does not liquidate the property at all,
serving merely to transfer title to the lender as a prelude to
105
subsequent liquidation efforts.
It might not be immediately obvious why this process should
necessarily disfavor borrowers and subordinate lienholders. It is quite
common, of course, for the market value of the security property to
exceed the mortgage debt by a significant margin. In theory, a fair
liquidation process would bring market value in such cases, allowing
the lender to recover its full debt and costs and producing a surplus
that could be distributed to any junior lienholders and to the
borrower.
In reality, however, the American foreclosure process almost
always disadvantages borrowers and subordinate lienholders. To
illustrate why, we must temper our definition of “market value.” No
seller realistically expects to receive in cash the full market price of
the property, even if the nominal selling price is the equivalent of
market value. The reason for this lies in the fact that every sale
involves some selling expenses and some holding period. The selling
expenses will commonly include a real estate brokerage
commission—typically somewhere between 3 and 6 percent of the
sale price, depending on the seller’s relationship with the broker—
plus the costs of an owner’s title insurance policy (in the areas of the
nation where sellers customarily pay this expense) and various
miscellaneous items, such as transfer taxes and fees of escrow or
closing agents. In a negotiated sale the holding period itself
introduces additional costs, including property taxes, casualty and
liability insurance, inspection costs, perhaps security services, and the
opportunity cost that arises from the fact that the capital value of the
property is tied up and temporarily unproductive. These costs are
particularly significant if the seller has vacated possession of the
property in anticipation of the sale, so that the property is generating
no offsetting income. Finally, in the case of a sale of foreclosed

105. For this reason, Professor Wechsler described the traditional foreclosure by auction as
functioning, in reality, much like strict foreclosure. See Wechsler, supra note 104, at 885, 862
n.193, 863 nn.194–96.
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property, determining market value requires consideration of the
lender’s costs of conducting the foreclosure and acquiring title.
In determining how much the market price should be reduced to
reflect these costs, a useful reference point is the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), which publishes an annual estimate of the
percentage reduction in selling prices that is necessary to reflect net
values to sellers. The VA’s data are based on its experience with a
very large inventory of foreclosed residential properties located
throughout the nation. The estimates published by the VA have
varied from year to year, but in recent years have generally been in
the range of 10 to 14 percent of sale prices; the current figure, in
106
effect since January 2000, is 11.87 percent. Such estimates seem
plausible and are confirmed by the work of Professor Debra Stark,
whose study of foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois concluded that
14 percent of the resale price was a reasonable estimate of the
average of such expenses107—a figure quite consistent with the
estimates of the VA. Professor Stark’s estimate was based on an
assumed property value of $75,000, but there is no a priori reason to
suppose that the cost of disposing of more valuable commercial or
other nonresidential property would vary by significantly different
percentages, since most of the elements of disposal cost, such as
property taxes, insurance, commissions, and opportunity costs are
roughly proportional to the property’s value.
If these data are realistic, they suggest that a seller who makes an
arms-length negotiated sale of property for $100,000 might expect to
receive a net amount of $86,000 to $90,000.108 If a commercial
property sells for $1 million, the seller might expect a net return of
$860,000 to $900,000. In a well-functioning foreclosure system—

106. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, HOME LOAN GUARANTY SERVICES: SERVICERS
HOMEPAGE, at http://www.homeloans.va.gov/servicers.htm (last modified Feb. 2, 2004) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). Prior to the establishment of the current estimate, the estimates by
fiscal year were as follows: FY 90: 11.45%, Loan Guaranty: Percentage to Determine Net Value,
55 Fed. Reg. 5112 (Feb. 13, 1990); FY 91: 10.19%, 56 Fed. Reg. 5451 (Feb. 11, 1991); FY 92:
10.94%, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,216 (Mar. 24, 1992); FY 93: 14.16%, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,548 (Dec. 10,
1992); FY 94: 11.19%, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,213 (May 10, 1994); FY 95: 11.18%, 60 Fed. Reg. 5250
(Jan. 26, 1995); FY 96: 15.11%, 61 Fed. Reg. 7046 (Feb. 23, 1996); FY 97: 13.54%, 62 Fed. Reg.
29,393 (May 30, 1997); FY 98: 13.97%, 63 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Feb. 11, 1998).
107. Stark, supra note 104, at 676. Professor Stark based her estimate on interviews with
lenders and other efforts to estimate carrying and resale expenses sustained by foreclosing
mortgagees in reselling their foreclosed properties. See id.
108. This assumes, of course, that there are no junior liens to be paid out of the sale
proceeds.
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which, as this Article has demonstrated, the present system certainly
is not—one might, at best, reasonably hope for returns on foreclosed
property at a comparable level.
3. Empirical Evidence on the Fairness of Foreclosure Prices. If
foreclosure sales do indeed produce below-market prices, it should be
possible to demonstrate this empirically. However, few investigators
have attempted the rather daunting task of examining statistically the
actual results of large numbers of foreclosure sales. In this Section we
consider the results of two such studies, with specific attention to their
conclusions about the adequacy of prices paid. Both studies suggest
that, although in the majority of foreclosures the prices paid are
reasonably close to market values, in a small but significant minority
of foreclosure sales the price bid is well below market value. This
discrepancy allows the bidder to capture a windfall financial gain that,
in principle, should belong to the debtor or creditor.
The first of these two empirical studies of foreclosure prices was
conducted by Professor Steven Wechsler on the basis of 118
foreclosure sales conducted in Onondaga County (Syracuse), New
109
York during 1979. The second study was conducted by Professor
Stark on the basis of 870 foreclosures filed in Cook County (Chicago),
Illinois in 1993 and 1994, of which about one-third (276) proceeded to
an actual foreclosure sale.110
As a rough gauge of the fairness of foreclosure prices, one can
compare the amount for which the mortgagee purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale with the amount for which it was subsequently
resold. If mortgagees are frequently able to liquidate their REO
properties at prices higher than acquisition cost, it follows that the
acquisition cost was probably below market. Professor Wechsler’s
data indicate that mortgagees resold REO properties above
acquisition cost in about half of the cases, with a median “profit” in
these cases of $5,080.111 To give this figure context, the median
original loan amount for the entire data set was $20,400,112 and the

109. Wechsler, supra note 104, at 880.
110. Stark, supra note 104, at 663.
111. Wechsler, supra note 104, at 880. Professor Wechsler commented, “[W]hile on the
average mortgagees lose money when they foreclose, many individual transactions result in
profitable resales.” Id. at 853. However, the term “profit” is a dubious descriptor here, since it
does not take into account the amount of the mortgage debt or the mortgagee’s preforeclosure
expenses in connection with the loan. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
112. Wechsler, supra note 104, at 872.
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median outstanding balance at the time of foreclosure was about
113
$23,000.
Judgments about the fairness of the foreclosure bid from these
data require considerable care. Two factors may skew one’s
inferences. First, there is no assurance that all mortgagees made full
credit bids. If there is no third-party bidding, a mortgagee might bid a
lower amount, or even a nominal amount such as one dollar. In such
cases, the mortgagee’s real investment in the property is the balance
owing on the loan (including foreclosure costs), even though the bid
114
does not reflect that amount.
The other factor that must be considered is the mortgagee’s
foreclosure, holding, and marketing costs. Professor Wechsler’s data
do not attempt to take account of this factor, which we have
estimated above at 10 to 14 percent of the foreclosure bid. Some of
the resales that Professor Wechsler describes as profitable may well
have constituted losses to the mortgagee if these added costs had
been considered. For example, if one takes the median outstanding
loan balance of $23,000 as a proxy for a full credit bid by a mortgagee,
median holding and marketing costs can be estimated at $2,300 to
$3,450 per case. Given the reported nominal median profit for lenders
of $5,080, it is apparent that true profits must have been realized in a
substantial number of these cases, but not the roughly 50 percent of
cases that Professor Wechsler reports.
Professor Stark’s conclusions are quite consistent with Professor
Wechsler’s, although Professor Stark reports a smaller percentage of
cases in which mortgagees were able to resell REO property at a
115
profit. She summarizes her findings as follows:
[I]n the vast majority of those cases where the property was sold at
foreclosure sale, the lender was the successful bidder and resold the
property for a loss, but . . . occasionally, third parties and very few
lenders purchased and resold the property for huge profits . . . .

113. Id. at 874.
114. Professor Wechsler does not attempt to determine whether bids were nominal, full
credit, or in between. However, Professor Stark’s study indicates that virtually all bids by
mortgagees were for the full balance owing on the debt. Stark, supra note 104, at 664.
115. After taking holding and marketing costs into account, Professor Stark estimates that
mortgagees acquiring property at foreclosure made a true profit in about 20 percent of the cases
in 1993 and 10 percent of the cases in 1994. Id. at 667–68. The 1994 cases included two
spectacular profits, 379 percent and 98 percent. Id. at 668.
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. . . [T]he foreclosure system typically operates in a manner that
protects the borrower’s equity in the property. In a very small
percentage of the cases, however, the system operates in an
116
unconscionable manner.

The discussion above has concentrated on resale profits to
mortgagees. However, it is fairly obvious that profits upon resale are
more likely when third-party bidders purchase at foreclosure sales. As
noted in Section A.2, most lenders are not speculators and are averse
to the sort of risk inherent in buying property for future profitable
resale. For this reason, most lenders are quite willing to make a full
credit bid and then allow the property to go to a third-party bidder
who offers a higher price. Hence, properties whose value exceeds the
mortgage debt by a wide margin are those that third parties are most
likely to buy—assuming, of course, that prospective buyers other than
the mortgagee are present at foreclosure sales. And it is precisely
these cases in which there is the greatest potential for resale profits.
Both Professor Wechsler’s and Professor Stark’s studies support
this conclusion. Professor Stark’s data from 1993 include twelve thirdparty buyers whose resale prices could be tracked. Nine of these (75
percent) resold at a higher price than their acquisition cost at the
117
foreclosure sale, with a median price difference of $25,971. Five of
the nine sold at double their acquisition cost or higher. Even after a
generous allowance for holding and marketing costs, it is clear that
these third-party bidders made substantial profits. Professor
Wechsler’s findings were similar: Of the fifteen third-party bidder
resales that he was able to track, fourteen properties sold at prices
exceeding the foreclosure bid, with price differences ranging in twelve
cases from $7,000 to $23,000.118 The remaining two cases had much
more spectacular price gains: $42,000 and $54,000.
On the whole, both Professor Stark’s and Professor Wechsler’s
studies suggest, as Professor Stark observes, that most debtors, most
of the time, are not treated unfairly in foreclosure. Unless their
properties have a value that exceeds the amount of the debt by 10 to
14 percent, they cannot reasonably expect to realize any surplus from
even an ideal system of foreclosure (just as they could not expect to
put their properties on the market, sell them, and pay off the
mortgage debt with the proceeds). When property values are below
116. Id. at 668.
117. Id. at 667. The median debt balance in Professor Stark’s 1993 data was $62,646. Id.
118. Wechsler, supra note 104, at 883.
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this level, the price bid at the foreclosure sale is a matter of complete
indifference to the debtor unless the lender is expected to seek a
deficiency judgment—and, in practice, deficiency judgments are rare
119
indeed. In such cases, foreclosure by sale is neither better nor worse
than strict foreclosure; the debtor will lose the property and have
nothing to show for it, irrespective of the method of foreclosure.
On the other hand, there are significant numbers of foreclosures,
albeit a minority, in which the property’s value exceeds the mortgage
debt by a large enough margin that there is a potential for a sale that
will produce a cash surplus, even after taking foreclosure, holding,
and marketing costs into consideration. In such cases, one might
wonder why the debtor did not sell the property privately to realize
the surplus value and avoid the stigma of foreclosure. There are
manifold plausible explanations: physical or mental illness, difficulty
coping with marriage or family problems, or a temporary or seasonal
falloff in demand for real estate, perhaps combined with a very quick
foreclosure process that gives the debtor little time to expose the
property to the market.120
It is in these cases that traditional auction foreclosure is most
likely to fail to provide adequate protection for mortgage debtors.
When this occurs, someone other than the debtor—the foreclosing
mortgagee or a third-party bidder—will realize the surplus, unjustly
depriving the debtor of wealth. And in at least a few of those cases,
the mortgagee, by virtue of below-market bidding at the foreclosure
sale, will seek to collect a deficiency judgment, adding the insult of
the artificial deficiency claim to the injury of the debtor’s loss of
equity value. Although loss of significant equity does not occur for a
large percentage of debtors, when it does occur the amount of the loss
can be very significant. A principal goal of foreclosure reform should
be to alleviate these cases.

119. Professor Wechsler’s data indicated that about 80 percent of foreclosure sales (94 sales)
resulted in a deficiency, but that the mortgagee obtained an actual deficiency judgment in only
one case, and that judgment went uncollected. Id. at 877. Professor Stark’s data indicated that a
deficiency resulted from the foreclosure in only about 25 percent of the cases, and of those, the
lender sought a deficiency judgment in 28.2 percent of such cases in the 1993 sample and 12.9
percent of such cases in the 1994 sample. Stark, supra note 104, at 664. Thus, deficiency
judgments were sought following only 3 to 7 percent of the foreclosure sales.
120. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.310 (West 2000) (requiring a minimum of twenty days
from notice of foreclosure to the date of sale); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2004) (requiring a minimum of twenty-one days from
notice of foreclosure to the date of sale).
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B. UNFA’s Approach to Improving Foreclosure Dispositions
The drafters of UNFA took a twofold approach to the matter of
improving dispositions of property in foreclosure. First, they
examined the traditional auction foreclosure process to see if it could
be modified in ways that would make foreclosure auction outcomes
comparable to outcomes of commercial real estate auctions. Second,
they developed two distinct nonauction methods of disposing of real
estate in foreclosure.
1. Improving the Auction Sale Process. Improving foreclosure
auctions is a more daunting process than might first appear. It is
possible to devise numerous “improvements” that would have the
effect of imposing significant additional workload and liability on
lenders. Such changes might be better in theory, but would probably
engender lender opposition to adoption of the Act. As we have noted
in Section A.2, lenders tend to view a foreclosure auction not as a way
of disposing of real estate, but merely a way of acquiring title to it,
with the expectation that they will spend additional time and effort to
liquidate the property. From this viewpoint, proposals for improving
auction sales are largely irrelevant unless they will actually result in
competitive bidding in a significantly higher proportion of all
auctions—a result that most lenders probably would not expect, no
matter what the list of “improvements.” The UNFA drafters worked
from the fundamental premise that a statute incapable of attracting at
least a modest degree of support from the mortgage lending
community would be doomed to failure. This premise was supported
by the dismal record of the Conference’s prior uniform acts dealing
with real estate—a record for which lender opposition was at least
partly responsible. Hence, the drafters tended to discount proposals
for improvement that they believed would be unacceptable to the
lending community.
This background helps to explain why UNFA’s drafters adopted
only a fairly modest list of changes in the traditional process of
foreclosure by auction. The principal changes are discussed below.
a. Title Information for Bidders. It is an absolute fact that no
person can safely buy at a foreclosure sale without first reviewing the
state of the property’s title. The buyer must know the priority of the
mortgage being foreclosed in order to know whether other liens on
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121
the property will be terminated by the foreclosure. Occasionally an
inexperienced foreclosure purchaser learns this lesson the hard way—
by assuming that the mortgage is a first lien, bidding accordingly, and
then discovering that prior liens remain as encumbrances on the
buyer’s newly purchased property.122
At the same time, a foreclosing lender also needs to review the
state of title to property before instituting foreclosure. This review is
necessary to determine whether junior interests exist and to identify
who holds them. If the foreclosure is judicial, their holders must be
joined in the proceeding or it will not have the effect of cutting off
123
their interests. This is also true under many (although not all)
124
125
nonjudicial foreclosure statutes, and it is true under UNFA.

121. Prospective bidders must (1) determine the relative priority of the lien being foreclosed
as against other liens on the property, and (2) at least in a judicial foreclosure, determine that all
junior lienors have been served with process and made parties to the proceeding. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 72–80 (discussing the impact of failing to join a junior lienor). In a
nonjudicial foreclosure under a power of sale, the latter step may or may not be necessary. See
Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Prods., Inc., 270 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1990)
(indicating that junior interests are automatically cut off by a California nonjudicial foreclosure,
irrespective of notice to them). Other authorities suggest that a junior interest holder that does
not receive a statutorily mandated notice of a nonjudicial foreclosure is not affected by it. See
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 61.24.040(7) (West 2004) (stating that a subordinate interest holder
omitted from notice under power of sale foreclosure is treated as if omitted from judicial
foreclosure). In a judicial foreclosure, it is clear that a junior interest will survive the foreclosure
if its holder is not made a party to the action. See Diamond Benefits Life Ins. Co. v. Troll, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 584–85 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a junior easement holder who is not
joined in a judicial foreclosure is not bound by it); McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 60
P.3d 1277, 1287 (Wyo. 2003) (stating that a subordinate lienholder who is not joined in judicial
foreclosure is not bound by it). One might expect the express language of the nonjudicial
foreclosure statutes to resolve the issue, but in fact they are almost invariably silent on the point.
122. See, e.g., Mann v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 35 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(dismissing a foreclosure buyer’s claim for misrepresentation against the trustee who conducted
the sale). The court held that the trustee had no duty to explain to bidders that the foreclosure
was of a lien of second priority. Id.; see also Ostayan v. Serrano Reconveyance Co., 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d 577, 583–84 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that neither the creditor nor the trustee was liable for
misleading the bidder when they failed to warn him that the deed of trust being foreclosed was
subject to a senior lien).
123. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 572–80.
124. Perhaps surprisingly, only slightly more than half of the existing nonjudicial foreclosure
statutes provide for personal or mailed notice to junior lienholders or interest holders. See
ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070(c)(4) (Michie 2002) (interests of record or of which the foreclosing
mortgagee has actual notice); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-809(B)(1) (West Supp. 2003)
(interests of record); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-104(b)(3) (Michie 2003) (interests of record or
of which the foreclosing mortgagee has actual notice); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b(c)(1) (West
Supp. 2004) (recorded successors of the mortgagor’s estate, holders of subordinate mortgages,
and subordinate lessees and contract vendees; apparently no notice is required to holders of
subordinate easements or judgment liens); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-101(7)(a) (2003) (all
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Under some nonjudicial foreclosure statutes, the entire sale may be
126
held void for failure to provide notice to a junior party. Hence, it is
of critical importance to the foreclosing lender to review the title.
junior interests of record and unrecorded tenants); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-22(c)(2)
(Michie 2002) (any prior or junior creditors having a recorded lien on the mortgaged property);
IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(1)(b)–(c) (Michie 2003) (persons having liens or interests subsequent to
the trust deed, when such lien or interest appears of record prior to the recording of the notice
of default, or when the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice); IOWA CODE. ANN.
§ 655A.3(2) (West Supp. 2004) (all junior lienholders of record); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 7-105(c)(2) (2003) (the holder of any subordinate mortgage, deed of trust, or other
subordinate interest, including a judgment); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 2003)
(all persons of record); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-224 (2003) (the occupant of the property, the
mortgagor if within the state of Montana, and every person having or claiming an interest of
record in the real estate); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1402(1) (McKinney Supp. 2004)
(repealed effective July 1, 2005) (any person having a lien of record upon the mortgaged
property, or interest in the mortgaged property subordinate to the mortgage of which the
mortgagee has actual knowledge or is on constructive notice); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(b)(3)
(2003) (record owner of the real estate, not including the holder of a lien or security interest in
the real property or a tenant in possession under an unrecorded lease); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
46, § 45 (West 1996) (any person having an interest, claim, or lien of record in the property
whose interest, claim, or lien the mortgagee seeks to foreclose); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (2003)
(any successor in interest to the grantor whose interest appears of record, or of whose interest
the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-6.1 (Michie Supp.
2003) (any lienholder or encumbrancer whose interest in the property being foreclosed would
be affected by the foreclosure); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1 (Michie Supp. 2004) (any subordinate
lienholder who holds a note against the property secured by a deed of trust); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 61.24.040 (West 2004) (any person who has a lien or claim of lien against the property
recorded subsequent to the recordation of the deed of trust being foreclosed); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 38-1-4 (Michie 1997) (any subordinate lienholder who has previously notified the
primary lienholder by certified mail of the existence of a subordinate lien).
Note that nearly all of the provisions cited above contain time limits—for example, that
the notice need be given only to persons whose interests are of record at least thirty days prior
to the foreclosure sale date or prior to the date of sending notice. This limit is necessary to
eliminate an obligation on the part of the foreclosing lender to conduct repeated title
examinations down to the actual date of foreclosure. We have eliminated the time provisions
from the above list in the interest of brevity and simplicity.
Jurisdictions whose power of sale foreclosure statutes do not require personal or mailed
notice to subordinate interest holders include Alabama, the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. In addition, the requirements of North Carolina and
West Virginia are quite weak; North Carolina’s notice requirement applies to subsequent
parties acquiring title but not to subsequent lienholders, and West Virginia’s applies only to
subsequent lienholders who have given the foreclosing lender actual notice of their liens. See
infra note 270.
125. See UNFA art. 2, § 203(c) (requiring that notice of the foreclosure be given to any
person shown by the public records to be an interest holder in the real property collateral and to
any person the foreclosing creditor knows is an interest holder).
126. Williams v. Kimes, 996 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (holding that failure to
notify the holder of a contingent remainder rendered a nonjudicial foreclosure void); Title Ins.
& Trust Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Nev. 1981) (holding that the vendor’s
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Typically the foreclosing creditor does its own title work, as does
each individual bidder. UNFA’s drafters viewed this duplication as
wasteful. Moreover, the expense of paying for the cost of title
evidence (often in the form of a “foreclosure report” from a title
company at a cost of at least $50 to $100) is surely likely to discourage
some bidders because, for every individual except the successful
bidder, the cost is a deadweight loss.
To avoid the duplication of expense, UNFA requires the
foreclosing creditor to obtain title evidence and provide a copy to
127
each prospective bidder upon request. The title evidence may be
any of the usual forms of title insurance products,128 an attorney’s
opinion based on an examination of title, or any alternative form of
title evidence that is customary in the locality. Unless it is an
attorney’s opinion,129 the title evidence “must state that the issuer is
willing to provide a policy of title insurance to a person that acquires
title to the real property by virtue of the foreclosure and the
exceptions and exclusions from coverage to which the policy issued to
130
that person will be subject.” In most cases, then, the title evidence
will be a title insurance binder; its purposes are to inform prospective
bidders of the existence of any interests that will survive foreclosure,
and to assure them that they will be able to insure the title if they buy
the property. This provision eliminates the need for each bidder to
obtain an individual title insurance commitment, and does so with
only trivial additional expense to the foreclosing creditor.131

failure to notify the vendee of property under the recorded contract of sale rendered the
nonjudicial foreclosure void).
127. UNFA art. 3, § 302(a). The statute requires that a copy of the title evidence be
provided without cost to “any person” requesting it, but there is no plausible reason that anyone
other than a prospective bidder or purchaser would wish to receive it. The advertisement of a
foreclosure by auction must state that the title evidence is available and must indicate whom to
contact to obtain it. Id. § 303(c)(7). Further, at the commencement of the auction, the person
conducting it must make copies of the title evidence available to prospective purchasers who
have not already obtained it. Id. § 308(a)(1)(A).
128. See UNFA art. 1, § 102(22) (“‘Title evidence’ may be denominated in a variety of ways,
depending on local custom or practice.”).
129. The exclusion for attorneys’ opinions of title resulted from the drafting committee’s
discomfort with the notion that an attorney could be required by law to provide an opinion of
title to a client whom the lawyer did not specifically agree to represent. Additionally, requiring
attorneys to provide title opinions to successful bidders might give rise to conflicts of interest in
some cases.
130. UNFA art. 3, § 302(a).
131. Id.
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b. Other Information for Bidders. Foreclosing creditors often
possess a great deal of information about the properties on which
they foreclose. Their files may contain appraisals, environmental
assessments, surveys, engineering studies, inspection reports, and a
variety of other documents. The UNFA drafting committee
considered whether to require foreclosing creditors to disclose such
information. However, such a requirement would pose several
difficulties. Beyond the title evidence, there is no standard set of
documents that lenders would always or routinely possess. The
drafting committee did not want to require the creation of documents
that were not already in existence, as such a requirement would
undoubtedly have added significantly to lenders’ costs and
administrative burdens and would likely have stimulated serious
opposition to UNFA. Hence, any requirement that documents be
disclosed would inevitably have a “hit-or-miss” effect, producing
many documents in some cases and few or none in other cases.
Moreover, lenders may have good reasons not to disclose some
documents. A report might contain proprietary information that the
lender wishes to protect. It might reflect badly on the lender’s care or
wisdom in making the original loan, or on the way the loan has been
serviced over its life. It might even cast doubt on the lender’s
compliance with applicable supervisory regulations. Perhaps worst
from a lender’s viewpoint, a document might cast a pall on the
property’s desirability—perhaps erroneously—and might therefore
chill not only the bidding at the foreclosure sale, but also the lender’s
subsequent efforts to market the property.
For these reasons, the drafting committee concluded that it was
impractical to require any specific disclosures except for title
information. Instead, the committee simply authorized foreclosing
creditors to make other reports or information available to
prospective bidders. To encourage such disclosures, UNFA
exculpates creditors from liability for errors in such information
unless the foreclosing creditor has actual knowledge of the error
when the information is disclosed.132 This step admittedly falls far
short of making foreclosure auctions comparable to commercial real
estate auctions, in which detailed informational packages are
routinely distributed, but the drafting committee could find no
acceptable way of expanding the disclosure requirement.

132.

Id. § 302(b)–(c).
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c. Inspecting the Collateral. A major limitation of foreclosure
auctions is the difficulty that prospective bidders experience in
inspecting the property before the sale. The need for inspection is, if
anything, greater with foreclosure auctions than with commercial
auctions of real estate, because it is well known that defaulting
debtors often feel little incentive to provide good maintenance on
properties that they expect to lose in the immediate future.
“Stripping” or even vandalism of properties to be foreclosed is
common. Hence, prospective bidders have a strong need to inspect.
Because they are usually unable to do so, they are likely to formulate
their bids based on worst-case assumptions.
Unfortunately, the need to inspect conflicts headlong with the
notion, held in so-called “lien theory” states, that the property
belongs to the debtor until the foreclosure is completed, and that it is
an infringement of the debtor’s rights to encroach on possession
133
before foreclosure. Of course, a statute could modify or even
reverse that concept, but the UNFA drafting committee was
concerned that attempting to break down the mortgagor’s
preforeclosure right of possession would produce strong opposition
from consumer interests. Some members of the committee had
serious concerns as to whether such a change would be fair to
borrowers.
Even in lien theory states, foreclosing lenders may have the right
to take possession of the real estate before foreclosure in limited
134
situations, such as when the mortgagor has voluntarily relinquished
possession or has abandoned the property. In title theory and
intermediate theory states, which take the view that the mortgagee is
entitled to take possession as soon as a default has occurred, the
mortgagee is not so constrained. However, mortgagees are often
understandably reluctant to assume possession even under these
circumstances, because taking possession actuates a long and
135
frightening list of potential liabilities for mortgagees. To avoid these

133. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 10, 187. The lien theory is followed in more
than half of the American jurisdictions. Id. at 10.
134. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1(c) (1997).
135. Those liabilities include strict accounting for all rents and other revenues collected,
with duties to the mortgagor that are tantamount to fiduciary duties, see Johns v. Moore, 336
P.2d 579, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); a duty to manage the property in a reasonable, prudent, and
careful manner, prevent damage to it, and keep it productive, see ComFed Sav. Bank v.
Newtown Commons Plaza Ass’n, 719 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1989); liability in tort to third
parties injured on the premises, see City of Newark v. Sue Corp., 304 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. Super.
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liabilities, mortgagees who want to intercept rents from commercial
properties secured by defaulted mortgages often employ equitable
136
receiverships instead of taking direct possession, but unfortunately a
receivership provides no means of giving prospective bidders access
to the property.
A lender need not take the full step to formal “possession” to
exhibit the property; it is very likely that a debtor could voluntarily
authorize a foreclosing creditor to show the property to prospective
bidders without making the creditor a “mortgagee in possession” with
137
its attendant liabilities. Concern by mortgagees that simply showing
the property will activate that status is almost certainly exaggerated.138
However, it is probably not common for a defaulting mortgage debtor
to voluntarily permit the foreclosing mortgagee to show it to
prospective bidders.139
UNFA does not require the foreclosing lender to become a
“mortgagee in possession,” even if the lender could legally do so. The
drafters did not feel it would be appropriate to force lenders into such
a high-risk situation. However, if a foreclosing lender has already
become a “mortgagee in possession,” or if the mortgagor has
voluntarily granted the lender the right to show the property to
Ct. App. Div. 1973); liability under statutes imposing duties on owners, see Craig v. Mohyde,
No. CV 940316056S, 1997 WL 206630 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1997) (recognizing a duty to
residential tenants to make repairs under a residential landlord-tenant statute, but finding no
duty in the absence of evidence that the mortgagee had taken control of the premises); liability
for all goods and services furnished by third parties to the property, see Essex Cleaning
Contractors, Inc. v. Amato, 317 A.2d 411, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); and liability for
breach of any covenants running with the land, see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Orchard Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 672 N.E.2d 876, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). See also NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 195–99 (describing a mortgagee’s liability to third parties and duty
to account).
136. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 207 (stating that a receivership will insulate
the mortgagee from the normally imposed tort and landowner liabilities).
137. In retrospect, it might have been wise to include in UNFA a specific provision
disclaiming mortgagee-in-possession status to allow mortgagees to show the property to
prospective bidders. The Act contains no such provision.
138. See, e.g., Blackstone Valley Nat’l Bank v. Hanson, 445 N.E.2d 1093, 1093–94 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that a mortgagee who visited the property a few times, asked a tenant
to “take care of it,” and made some emergency repairs had not assumed the status of
“mortgagee in possession”). A fortiori, a mortgagee who merely inspects or invites bidders to
inspect the property should not be deemed in possession.
139. In Connecticut it is customary for the debtor to permit inspection, but there is no legal
recourse if the debtor refuses to do so. See Second Nat’l Bank of New Haven v. Burtchell, 349
A.2d 831, 833 (Conn. 1974) (holding that a foreclosure committee had no authority to allow
prospective purchasers to inspect a property prior to foreclosure against the mortgagor’s
wishes); DENIS R. CARON, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES ' 6.01G (1997).
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bidders, UNFA requires the lender to reasonably accommodate a
140
request by a prospective bidder to inspect the property.
A further provision of UNFA makes a grant of access by the
mortgagor somewhat more probable. The Act permits a residential
debtor to avoid liability for a deficiency judgment by acting in “good
141
faith” with respect to the property, and it contains a safe harbor
provision defining “good faith” to include providing “reasonable
access to the collateral for inspection by the foreclosing creditor and
prospective purchasers.”142 Residential debtors are informed of this
provision in the notice of foreclosure,143 and may well see it as in their
best interest to cooperate in showing the property prior to
foreclosure. Overall, lenders will probably be able to offer inspection
to prospective bidders under UNFA more frequently than under
present foreclosure procedures, but UNFA by no means makes this a
certainty.
d. Advertisement of the Sale. Commercial real estate auctions
are usually preceded by a marketing period during which sellers
attempt to attract the interest of potential buyers. The marketing
devices may include display advertisements in newspapers and
magazines and the use of billboards, broadcast media, and the
internet. Advertisement of foreclosure auctions, by contrast, is
usually conducted only by means of statutorily mandated fine-print
advertisements in the classified sections of newspapers. They serve
the purpose of alerting professional real estate speculators to sales
but are not well designed to attract members of the buying public.
There was a general feeling among the drafters of UNFA that
more could be done to expand bidding audiences at foreclosure sales.
However, it is not easy to prescribe a marketing program by law,
because effective marketing of real estate must, by its nature, be
attuned to unique local conditions and customs. Moreover, the
drafting committee was reluctant to impose marketing requirements
that might substantially increase the cost of foreclosure.
Thus the changes UNFA makes in the advertisement of
foreclosure sales are quite modest. UNFA gives the adopting
legislature the choice of retaining its existing rules concerning

140.
141.
142.
143.

UNFA art. 3, § 304.
UNFA art. 6, § 607(b)(2).
Id. § 607(c)(5).
UNFA art. 2, § 204(b)(9).
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newspaper advertisement or adopting a simple provision requiring
one advertisement per week for three consecutive weeks, with the last
publication date between seven and thirty days before the auction.
The option of keeping the existing rules was included on the ground
that, although some states have rather elaborate, burdensome, and
costly advertising requirements,144 existing newspapers might have a
strong stake in retaining those requirements and might vigorously
oppose passage of UNFA if it threatened traditional practices.
The other UNFA innovations concerning advertisements are
minor. The Act provides that advertisements “may contain any other
information concerning the collateral or the foreclosure that the
145
foreclosing creditor elects to include.” The foreclosing creditor may
also post a copy of the advertisement or a sign containing information
about the auction on the real property collateral.146
One member of the UNFA drafting committee strongly argued
that state governments should create internet sites on which all
foreclosures statewide would be listed. The committee as a whole was
sympathetic to this idea but reluctant to require its adoption, feeling
that it might impose unacceptable costs that could form the basis for
opposition to the Act. In the final statute, the concept is reflected in a
comment stating that the foreclosing creditor may post information
about the sale on an internet site that provides information about
foreclosures, whether the site is operated by a private party or by an
entity of state or local government.147
e. Eliminating Statutory Redemption. One additional feature of
foreclosure auctions that sharply distinguishes them from commercial
real estate auctions in roughly half of the American jurisdictions is
the statutory postsale right of redemption. This right, which we
148
considered briefly in Part I.A, should not be confused with the
equitable right of redemption that is cut off by foreclosure in every
state. Statutory redemption arises only after the foreclosure sale and
lasts for some statutorily specified period, commonly in the range of

144. For example, the Missouri statute requires that, in cities of at least 50,000 population,
the advertisement appear for twenty days, “continu[ing] to the day of sale.” MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 443.320 (West 2000). For a property with a lengthy legal description, such an advertisement
may cost several thousand dollars.
145. UNFA art. 3, § 303(d).
146. Id. § 303(b).
147. Id. § 303 cmt.
148. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1439

149
six months to two years. In effect, it is a right of the former debtor,
and in some jurisdictions, any cut-off junior lienholders as well, to
repurchase the property from the successful bidder at the foreclosure
sale.150 Although the right is probably not often exercised, it is
impossible for bidders to be sure that it will not be asserted. Hence,
until the redemption period has expired, successful bidders do not
know whether they will be able to retain the property. It therefore
makes little sense for successful bidders to invest time, effort, or
money on repairs or improvements until the redemption time has
elapsed. Thus, the property is likely to remain largely or wholly
unproductive to the successful bidder during that period. There is
little doubt that statutory redemption rights cast a pall on foreclosure
sales in the states in which they apply. Further, in many of the states
authorizing statutory redemption, the foreclosure bidder’s situation is
worse because the former mortgagor has the right to remain in
possession during the redemption period.151
Statutory redemption was invented as a supposed prodebtor
device, allowing the former owner one last chance to save the
property and increasing sale prices by encouraging bidders to bid
amounts closer to full market value so that the redemption right is
152
less likely to be exercised. However, its likely effect on debtors as a
class is decidedly negative, as foreclosure bidders discount their bids
to reflect the uncertainty that they can keep the purchased
properties.153 For the drafters of UNFA, this problem was easily

149. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 689.
150. Id. at 694.
151. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Snider, 808 P.2d 475, 480 (Mont. 1991) (holding
that the debtor was entitled to possession of the property during the redemption period); CIT
Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 504 N.W.2d 565, 568 (N.D. 1993) (“[A] mortgagor
is entitled to possession of, and to the rents and profits derived from, mortgaged real property
from the time of the foreclosure sale until title is divested by expiration of the period of
redemption.”).
152. See Edgar Noble Durfee & Delmar W. Doddridge, Redemption From Foreclosure
Sale—The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825, 839 (1925) (“It is clear . . . that
redemption statutes have [the] purpose and effect . . . of the prevention of the hardship of a
sacrifice sale.”); Hart, supra note 24, at 848 (“Purposes include . . . encouraging those who do
bid at the sale to bid in at a fair price.”).
153. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 365–66 (9th Cir. 1970):
[I]t is argued that the purpose of the redemption statutes is to force the mortgagee
and others to bid the full market price at the sale. We assume that this is the purpose;
we are not convinced that the statutes accomplish it. What third party would bid and
pay the full market value, knowing that he cannot have the property to do with as he
wishes until a set period has gone by, and that at the end of the period he may not get
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solved. The Act simply provides that persons who have redemption
154
rights “may not redeem after the time of foreclosure.” Hence, a
foreclosure auction conducted under the Act will have the same
degree of finality as a commercial auction. Under UNFA’s
philosophy, whatever the fair period during which to allow
mortgagors to redeem their properties, this period ought to run
before the date of foreclosure, not after.
2. Alternatives to Auctions: Foreclosure by Negotiated Sale and
by Appraisal. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, it is not easy to
make a foreclosure auction emulate an arms-length sale. Perhaps the
most significant innovation of UNFA is its adoption of two new
methods of foreclosure—negotiated sale and appraisal—that do not
involve auctioning the property at all. These methods have no
equivalent in current American foreclosure practice.155
a. Negotiated Sale. Under a foreclosure by negotiated sale, the
foreclosing creditor can use any means of attracting a buyer and
entering into a contract of sale. For example, the property could be
listed with a real estate broker and advertised in magazines and
newspapers or on the internet. The contract of sale must be
conditioned on the failure of the mortgage debtor to redeem the
156
property by the time of foreclosure. The lender, having arranged for
such a sale, then notifies the borrower of its terms, and states the
157
amount the lender is willing to credit against the debt. This amount
need not be identical to the contract price that the lender has
arranged with the third-party buyer, but must be at least 85 percent of

it, but instead may be forced to accept a payment which may or may not fully
reimburse him for his outlays?
154. UNFA art. 2, § 209.
155. They are quite similar to mortgage foreclosure in the United Kingdom. Under an
English “power of sale,” the lender is permitted to foreclose simply by selling the real estate to
any buyer other than itself or its agents. See Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, Ch. 20 §§ 101–107
(1925) (Eng.); BERNARD RUDDEN & HYWEL MOSELEY, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES 52–57 (3d ed. 1967). The price must be reasonable, although it need not be the
highest price obtainable. Lenders in England commonly use real estate brokers (“estate
agents”) and other means of conducting foreclosure sales, just as with other sales of real
property. Foreclosures by judicial auction are also permissible, RUDDEN & MOSELEY, supra, at
67, but are rare in practice. One of the authors of this Article has earlier advocated the adoption
of foreclosure by negotiated sale. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 163–66.
156. UNFA art. 4, § 404(a)(2).
157. Id. § 403(a).
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158
that price. The 15 percent difference is intended to allow the
creditor compensation for brokerage, marketing, and holding
expenses. The lender must disclose the actual contract price to the
borrower, thus giving the borrower a reference point in determining
whether to accept the lender’s offer.
A borrower, once notified of the proposed sale, has the right to
159
accept or reject it. If the borrower takes no action, the sale can be
completed by the foreclosing creditor and title will pass to the
160
contract purchaser, subject to any prior liens. The borrower may
object to the sale by written notice up to seven days before the
proposed sale date. Upon objection from the borrower, the proposed
sale is cancelled, and the lender must resort to a different method of
foreclosure (or an alternative negotiated sale, presumably with a
higher credit offer to the borrower).
The lender must also give notice of the proposed sale to the
holders of subordinate liens161 that will be terminated by the
foreclosure. They, too, have the right to object up to seven days
before the proposed sale. This provision is essential to fundamental
fairness; in many cases it will be the junior lienholders rather than the
borrower who will suffer practical harm if the foreclosure amount is
inadequate, because the foreclosure amount will often be far less than
would be necessary to generate a surplus for the borrower. However,
the foreclosing creditor may elect not to cancel the sale in the face of
objections from junior lienors. Instead, the foreclosing creditor can
simply pay off their liens (a course of action likely only if the balances
owing on such liens are small) or can notify them that their liens will
be preserved rather than terminated by the foreclosure.162

158. Id. § 403(c).
159. Id. § 404.
160. Id. art. 6, § 603(1). Title also passes subject to interests whose holders were entitled to
notice of foreclosure but to whom such notice was not given, and to interests that, by virtue of a
notice from the foreclosing creditor, were expressly preserved from the terminating effect of the
foreclosure. Id. § 603(2)–(3).
161. Note that nonlien subordinate interest holders, such as tenants or easement holders,
are not given notice or the right to object. This is consistent with UNFA’s philosophy of making
no provision for payment of surplus sale proceeds to such parties. See infra notes 324–332 and
accompanying text.
162. UNFA art. 4, § 404(a)(2), (3). If the creditor pays off a subordinate lien, the amount of
the payment is open to negotiation. Hence, if it appears that a particular objecting lienholder is
unlikely to receive much or any of the foreclosure proceeds, it may be possible for the
foreclosing creditor to negotiate a payoff at a price well below the lien’s face amount.
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The concept of the negotiated sale is designed to allow lenders to
complete the process of property disposition in a single step, rather
163
than the two-step procedure usually employed now. From the
lender’s viewpoint, the negotiated sale should be faster and more
efficient. It should be attractive to borrowers as well, because the
foreclosure amount realized should ordinarily be a good deal higher
than would be experienced in a foreclosure auction. Hence,
borrowers can expect to receive a distribution of surplus, or at least a
retirement of junior liens on the property, in a higher proportion of
cases. From the viewpoint of the borrower and junior lienors, the
question is simple: Am I likely to be better off with the sum that the
lender has offered as a foreclosure amount than I am with the
probable result of an auction? In a large proportion of cases the
answer will be affirmative, but if borrowers or junior lienors believe
otherwise, they can simply give notice to stop the negotiated sale.
This is not to assert that foreclosures by negotiated sale will
necessarily produce prices precisely equivalent to those obtained
through arms-length negotiated sales. Such foreclosures will be
subject to the uncertainty that results from the right of objection by
the borrower and junior lienors until seven days before the proposed
sale date, and that very uncertainty will likely result in some
discounting of offering prices by prospective buyers. Of course, most
real estate sales are subject to some period of uncertainty, because
sale contracts commonly allow buyers a due diligence period in which
to investigate the property and permit buyers to withdraw from their
obligations to purchase if the results of their investigations are
unsatisfactory. However, a period of uncertainty that lasts until seven
days before the proposed settlement date is much longer than would
usually occur in an arms-length negotiated sale. In addition, the
borrower and junior lienors can redeem any time before the
foreclosure date, and a redemption will result in cancellation of the
sale that the lender has negotiated.164 This extends the uncertainty
even further.
The period of uncertainty can be reduced by agreement. A
foreclosing lender might contact a borrower (and junior lienors, if
any), for example, two months before the proposed foreclosure date,
advise them that the lender has arranged a sale of the property, and
state the amount that the lender proposes to credit against the debt. If
163.
164.

See supra Part II.A.2.
UNFA art. 2, § 209.
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the borrower and junior lienors find the amount fair and attractive,
they can simply agree to the sale at that point, thus waiving the right
to object for the remainder of the foreclosure period. It makes little
difference whether this agreement takes the form of an immediate
deed in lieu of foreclosure, a contract to give a deed in lieu of
foreclosure at a future date,165 or simply a waiver of the right to object
to the foreclosure amount and to exercise the equitable right of
166
redemption from the mortgage. Whatever the form, the result will
be to pin down the lender’s right to consummate the sale, eliminating
the uncertainty. In theory, an actual foreclosure provides a result
superior to a deed in lieu of foreclosure because it cuts off junior
liens, which a deed in lieu cannot do. But if the junior lienholders
agree to the negotiated sale, they can also provide lien releases in
return for distributions of their shares of the sale proceeds. In this
setting, foreclosures and deeds in lieu of foreclosure are
indistinguishable.
Negotiated sales, like foreclosure auctions, need not be
accompanied by any warranty as to the physical quality of the land or
improvements (although there is nothing to prevent the foreclosing
lender from providing such a warranty), and they will not necessarily
carry a warranty of title (although the practical demands of the
market may well cause lenders to provide title insurance coverage to
their purchasers). Only after the Act is adopted and its operation is
observed will it become apparent whether lenders find the speed and
efficiency of the negotiated sale process attractive enough to spend
the necessary money on the sorts of warranties that the market
expects. The 85 percent requirement mentioned above should give
them the latitude to do so. Once lenders learn to use the flexible
procedures of the negotiated sale foreclosure to meet the market’s
demands, lenders will be able to get a jump start of up to several

165. This sort of contract does not lend itself to the objection that it is an unenforceable
“clog” on the equity of redemption. A contract to give a deed in lieu of foreclosure may well be
a “clog” if it is conditioned on occurrence of a future default. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 17, at 43–46 (discussing the problems with hinging an agreement on a future forfeiture);
John C. Murray, Clogging Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279, 287–96 (1998) (giving
an overview of the clogging doctrine as applied to deeds in lieu of foreclosure). But in the
present context, the default has already occurred and the clogging doctrine is inapplicable.
166. Section 104 of UNFA prevents the parties from varying the effect of the Act by
agreement, with certain exceptions. However, this provision should not stand in the way of the
sort of agreement described in the text, because its real effect would be to take the transaction
outside of the Act, making it the equivalent of a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
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months on property disposition, a feature that they should find very
167
attractive.
b. Appraisal. The second new method of foreclosure authorized
by UNFA, termed “foreclosure by appraisal,” permits the lender to
obtain and give to the debtor an appraisal of the property,
accompanied by an offer of a proposed net amount that the lender
168
agrees to allow in return for taking title to the property. This
method is somewhat like common law strict foreclosure, in the sense
169
that the lender winds up owning the real estate. Unlike a
foreclosure by negotiated sale, foreclosure by appraisal does not
attempt to accomplish the ultimate disposition of the property in a
single step; the lender will take title immediately, and may then
engage in marketing the property at whatever pace it desires. This
could be an attractive approach if the property is not ripe for
immediate marketing—if, for example, it is in poor physical condition
or requires remediation of hazardous waste—or if the lender is simply
unable to locate an interested buyer quickly enough to consummate a
negotiated sale.
c. Common Features of Negotiated Sale and Appraisal. Under
UNFA, the protections for borrowers and junior lienholders are
precisely the same in foreclosure by appraisal and foreclosure by
negotiated sale; in either case, the debtor and junior lienors have the
right to object to the proposed foreclosure amount. The appraised
value of the property, which must be disclosed to the borrower and
junior lienors along with the lender’s proposed foreclosure amount,

167. The Act requires that at least ninety days elapse between the issuance of a notice of
foreclosure by the creditor and the actual date of foreclosure. UNFA art. 2, § 207. The
foreclosing creditor may begin seeking a purchaser under the negotiated sale process as soon as
the notice of foreclosure is issued.
168. This approach is similar to a system advocated by Professor Wechsler. See Wechsler,
supra note 104, at 893 & nn.237–41 (describing the possibility of structuring foreclosure sales
like ordinary real estate sales).
169. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 554 (describing the vesting of title in the
mortgagee after a strict foreclosure). Strict foreclosure—by which title passes directly to the
foreclosing mortgagee, rendering an auction unnecessary—was the ordinary method of
foreclosure during the period of development of the mortgage in England but today is generally
used in the United States only in Connecticut and Vermont. See, e.g., Dieffenbach v. Attorney
Gen. of Vt., 604 F.2d 187, 195–96 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding the constitutionality of Vermont’s
strict foreclosure procedure); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Irick, 525 A.2d 551, 552–53 (Conn. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that the trial court had discretion to order either strict foreclosure or foreclosure
by sale, and did not abuse that discretion by ordering strict foreclosure).
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provides a reference point for their decision as to whether to object to
the foreclosure. Once again, the functioning of the Act depends on
the exercise of intelligent self-interest by borrowers and junior
lienholders. If the amount that the lender is offering them is more
than they believe they would be likely to receive in a foreclosure
auction, they will accept it.
In both foreclosure by negotiated sale and foreclosure by
appraisal, the foreclosure amount proposed by the mortgagee
becomes binding and conclusive if not objected to, so long as it meets
the 85 percent criterion.170 Neither the borrower nor junior interest
holders may otherwise maintain that the foreclosure amount was
171
inadequate. This eliminates a major source of risk to lenders that
exists with conventional auction foreclosures—that a foreclosure will
be set aside because the sale was commercially unreasonable or
brought an inadequate price.172
If a foreclosing creditor receives a timely objection to a proposed
foreclosure by negotiated sale or appraisal, the creditor has a number
of options. The creditor might enter into negotiations with the
objector, offering to increase the foreclosure amount in return for the
173
objector’s revocation of the notice of objection. If such negotiations
are unsuccessful, the creditor must discontinue the foreclosure174 but
can immediately issue a new notice of foreclosure, using either the
175
same method or a different method of foreclosure. It is probable
that lenders in this situation would resort to foreclosure by auction,

170. Specifically, the criterion is 85 percent of the selling price in the case of a foreclosure by
negotiated sale, see UNFA art. 4, § 403(c), and 85 percent of the appraised value in the case of a
foreclosure by appraisal, see UNFA art. 5, § 503(c).
171. UNFA art. 4, § 404(d); UNFA art. 5, § 504(d).
172. See, e.g., Krohn v. Sweetheart Props., 52 P.3d 774, 776 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (setting
aside a foreclosure sale when the bid was $10,304 and the property’s value was at least $57,000,
even though there was no other defect in the sale). But see McNeill Family Trust v. Centura
Bank, 60 P.3d 1277, 1284 (Wyo. 2003) (refusing to set aside a sale on account of inadequate
price). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 (1997) (stating that a
grossly inadequate foreclosure sale price will render a foreclosure defective).
173. Revocation of any notice issued under the Act is permissible unless the recipient of the
notice has materially changed its position in reliance on the notice. UNFA art. 1, § 111.
174. This is the case unless the objector is a lienholder and the foreclosing creditor is willing
to buy out the lien or preserve it from termination by the foreclosure. UNFA art. 4, § 404(a)(2)–
(3); UNFA art. 5, § 504(a)(2)–(3).
175. UNFA art. 6, § 601(b)(1)–(3). The creditor can also abandon the foreclosure altogether
or commence a judicial foreclosure proceeding, but these courses of action are expected to be
relatively rare. Id. § 601(b)(4)–(5).
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because that is the one form of foreclosure under UNFA that is not
subject to any further objection by the borrower or junior lienors.
If the creditor does issue a new notice of foreclosure, another
ninety days must elapse before the auction foreclosure sale can be
held. However, a lender can eliminate this waiting period by giving an
176
initial notice of foreclosure that specifies more than one method.
For example, the lender might issue an initial notice of foreclosure
stating that the lender reserves the right to use both foreclosure by
negotiated sale and foreclosure by auction. If the lender then
proposes a negotiated sale, receives an objection from the borrower,
and is unable to negotiate a revocation of the notice of objection, the
lender can simply carry out the foreclosure by auction.177 It seems
likely that most lenders would generally specify more than one
method in their notices of foreclosure, thus giving themselves greater
flexibility.
C. Summary
In sum, foreclosure by negotiated sale or by appraisal offers
significant advantages to creditors over the conventional auction sale.
A foreclosure by negotiated sale collapses the two-step process—the
creditor’s acquisition of title and subsequent disposition of the
property—into a single step. This may save considerable time, and it
eliminates any need for creditors to concern themselves about
payment of insurance, property taxes, or property security expenses
while they hold title. A foreclosure by appraisal does not collapse the
two steps into one, but it does permit a quick acquisition by the
creditor. Both new forms of foreclosure expressly eliminate any
possibility of collateral attack on the foreclosure by the debtor on the
basis that the foreclosure price was inadequate. This restriction on
debtors is fair, because in all cases of foreclosure by negotiated sale or
by appraisal, the debtor has in fact agreed to the price offered by the
creditor, and therefore should not be heard to dispute its sufficiency
later. At the same time, the 85 percent “floor” on the price
(computed as a percentage of the contract price or the appraisal,
whichever is applicable) provides the debtor a reasonable degree of
protection against an unfairly low offer by the creditor.

176. UNFA art. 2, § 204(b)(8).
177. However, the creditor must have advertised the auction as required by section 303 of
UNFA.
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III. PROTECTING RESIDENTIAL DEBTORS
One of UNFA’s key features is that it represents a complete and
rather creative rethinking of the special protections provided to
residential debtors under existing foreclosure statutes. It is widely
believed that residential mortgage debtors need legal protections
against the demands of their creditors that are unnecessary for
commercial debtors. This belief manifests itself in many existing
statutes dealing with mortgage lending. For example, a number of
states restrict the imposition of late fees178 and prepayment charges179
on residential borrowers. Other states provide residential debtors a
statutory right to cure a default without acceleration for some period
of time.180 The Federal Garn-St. Germain Act, which generally
approves enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, denies enforcement in
the case of certain transactions involving one-to-four-family
dwellings.181
It is not entirely clear that there is a sound basis for this
distinction between residential and commercial debtors. Perhaps it is
assumed that residential borrowers are less sophisticated than
commercial borrowers and thus have less capacity to understand loan
documents and recognize unfair or undesirable terms. Another
possible assumption is that residential borrowers do not usually have,
and should not be expected to undertake the expense of acquiring,
legal counsel. Hence, general statutes should prevent certain types of
overreaching by lenders. We suspect that these generalizations are
weak; there are many “mom-and-pop” businesses whose owners have
no greater understanding of mortgage loan documents and no greater
ability to obtain legal counsel than the typical residential borrower.
But the political appeal of providing extra protections to residential

178. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2954.4 (West Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183,
§ 59 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254-b (McKinney 1989); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 510–13 (discussing the legislative and other regulatory impacts of
late payment charges and default interest).
179. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-31 (2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.036 (West 2001);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.052 (West Supp. 2003); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 473–82
(discussing legislative and other nonjudicial regulation of prepayment clauses).
180. See, e.g., 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 404 (West 1999); see also NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 17, at 546 (describing “arrearages” legislation, which allows the mortgagor to avoid
acceleration by curing the preexisting default).
181. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (2000);
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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borrowers cannot be denied. There are a large number of residential
borrowers, and they vote.
UNFA contains a number of special protections for residential
borrowers, many of which were included with an eye toward
“enactability.” In essence, these provisions make the Act more
politically attractive. This is not to say that the special protections
lack a sensible policy basis. On the contrary, perfectly plausible
arguments can explain most of them.
The most general of UNFA’s distinctions between residential
and nonresidential borrowers is its approval of agreements between
creditors and debtors determining “the standards by which
performance of an obligation under this [Act] is to be measured if
those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”182 Such agreements
183
This provision is
are not permitted for residential debtors.
maddeningly vague, in contrast to most provisions of UNFA, which
are so specific as to leave little room for negotiation or agreement
about standards of performance. It is therefore doubtful that this
UNFA provision has much practical application.184
The remaining residential debtor distinctions found in UNFA are
identified and analyzed below, except that those relating to debtors’
liability for deficiencies are examined in Part V.
A. Defining “Residential Debtor”
UNFA approaches the task of defining “residential debtor” by
first defining “residential real property,” and then defining
“residential debtors” as those associated with such property.
Residential real property is

182. UNFA art. 1, § 104(d).
183. Id. § 104(d)(1). Similar language appears in the UCC. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3)
(2001) (allowing parties to vary their agreements so long as performance is measured by
standards that are not manifestly unreasonable); id. § 4-103(a) (allowing parties to determine by
agreement the standards by which a bank’s responsibility will be measured, if the standards are
not manifestly unreasonable); id. § 9-603(a) (allowing parties to determine the standards by
which the fulfillment of rights and duties are measured, if they are not manifestly unreasonable).
184. Under section 209 of UNFA, a foreclosing creditor is required to cooperate with a
person who “attempts to redeem the collateral from the security interest before the time of
foreclosure by promptly providing information concerning the amount due or performance
required to redeem.” Conceivably, a provision of the security agreement could set out standards
as to the extent of the creditor’s duty to provide information.
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property that, when a security instrument is entered into with
respect to the property, is used or is intended by its owner to be used
primarily for the personal, family, or household purposes of its
owner and is improved, or is intended by its owner to be improved,
185
by one to [four] dwelling units.

Several elements of this definition are worth noting. The phrase
“when a security instrument is entered into with respect to the
property” was included because the use of property can change over
time. The quoted phrase, in effect, locks in the property’s status when
the mortgage loan is made; a lender who is not dealing with
“residential real property” at that time need not be concerned that a
subsequent change in status will trigger obligations that the lender did
not anticipate. Hence, the lender will have no need to monitor the
status of the property continually over the life of the loan.
The phrase “or is intended by its owner to be used” is designed
primarily to deal with the case in which a borrower buys raw land
with the expectation of building a residence on it. Of course, if the
lender has no reason to know of the borrower’s intention when the
loan is made, a court should not find the property to constitute
“residential real property” even when it is later converted to
residential use.
Several elements of the definition remain. The phrase “personal,
family, or household purposes” has become a common legal
186
euphemism for consumer or personal use. It appears in the UCC,
187
the Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Uniform Consumer
188
189
Credit Code, the Uniform Consumer Leases Act, the Federal
Trade Commission’s Holder in Due Course regulation,190 and many
other legislative enactments. The phrase “of its owner” clarifies that
property held exclusively for rental use will not qualify; in essence,
the property must be partly owner-occupied. On the other hand,
there is no requirement that it be the owner’s principal residence. A
second home or vacation home will qualify.
185. UNFA art. 1, § 102(17).
186. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(11) (defining “consumer”). The definition appears in many
other places in the UCC.
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (2000) (defining “account”).
188. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3-104(a)(ii) (1974) (defining “consumer loan”).
189. See UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT § 102(a)(2)(B) (2001) (defining “consumer lease”).
190. See Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.1 (2003)
(defining “consumer”).
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The final element in the definition of residential real property is
the maximum number of dwelling units that the property may
contain. UNFA sets the limit at four units, following the usual pattern
of federal statutes and regulations, but the number is bracketed in
recognition of the fact that in some areas a different number of
dwelling units191 may be the customary dividing line between
incidental rental use and a commercial rental operation. There is no
land area limitation, and in theory a hobby farm containing hundreds
of acres would qualify. However, a commercial farm would not,
because it would not be used “primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.”192
Having defined “residential real property,” UNFA then defines a
“residential debtor” as an individual “who owns, or is obligated on an
193
obligation secured in whole or in part by, residential real property.”
The reason for the separate mention of “owns” and “obligated on an
obligation secured by” is to grant the “residential debtor” protections
to guarantors and to individuals who have sold real estate with the
purchaser’s assuming or taking subject to a preexisting mortgage.
B. Meeting to Object to Foreclosure
Of the ten or so residential debtor distinctions in UNFA, two
stand out as most significant. The first is the exemption from
deficiency liability for residential debtors who have acted in good
faith. That provision is discussed elsewhere in this Article in the
context of deficiency liability generally.194 The other, which we believe
is unique in American foreclosure law, is the “meeting to object to
foreclosure,” a right available only to residential debtors.
The drafters had two underlying rationales for the “meeting-toobject” concept. The first was the conviction that some unwarranted
foreclosures of residential mortgage loans occur simply because
consumers are unable to establish a clear line of communication with
their lenders. Large numbers of residential loans are sold on the
secondary mortgage market and serviced remotely (that is, from an

191. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1402.1 (McKinney Supp. 2004) (repealed
effective July 1, 2005) (setting six units as the threshold for exclusion from nonjudicial
foreclosure statute); N.Y. TAX LAW § 253-b (McKinney 1998) (defining a credit line mortgage
in terms of property containing one to six units).
192. UNFA art. 1, § 102 cmt. 17.
193. Id. § 101(16).
194. See infra Part V.B.1.
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195
office located at a different place than the loan originated). The
borrower will be given a (usually) toll-free telephone number to call
with questions about the loan’s servicing, but often that number will
simply connect the borrower to a computerized “tree” of automated
responses. It can be maddeningly difficult to locate and talk with a
person who has authority to take any action with respect to the
loan.196 Even if the borrower believes that the loan is not delinquent,
or that for other reasons the lender is not entitled to foreclose,
communicating this belief to someone on the lender’s staff who can
take action may be extremely frustrating.
A second factor motivating the drafters was a desire to create a
foreclosure procedure that would withstand an attack on due process
grounds. Because of the familiar state action requirement, due
process must be observed only if a governmental entity is
197
foreclosing. It involves two elements: notice (about which we have

195. BOTHWELL, supra note 36, at 3–4; Keith Turbett, Community Development
Loans
and
the
Secondary
Market,
BRIDGES,
Spring
1998,
available
at
http://www.stlouisfed.frb.org/publications/br/1998/a/br1998a3.html. When a loan is sold, it may
be with “servicing retained” (in which case the originating lender will continue to service the
loan) or “servicing released” (in which case the investor who purchases the loan will either take
over the servicing, or will sell the right to service the loan to some other servicer). In either of
the latter situations the new servicer is likely to be located at a distance from the property and
borrower. Id. On servicing generally, see FANNIE MAE, SERVICE LOANS FOR FANNIE
MAE: AN OVERVIEW, at http://www.efanniemae.com/learning_center/servicing_loans/
servicing_loans.html (last visited May 24, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). On the
valuation of servicing as an asset, see Advisory Letter, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency et al., Interagency Advisory on Mortgage Banking (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2003/PR1403a.html.
196. See Jack Guttentag, A Cure for the Mortgage-Servicing Blues, BANKRATE.COM, Jan. 2,
2003, at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20030102a.asp? (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (discussing the multitude of problems inherent in interacting with mortgage
servicing agencies); Michael D. Larson, Refinancing: New Rate, New Rules, BANKRATE.COM,
Jan. 8, 2003, at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/loan/20010106a.asp? (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (noting the difficulties faced by borrowers in mortgage refinancing and
encouraging mortgagees to investigate potential lenders).
197. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 621–25 (discussing the constitutional
requirement of a hearing); Grant S. Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Real
Estate Foreclosure: A Judicial Dilemma, 43 MO. L. REV. 25, 35–45 (1978) (stating that sufficient
state action must be connected to a power of sale foreclosure to trigger Fourteenth Amendment
requirements); Daniel E. Blegen, Note, The Constitutionality of Power of Sale Foreclosures by
Federal Government Entities, 62 MO. L. REV. 425, 433–34 (1997) (asserting that direct
government instrumentalities implicate the Due Process Clause when using a power of sale
clause). Some courts have taken the view that federally owned instrumentalities that are not
direct government agencies are not subject to the Due Process Clause in foreclosing, a
conclusion that we consider highly doubtful. See, e.g., Warren v. Gov’t Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n,
611 F.2d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Government National Mortgage
Association, although wholly owned by the United States and a constituent part of HUD, is not
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198
199
much to say below) and a right to a hearing. We believe that
government agencies can readily adapt UNFA’s meeting-to-object
process to satisfy the hearing requirement. Under the applicable case
law, an agency can appoint an agency employee to conduct the
hearing,200 provided that the employee is sufficiently neutral to be an
“impartial arbiter.”201 Selecting a suitable employee will obviously
require some thought and care but seems entirely feasible. That
employee can then conduct the meeting to object required by UNFA,
thereby satisfying the demands of due process as the drafters
intended.
202
The meeting to object bears many of the earmarks of a formal
hearing. It must be held by the foreclosing creditor (if an individual)
or a “responsible representative” of the creditor. The term
“responsible” is intended to indicate that the person holding the

subject to the Due Process Clause); AgriBank FCB v. Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc., 919 S.W.2d
263, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the Farm Credit Bank chartered by the United States
pursuant to a congressional act is not subject to the Due Process Clause). Occasionally a court
has used even more specious reasoning to avoid the application of the Due Process Clause to
admitted government agencies. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610, 615
(11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he FDIC has nowhere infringed upon Morrison’s property. Foreclosure
within the contractual terms and the requirements of Alabama law did not deprive him of his
equity of redemption, but only terminated it.”). When a foreclosure is conducted by a private
lender pursuant to a state nonjudicial foreclosure statute, the case for state action, and hence for
application of the Due Process Clause, becomes a great deal weaker. See Kenly v. Miracle
Props., 412 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D. Ariz. 1976) (finding that a statute setting out qualifications
for trustees under deeds of trust, and providing for minimal involvement of a clerk of court,
does not rise to the level of state action); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 628–34
(discussing sufficient state action).
198. See infra notes 217–61 and accompanying text.
199. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 138 (D. Me. 1976) (“[T]he Constitution
requires a meaningful and timely opportunity to be heard.”); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp.
1250, 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (“[A]t a minimum due process requires the trustee to make an
initial showing before the clerk or similar neutral official that the mortgagor is in default under
the obligation; the mortgagor must of course be afforded the opportunity to rebut and defend
the charges.”).
200. See United States v. Ford, 551 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (stating that the
opportunity for meeting with the County Supervisor of the Farmers Home Administration
combined with a failure to respond to mail notices was sufficient to satisfy the hearing
requirement). The court found no relevance in the fact that a “meeting” rather than a “hearing”
was offered to the debtors. Id. at 1106 n.2 (“[W]e consider this to be an insignificant question of
semantics . . . .”).
201. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 782–83 (11th Cir. 1984)
(expressing doubt that the use of a district director from a nearby district of the Farmers Home
Administration would be sufficiently neutral because “[t]he nearby district director will be
evaluating a decision to foreclose made by a peer and already approved by his boss, the state
director.”).
202. UNFA art. 2, § 206.
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meeting has authority to decide whether the foreclosure will proceed.
Neutrality is not required and, except when government agencies
seek to satisfy due process, the person conducting the meeting may
well be a loan officer, other employee, or attorney of the lender with
direct responsibility for servicing or foreclosing the loan. On the other
hand, there is nothing in the Act to preclude the use of a neutral
person who has no other duties in connection with the mortgage loan.
Within ten days after the meeting, the arbiter must render a decision
on whether to proceed with the foreclosure, issuing “a written
statement indicating whether the foreclosure will be discontinued or
will proceed and the reasons for the determination.”203 Thus, the
decision must take a form much like the traditional “findings of fact
204
and conclusions of law” employed in judicial hearings.
The meeting is similar to a judicial hearing in other ways. Both
parties may be represented by counsel, and the debtor may bring an
advisor who is not a lawyer. The person conducting the meeting (or
some other representative of the lender who is present) must possess
and make available to the debtor “[d]ocuments that provide evidence
205
of the grounds for foreclosure.” Ordinarily these documents will
take the form of loan payment records, or, if the default is based on
some conduct of the debtor other than a payment default, a record of
that conduct.206 In effect, the lender has the initial burden of
producing evidence that foreclosure is warranted. The debtor receives
an opportunity to present objections to the foreclosure, and the
person conducting the meeting must “consider” them.207 These
objections need not be legal in nature; the debtor might simply ask
for mercy on the ground that, notwithstanding the existence of a
default, a foreclosure would impose hardship. In some cases, the
meeting may result in a workout agreement, with a modified payment
schedule or some other form of relief to the debtor.
At a minimum, the meeting procedure should eliminate some
foreclosures that would have been based on miscommunication or
faulty records. It is not unusual for such mistakes to occur,
203. Id. § 206(c).
204. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (noting that in bench trials, “the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon”).
205. Id.
206. For example, if the default is failure to pay property taxes, the lender might present a
copy of a notice of delinquency from the taxing authority or a copy of the lender’s check paying
the taxes on the borrower’s behalf.
207. UNFA art. 2, § 206(c).
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particularly when secondary market servicing is transferred from an
originating lender to a separate servicer, or from one servicer to
208
another. One might expect that a debtor in such a situation would
be assertive in calling the problem to the lender’s attention, even in
the absence of UNFA’s meeting-to-object procedure. But the value of
the meeting to object is that it compels the lender to assign a live
human being to address the debtor’s assertions—something that
otherwise might be quite difficult to ensure.209
However, a meeting to object is not held automatically. The
notice of foreclosure will inform the debtor of the right to a
210
meeting, but the debtor is responsible for making the request in
211
writing. It seemed unreasonable to the drafters to force the
scheduling of a meeting, with its attendant cost to the foreclosing
creditor, in every case, because in most situations the borrower would
probably have little or nothing to present. Requiring the borrower to
take the initiative in requesting the meeting seems acceptable even
when a governmental entity is foreclosing and due process
requirements apply.212

208. See, e.g., Hibernia Sav. Bank v. Bomba, No. 621, 1991 WL 35230, at *2 (Mass. App.
Div. Apr. 18, 1991) (describing a mortgage holder that refused to honor its promise of a
moratorium on payment made by its servicer).
209. See, e.g., Colman v. Wendover Funding, Inc., No. 95-8051, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
14251, at *5 (10th Cir. June 12, 1996) (“[The borrower] never received any understandable reply
or explanation of the balance owing or calculations of the default amounts.”); Sutherland v.
Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 625 (Ct. App. 1997) (featuring a borrower
who alleged “that she had to deal with multiple representatives of the lender, was asked to
submit the same materials on more than one occasion, received the wrong form letters, was
‘harassed’ to make payments she did not owe, and was improperly threatened with
foreclosure”); Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Robertson, No. CV 920124622S, 1997 WL 561235, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1997) (featuring a lender who allegedly “failed to disclose to the
[borrowers] a person with authority to contact in order to work out a short payoff, or to
compromise the debt”).
210. UNFA art. 2, §§ 204(b)(10)–(11). The notice will advise the debtor of the right to
assistance from another person at the meeting, the last date on which a request for a meeting
must be received by the foreclosing creditor, and the name, address, and telephone number of a
representative of the creditor to whom the request for a meeting can be directed. The notice
must also contain a statement “that a default exists under the security instrument and the facts
establishing with particularity the default.” Id. § 204(b)(5). This information should permit the
debtor to prepare for the meeting.
211. Id. § 206(a). The request must be received by the creditor within thirty days after the
notice of foreclosure is issued.
212. In United States v. Ford, 551 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Miss. 1982), the borrowers received a
letter inviting them to contact the district director of the Farmers Home Administration (their
lender) to set up a meeting if they believed that foreclosure was improper. They did not do so,
and the court had no difficulty finding that they had
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It has become common for mortgage holders to transfer the
servicing of their loans to centralized servicers who handle large
numbers of loans, spread over many states, from a single location. In
recognition of this practice, UNFA permits the meeting to object to
be held telephonically rather than in person. Because in every case
the relevant documents demonstrating a default must be provided to
the debtor, the foreclosing creditor must put those documents in the
debtor’s hands by mail, courier, or facsimile before a telephonic
meeting begins.
The drafters went to some lengths to ensure that neither party
would be prejudiced in later litigation by participating in the meeting
to object. The objective was to maximize the probability of free and
open communication at the meeting. Thus, neither the grounds for
foreclosure stated by the lender nor the defenses or objections raised
by the debtor can limit the grounds or objections asserted in
subsequent litigation.213 The statements and representations of both
parties presented in the meeting to object are off-the-record and
cannot be used against them in later proceedings. Finally, requesting
or participating in the meeting cannot give rise to liability on the part
of the debtor, and making a decision adverse to the debtor cannot
give rise to any independent liability on the part of the foreclosing
creditor.214 Of course, if the foreclosure is wrongful, the lender may be
held liable in damages or may have the foreclosure set aside;215
however, an adverse determination based on the meeting to object
will not add to that liability.
It is arguable that the drafters should have expanded the scope of
the meeting-to-object provisions of UNFA in two respects. First, they

waived their right to a hearing by failing to respond to notices mailed to them. . . . It is
manifest that the [borrowers] were apprised of their rights and the impending
foreclosure, and understood their options, yet they failed to take any action to seek a
hearing and present reasons for having the foreclosure postponed. By making no
effort to contact [Farmers Home Administration] officials to be heard, the
[borrowers] waived their fifth amendment rights to a hearing.
Id. at 1105. By way of contrast, it has sometimes been assumed that, when due process is
applicable, it is not sufficient to point out the debtor’s right (generally available under common
law principles, and provided by statute in some jurisdictions) to bring an action to enjoin the
foreclosure, and in so doing to obtain a hearing. Cf. In re Burgess, 267 S.E.2d 915, 918 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that the ability to seek an injunction satisfies the debtor’s due process
hearing right).
213. UNFA art. 2, § 206(c).
214. Id. § 206(d).
215. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 605–16 (discussing the available remedies for a
defective power of sale foreclosure); see also infra notes 375–90 and accompanying text.
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might have broadened the Act to apply to nonresidential debtors.
The Act implicitly assumes that nonresidential debtors are more
likely than residential debtors to be represented by counsel, to
recognize fallacious or unjustified attempts to foreclose, and to assert
their rights aggressively. We think that these assumptions are
plausible. Commercial borrowers are also somewhat less likely to be
victims of sloppy or incompetent transfers of servicing, given that
multiple transfers of servicing are not as common with nonresidential
loans. Of course, whether the borrower is residential or commercial,
the need for a due process hearing is equally strong when the
government forecloses a mortgage. However, there is nothing in the
Act to stand in the way of a government agency’s providing a
commercial borrower a meeting to object; the Act simply does not
mandate such a meeting.
The other way in which the drafters might have expanded the
meeting to object would have been to offer it to junior lienholders as
well as debtors. There is a certain appeal to this notion, because in
many cases junior lienors’ economic stake in the property being
foreclosed is greater than the debtor’s. But the drafters concluded
that it made little sense to offer junior lienholders the right to a
meeting. Junior lienholders seem unlikely to have much to say at such
a meeting because they would not ordinarily have possession of
payment records, cancelled checks, receipts, correspondence, or other
documents that might help establish the absence or waiver of a
default on the part of the debtor. Including junior lienholders in the
meeting to object might well muddy rather than clarify the waters and
would very likely add to the expense of the foreclosing lender. If a
government agency is foreclosing, junior interest holders quite
arguably have the right to a due process hearing, although we know
of no case so holding. The Act leaves the provision and structuring of
such a hearing to the agencies involved without mandating it.
C. Other Protections for Residential Debtors
The remaining features of UNFA that provide special treatment
to residential debtors are fairly minor in terms of policy implications
and likely importance. These features are briefly addressed here to
provide a convenient reference.
1. Agreements Fixing Standards of Performance. UNFA allows
the parties to a security agreement to “determine the standards by
which performance of an obligation under this [Act] is to be
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216
measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.” This
language permits parties to commercial mortgage loans some degree
of increased flexibility in negotiating and drafting their agreements.
However, this provision is inapplicable if any debtor in the
transaction is a residential debtor. This exemption results from
concern that creditors with superior bargaining power might take
advantage of residential debtors.

2. Double Notices. UNFA generally requires that debtors be
sent three notices in connection with a foreclosure. Two of these are
217
218
always required: a notice of default and a notice of foreclosure.
The third will vary depending on the method of foreclosure. If the
foreclosure will be conducted by auction sale, a copy of the
advertisement219 must be sent to the debtor. Alternatively, if
foreclosure will be accomplished by negotiated sale or appraisal, an
220
221
appropriate notice specifying the sale price or appraised value,
and the amount the foreclosing creditor proposes to credit to the
debtor and junior lienors on account of the property’s disposition,
must be sent.
In foreclosures involving only nonresidential debtors, a single
copy of each of these notices sent by ordinary mail is sufficient.
However, when such notices are sent to residential debtors, they are
entitled to two copies, one of which must be sent by registered or
222
certified mail. The purpose of the double-notice and registered or
certified mail requirements is to attempt to overcome avoidance
behavior. When consumers accept a loan and promise to repay it,
they ordinarily have every expectation of being able to do so. Default
is usually associated with problems that were not anticipated by
either the debtor or the creditor when the loan was made: ill
health, loss of employment, breakup of a domestic relationship,
excessive debt service burden,223 or a combination of these
216. UNFA art. 1, § 104(d). The concept is borrowed from section 1-302 of the UCC.
217. UNFA art. 2, § 202.
218. Id. §§ 203–204.
219. UNFA art. 3, § 303(b).
220. UNFA art. 4, § 403.
221. UNFA art. 5, § 503.
222. UNFA art. 1, § 108(b). A return receipt is not required, although many foreclosing
lenders or their counsel might consider it essential, given that it provides a convenient written
record of the delivery.
223. There is considerable evidence of a correlation between consumer bankruptcy filing
trends and consumer debt level and debt service burden; changes in these factors tend to result
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224
factors. When consumers cannot pay their bills, they often develop
feelings of inadequacy, hopelessness, and mental depression. Bad
news seems to accumulate, and for some people it simply becomes
unbearable.225 The simple act of opening an envelope containing a
notice from a bank or other creditor—likely to contain more bad
news—is avoided. The envelope may sit unopened on a desk or table
for weeks or months.
But avoidance behavior can be disastrous when foreclosure is
imminent. It raises a direct risk that debtors will lose their homes and
may even become homeless. UNFA therefore uses the double-notice
provision as a way of alerting borrowers that their homes are in
jeopardy. When two notices are sent, there is a greater chance that
one of them will actually be read. Recipients must sign for registered
or certified letters, further increasing the chance that those letters will
get attention. The notice of foreclosure must include an explanation
of any workout or loss mitigation plan available from the foreclosing
creditor;226 this feature may encourage at least some debtors to
communicate with their lenders and find solutions, rather than
passively allow the foreclosure to occur.

3. Notices Unclaimed or Sent to Incorrect Addresses. Two
fundamental problems arise for creditors in sending notices to
debtors. The first is determining an initial address to which the notice
should be directed, and the second is deciding on a proper course to
follow if an initial notice is returned undelivered. The first problem
may seem easy to resolve; the creditor can use the debtor’s address as
it appears in the loan file. However, that address may have been
obtained when the loan was made, some months or years earlier. The
in changes in the number of filings one year later. See Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Explaining
the (Complex) Causes of Consumer Bankruptcy, 20 AMERICAN BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (Sept.
2001) (“[D]ivorce rates partially predicted consumer [bankruptcy] filing rates.”). Of course,
increases in consumer debt, in turn, may well be related to illness, domestic breakup, and job
loss. The relationships among these factors are complex and difficult to isolate because of
myriad and shifting state exemption statutes, Federal Bankruptcy Code amendments, other
consumer protection statutes, and societal attitudes toward bankruptcy.
224. Little is known about the causes of consumer debt delinquency and insolvency. See
Carolyn Curnock, Insolvency Counseling—Innovation Based on the Fourteenth Century, 37
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 387, 405–06 (1999) (questioning the usual explanations asserted in
Canada).
225. See, e.g., Jourdan v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 42 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Alaska 2002)
(“[Debtor] moved for and was granted an open-ended continuance based on an affidavit from
her psychiatrist that for the time being she was ‘unable to deal with complex legal matters.’”).
226. UNFA art. 2, § 204(b)(12).
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debtor who has moved since that time may have sent the creditor a
notice of change of address, but such a notice can take numerous
forms, some of them quite informal. For example, the creditor may
become aware of an address change because of a telephone call from
the debtor, a new address on the debtor’s payment checks, a copy of a
property tax bill showing a new address, or a personal visit in which
the debtor informs some employee of the creditor of the change.
Should the creditor be charged with notice from some or all of these
sources, or only from a written notice sent by the debtor for that
227
purpose?
The second problem arises because mailed notices may not reach
their intended recipients. One reason this often occurs is that
addressees move without providing the foreclosing creditor with new
addresses, conduct that is more likely when they cannot pay their
bills. In such cases, the letter may be returned to the sender, stamped
“No longer at this address” or “Moved—no forwarding address.”
Hence, the sender knows that the address used is no longer valid and
can reasonably be expected to make some effort to determine a
correct address and resend the notice. UNFA so requires, as we
explain below.
There is, however, another common reason that the notice may
not reach the intended recipient. Assume that the notice was sent by
registered or certified mail, requiring the addressee’s signature. If the
letter carrier does not find the addressee, the carrier will leave a note
indicating that the addressee may pick up the letter at the post office.
The addressee, realizing or suspecting that the letter involves
foreclosure or some financial delinquency, may intentionally avoid
claiming it.228 The difficulty is that when a registered or certified letter
is returned to the sender as unclaimed, it is impossible for the sender
to know whether the addressee has moved or simply refused to claim
the letter.
Case law, often based on the specific language of the relevant
statute or the mortgage itself, varies widely in its approach to this
dilemma. One view is that debtors (and even junior interest holders)
227. See, e.g., Zeller v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 471 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(“A telephone call, a notation on a file by an employee of [the creditor], and the receipt of
payment by checks with the new address, do not show compliance with the [written notice]
requirement.”).
228. See, e.g., Tamm v. Gangitano, No. CV990175640S, 2001 WL 254265 at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 2, 2001) (“The undisputed evidence indicates also that the defendants may have
asserted lack of notice in bad faith by purposefully not claiming the letter.”).
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should keep the senior mortgage lender informed of their address
changes, and that if they fail to do so, notices delivered to original
addresses should be treated as received. Similarly, debtors should be
expected to claim their registered or certified letters. Under this view,
it does not matter whether the intended recipient has moved or
simply failed to claim the letter; in either case the recipient has acted
229
irresponsibly, and the notice is treated as having been received. The
alternative view, equally widely adopted, is that when the letter is
returned for whatever reason, the foreclosing creditor has a duty to
make a reasonable effort to locate the debtor’s current address and
send a further notice to any address identified through that effort.230
UNFA adopts a standardized approach to finding the correct
address to which notice must be sent, both as an original matter and
when the original letter is returned as undeliverable. First, the Act
provides a hierarchy of informational sources to which the foreclosing
creditor must resort in determining the initial address to which a
notice must be sent. The first source that the creditor must use is the
most recent address in the “security instrument or other document
[given by the recipient to the creditor] in connection with a security
231
instrument that contains an address.” This means that any written
229. Id. (stating that the lender gave sufficient notice by sending two letters by certified
mail, even though the recipients claimed not to have received them); Mueller v. Simmons, 634
S.W.2d 533, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that notice was sufficient when the trustee sent a
letter by certified mail and the post office notified the recipient to claim it, but the recipient
failed to do so); Southwest Nat’l Bank v. Carson, No. 2044 of 1989, 1990 WL 274462 (Pa. Com.
Pl. Feb. 20, 1990) (holding that sending notice to the debtor’s last known address was sufficient,
even if the debtor had moved, because the creditor had no duty to attempt to trace the debtor).
230. See Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 747 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ark. 1988) (“The
burden is on the party attempting service by publication to attempt to locate the [missing party
and to show the court] that after diligent inquiry, [the party’s] whereabouts remain[] unknown.”
(quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(f) cmt. 12)); Bank Mart v. Langley, 474 A.2d 491, 493 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1984) (finding that when a letter is unclaimed, the creditor must provide evidence of “all the
steps taken to determine whether notice by some other form could be given so that the court
may make an independent determination of the adequacy of the notice”); Sec. Pac. Fin. Corp. v.
Bishop, 704 P.2d 357, 360 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (setting foreclosure aside when notice by
registered or certified mail was sent to the correct address but was unclaimed); Barclays
Am./Mortgage Corp. v. BECA Enters., 446 S.E.2d 883, 885 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“[S]ervice by
publication is authorized only when a party ‘cannot with due diligence be served by personal
delivery or registered or certified mail.’” (quoting N.C. R. CIV. P. 4(j1) (1990))); Lewis v.
Premium Inv. Corp., 535 S.E.2d 139, 142 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (striking down a notice of
forfeiture of an installment contract that was returned to the vendor marked “unclaimed,” and
giving the debtor a further right of redemption).
231. UNFA art. 1, § 107(1)(A)(i), (B). Because “document” is defined as “a tangible
medium on which information is inscribed,” a telephone call will not be included, nor will an
electronic mail message unless it is printed. Id. § 102(5).
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communication from the recipient will be regarded as notice to the
creditor of an address change; a payment check, for example, or a
copy of a tax bill will do. On the other hand, oral communications will
not count as adequate notice unless the lender’s employees
memorialize them in writing in the loan file.
If no address is available from these sources, the creditor must
investigate the public real estate recordings and, if personal property
232
is included as part of the collateral, UCC filings. If these sources
provide no address, the creditor must make “reasonable efforts” to
233
determine a correct address. As a last resort, the creditor can use
the address of the real estate collateral.234
Suppose a notice sent to one of these addresses is returned
unclaimed or with a notation that the address is no longer valid. In
either case, the creditor now knows that “the notice will not be
received at the address to which the notice was directed,”235 and the
creditor must make a “reasonable effort” to find a correct address
236
and send a new copy of the notice to that address. UNFA does not
explicitly define “reasonable effort,” but the comment suggests that it
would include “any forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal
Service, the use of at least one generally-used telephone directory for
the area in which the recipient is believed to be located, and at least
one internet search database.”237 As technology develops, other
reasonable methods might become available.
When a notice is returned and a second effort to send it to a
correct address is made, a timing issue arises. The new notification
238
must occur “promptly” after the correct address is identified, but
that still might be substantially later than the date of the original
notice. In the case of nonresidential debtors, time periods run from
the date that the creditor gave the original notice,239 even though the
recipient is obviously likely to receive the notice some considerable

232. Id. § 107(1)(A)(ii). If this effort fails, and if the addressee holds a lease on the property,
the creditor can use the property address, plus any known apartment or unit number.
233. Id. § 107(1)(A)(iv).
234. Id. § 107(1)(A)(iii).
235. Id. § 108(e).
236. Id.
237. Id. § 108 cmt.
238. Id. § 108(e).
239. Notices by creditors under the Act are “given” when they are transmitted, not when
received. Hence, if the U.S. mail is used, depositing the notice with the Postal Service
constitutes “giving” the notice. Id. § 108(a)(4).
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time after it would have arrived had the original address been
240
correct.
For example, assume a notice of default is given by a mortgage
creditor to a debtor. The Act allows the debtor to cure the default for
241
up to thirty days from the date that the creditor gave the notice.
Suppose, however, that the debtor moved without informing the
creditor, and five days after the creditor mailed the notice, it is
returned stamped “No longer at this address; no forwarding address
available.” The creditor would then consult a current telephone
directory, discover a new address for the debtor, and send a new copy
of the notice of default. Because of the address error, the debtor
might not receive the notice until, say, ten days or more after the
original notice was mailed.
If all of the debtors are nonresidential, the thirty-day cure period
242
runs from the date that the original notice was mailed. This will
have the effect of shortening the effective cure period, of course, but
that is a penalty that nonresidential debtors must pay for failing to
provide their creditors with current address information. However,
the Act is more lenient toward residential debtors: the time for cure is
computed from the date that the replacement notice is mailed, with a
maximum time extension of forty-five days.243 This benefit to
residential debtors is an acknowledgment that consumers are often
less organized and punctilious in keeping their creditors informed
than business borrowers. The extension would also apply to a
debtor’s request for a meeting to object to the foreclosure, which the
Act requires the debtor to make within thirty days from the date the
foreclosure notice was given.244
4. Right to Notice of Default and Cure Period. In general, if a
mortgage or promissory note so provides, a default may result in an
immediate acceleration of the debt by the creditor. Acceleration,
which must be accomplished by some affirmative act of the creditor,
means that the entire debt—not merely the missed installment
payments—becomes due. Once acceleration has occurred, the debtor
can prevent foreclosure only by paying the full amount (including,

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. § 108(e)(1).
UNFA art. 2, § 202(c).
UNFA art. 1, § 108(e)(1).
Id. § 108(e)(2).
UNFA art. 2, § 206(a).
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typically, any accrued interest, late fees, attorneys’ fees, and other
expenses that the creditor has incurred), unless a statute expressly
245
authorizes cure by payment of only the missed payments.
This may seem unreasonable on its face. “Surely,” most
borrowers must think, “my lender cannot force me to pay off the loan
under threat of foreclosure simply because I was one day late with
one monthly payment.” Perhaps most lenders would not exercise
their right of acceleration in such a peremptory fashion, but it is
reasonably clear that the right exists.246 A court might exercise
equitable discretion by refusing to recognize the acceleration if the
creditor’s action was in bad faith247 or the debtor’s default was
248
inadvertent or due to factors beyond the debtor’s control. However,
debtors cannot rely on such discretion being exercised in their favor
in any given case.
Why would a lender act in this fashion? Most lenders do not
want to foreclose, and do so only as a last resort. But to see why the
“hammer” of acceleration might fall, consider the following case.
Assume that the borrower is a commercial entity with considerable
financial strength. It has made all payments on the mortgage loan on
time, and has complied with all of the other covenants in the
mortgage. The loan has a fixed interest rate that approximated
market level when it was made. However, a large run-up in interest
rates has occurred since that time, and the loan is now several
percentage points below current market rates. This loan is a sore spot
with the lender. The lender’s cost of funds has also increased, and
now exceeds the interest rate on the loan; every day the loan
continues in place represents a further economic loss.

245. The classic case is Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885–86 (N.Y. 1930),
which found the acceleration effective although the default was brief and inadvertent. In a
widely cited dissent, Judge Cardozo argued that default should have been excused. Id. at 886–
89.
246. Id. at 885–86.
247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.1(d) (1997) (“A mortgagor
may defeat acceleration [if] . . . the mortgagee has engaged in fraud . . . .”). Although such
mortgagee misconduct may be the basis for defeating acceleration, the “mortgagor’s negligence,
mistake, or improvidence are not.” Id. § 8.1 cmt. e.
248. See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Taylor, 318 So. 2d 203, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (excusing a loan default when the mortgagor was in the Philippines in military service and
had difficulty communicating with the mortgagee in the United States); DiMatteo v. N.
Tonawanda Auto Wash, Inc., 476 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1984) (finding that inadvertent
default raised factual questions that might prevent foreclosure).
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Assume further that a payment on the loan arrives a day or two
late. The reason for the payment’s tardiness might be a clerical error
by the borrower’s staff, a storm or other natural disaster, or a delay in
postal operations—perhaps another anthrax scare. Whatever the
reason, the creditor realizes that it has an opportunity to get rid of a
very undesirable loan. Perhaps some lenders would resist the
temptation to accelerate, fearing that doing so would jeopardize a
longstanding business relationship with the borrower, but lenders
who have no such relationship or scruples might well drop the
hammer. The borrower’s real sin is not the default, but rather having
too good a deal in economic terms—a deal that the lender is anxious
to escape at the first opportunity.
The scenario above has little relevance to loans secured by
individual residences. Throughout the nation, nearly all residential
loans are written on the standard mortgage or deed of trust forms
approved by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Clause 22 of that form,
although varying in details from state to state to accommodate
variations in local law, uniformly provides that the borrower is
entitled to written notice of any default and at least a thirty-day
period to cure it.249 Acceleration can occur only if no cure is effected
250
in the time allowed.
In principle, nonresidential borrowers can negotiate similar
notice and cure rights for themselves. In current practice, however,
commercial mortgage loan documents usually make a distinction
between monetary and nonmonetary defaults. For nonmonetary
defaults, such as failure of the borrower to provide financial reports
to the lender or to make timely repairs on the property, commercial
mortgage lenders are nearly always willing to agree to give notice and
a cure period (commonly ranging from ten to thirty days) before
accelerating. With respect to monetary defaults, however, many
251
lenders simply refuse to agree to any notice or cure period.
249. For links to state-specific mortgage forms, all of which allow a thirty-day period to cure
default, see Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, Mortgage Documents Security Instruments, at
http://www.efanniemae.com/singlefamily/forms_guidelines/mortgage_documents/sec_instr.jhtml
?role’ou (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
250. See Schaeffer v. Chapman, 861 P.2d 611, 613–14 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that the thirtyday cure right provided by the Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac form must precede the ninety-day
period between the notice of sale and the actual date of sale under Arizona law).
251. One of the authors negotiated about twenty commercial mortgage loans, ranging from
$1 million to $20 million, on behalf of borrowers from 2001 to 2003. In every case, the loan
documents as originally drafted by the lender made no provision for notice or cure of monetary
defaults. In about one-third of those cases, the lender was persuaded to modify its forms to
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External legal rules may also influence the availability of
acceleration. A number of states have adopted “arrearages” statutes
that prohibit acceleration of a mortgage loan until the borrower has
252
been given notice and an opportunity to cure the default. In some
states, debtor protection takes the form of a two-notice system:253 the
lender must first deliver a notice of default, wait a prescribed period,
and then deliver a notice of foreclosure if no cure has been made. In a
two-notice system, acceleration cannot occur until the notice of
foreclosure is issued. Other states use a single notice—typically called
a notice of foreclosure—but require the lender to rescind or
terminate the notice or discontinue the foreclosure if cure is made

provide for such notice, but in the majority of cases the lender refused to make any change.
Even when the borrower proposed a cure period as short as twenty-four hours and notice by
telephone, fax, or electronic mail, most lenders refused.
252. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070(b) (Michie 2002) (permitting cure any time prior to
the foreclosure sale); CAL. CIV. CODE, § 2924c(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (permitting cure up to
five days before the foreclosure sale); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-104(a), (c) (2003) (permitting
cure up to one day prior to the foreclosure sale, if the curing party gives notice of intent to cure
at least fifteen days prior to the sale); D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-815.01(b) (Supp. 2004) (permitting
cure for residential loans up to five days prior to the sale); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-28(c)
(Michie 2002) (permitting cure up to three business days before the sale); IDAHO CODE
§ 45-1506(12) (Michie 2003) (permitting cure up to 115 days from the recording of the notice of
default); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1602 (West 2003) (permitting cure up to ninety days
from the date of service of process in the foreclosure action); IOWA CODE ANN. § 655A.3 (West
Supp. 2004) (permitting cure for thirty days after receipt of the default notice); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 580.30 (West 2000) (permitting cure up to the time of the foreclosure sale); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 408.555(4) (West 2001) (permitting cure up to the time of the foreclosure sale, for
certain junior residential mortgages only); MONT. CODE ANN. 71-1-312(1) (2003) (permitting
cure up to the time of the foreclosure sale, for small tracts only); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
107.080(2)(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 2003) (permitting cure for thirty-five days after the recording
and mailing of the default notice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 44 (West 1996) (permitting cure
for thirty-five days after the sending of the default notice); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.753 (2003)
(permitting cure up to five days before the date set for the foreclosure sale); 41 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 404 (West 1999) (permitting cure up to one hour before the commencement of the
judicial foreclosure sale, for residential mortgages only); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2004) (permitting cure for twenty days after sending of the default notice);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31 (Supp. 2004) (permitting cure within three months of the date of
filing of the default notice); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.090(1) (West 2004) (permitting
cure up to eleven days prior to the scheduled date of the foreclosure sale).
Except for the District of Columbia, the creation of a statutory right to cure is largely a
Midwestern and Western phenomenon. We have identified no right to cure without acceleration
in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, or Wyoming.
253. States with two-notice systems include California, Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Washington. See supra note 252.
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254
within a specified period. Again, “cure” here means payment of the
unaccelerated delinquent amounts, plus any attorneys’ fees and costs
expended by the creditor.255
UNFA represents the view that it is fundamentally unfair to give
a creditor a right to accelerate upon default with absolutely no
opportunity for the debtor to cure. A minor default may occur even if
the debtor is extremely careful, well-managed, and solvent, and the
results of such an acceleration can be financially catastrophic,
potentially forcing the debtor to refinance under extremely adverse
economic conditions at a much higher interest rate.
UNFA implements the right to cure by employing a two-notice
system. The secured creditor must first give the debtor a notice of
default, specifying the nature of the default and advising the debtor of
the amount of time allowed for cure.256 That time is ordinarily thirty
days, but if the default is not monetary and a debtor promptly
commences to cure and diligently proceeds, a period of ninety days is
allowed to complete the cure.257 The thirty-day period can be reduced
by agreement to as little as ten days if the security does not include
any residential real property.258 If a cure is made (either within the
allowed time period or after it has expired but before an
acceleration), no notice of foreclosure can be given and any
purported acceleration on account of that default is ineffective.259 The
cure right provided by UNFA runs concurrently with any cure right
provided in the security instrument itself, and the longer of the two
governs.260 For example, if the instrument allows a sixty-day cure
period for monetary defaults, it will prevail over the thirty-day period
allowed by UNFA.

254. States following this model include Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania. See supra note 252.
255. Alaska’s statute is typical of such provisions: “[T]he default may be cured by payment
of the sum in default other than the principal which would not then be due if no default had
occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default.”
ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070(b).
256. UNFA art. 2, § 202(b).
257. Id. § 202(c). The thirty-day period was selected as consistent with that allowed by the
standard Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac residential mortgage and deed of trust forms. See supra note
249 and accompanying text. If no one is diligently pursuing cure of a nonmonetary default thirty
days after the giving of the notice, the creditor is authorized to terminate the cure period and
accelerate the debt immediately. Id. § 202(d).
258. Id. § 202(e).
259. Id. § 202(h).
260. Id. § 202(g).
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The notice and cure provisions of UNFA might be criticized on
the ground that the notice of default must be given only to debtors,
and not to holders of junior interests who might be willing to cure.
Indeed, it is not unusual for junior lienholders or tenants to have a
greater financial stake at risk in foreclosure than the debtor. They
may have a greater financial capacity to cure the default as well.
Nonetheless, under UNFA only debtors are entitled to a notice of
default. This is consistent with the usual practice in states using a twonotice system, all of which direct the preliminary notice only to the
261
debtor. Of course, if a junior lienholder or tenant nonetheless cures
the default, the cure is effective to prevent foreclosure.
The principal argument for limiting the notice of default to the
debtor is that it minimizes the creditor’s costs. The creditor nearly
always has an address in its files for the debtor, but is unlikely to
know the identities or addresses of subordinate interest holders
without going to the expense and trouble of obtaining a title
examination. To cure the default, the curing party will have to pay the
creditor’s expenses as well as the delinquent payments. Hence,
limiting the notice of default to debtors reduces costs and makes a
cure more feasible. In many cases, junior interest holders will learn
about the default from the debtor (perhaps because the debtor has
also defaulted on the junior obligations). This will not always be so,
but UNFA’s approach nonetheless seems an acceptable compromise.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE “OMITTED JUNIOR”
Foreclosures, whether judicial or by power of sale, are sometimes
conducted imperfectly. One common error is the failure of the
foreclosing creditor to join as parties (in a judicial foreclosure) or to
give notice of the foreclosure (in a power of sale foreclosure) to one
or more subordinate interest holders. Although such interest holders
are usually described loosely as junior lienors, they may in fact hold
interests other than liens, such as leases, easements, or covenants. The

261. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring that notice of
default be sent to “each trustor or mortgagor,” as well as to persons who have recorded a
request for notice); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 107.080(3) (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring notice “to
the grantor, and to the person who holds the title of record”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 44
(West 1996) (mandating notice “to the mortgagor”); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2004) (requiring notice to “the debtor in default”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-26
(Supp. 2004) (requiring that notice be mailed to the address of either the trustor or the
property); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030(7) (2004) (mandating notice to “the borrower
and grantor”).
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omission of these interest holders is usually the result of an error by
the examiner who was employed to search the title in preparation for
the foreclosure.
In some cases, however, the foreclosing creditor may quite
consciously and intentionally omit a party. In nearly all of those cases,
the omitted party is a tenant holding a lease on the property that is
subordinate to the mortgage being foreclosed. Often the creditor has
evaluated the lease and concluded that its continuation after the
foreclosure is desirable and will add to the property’s value. Hence,
the creditor’s objective in omitting the tenant is to preserve the lease
from the terminating effect of the foreclosure.
Existing foreclosure statutes, both those dealing with judicial
foreclosure and those authorizing nonjudicial foreclosure, generally
fail to deal adequately with the results of omitting a junior party. The
courts have been forced to fill in the gaps. In doing so, they have
balanced the economic interests at stake with varying degrees of
success. By contrast, UNFA sets out the law unambiguously.
In this Part, we first consider how the courts have dealt with the
problem of the omitted junior party and compare those judicial rules
with UNFA’s position. We then give particular attention to
preservation of junior leases, a topic that has engendered much
judicial confusion. We analyze UNFA’s approach, which gives the
foreclosing creditor a great deal of flexibility in deciding whether the
foreclosure will terminate junior leases.
Finally, we consider UNFA’s treatment of unrecorded junior
leases. Such leases can be extremely problematic to foreclosing
creditors, but their treatment under existing nonjudicial foreclosure
statutes is generally a muddle. To cut off unrecorded leases under
UNFA, a foreclosing creditor must provide notice to the tenants only
if the creditor has knowledge of their existence. If the foreclosing
creditor is unaware of the unrecorded tenants, their leases can be
terminated by foreclosure without any notice. Constructive notice is
not imputed to the creditor from the tenant’s possession. We
conclude that this approach is consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties and the overall fairness of the foreclosure
system.
A. The Judicial Foreclosure Analogy
When foreclosures are conducted judicially, the courts have
carefully worked out the rights of omitted parties and the impact of
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these rights on the foreclosure process. The foreclosure sale transfers
to the purchaser the rights of all nonomitted parties, including the
262
mortgagor and the foreclosing mortgagee, and the foreclosure is
263
valid and effective despite failure to join the subordinate party.
However, the omitted party’s lien or interest is not affected by the
foreclosure. Hence, after the foreclosure, the omitted party retains all
of the rights that it had previously. For example, the omitted party
can redeem the original senior mortgage (which is regarded as
continuing to exist for this purpose), just as it could have done before
the foreclosure, forcing a transfer of the mortgage rights to the
omitted party. But because the original mortgagee’s rights have now
been transferred to the foreclosure purchaser, the omitted party must
redeem from the foreclosure purchaser rather than the original
mortgagee.264 Alternatively, if the omitted party holds a lien, it can
foreclose that lien against the original mortgagor’s rights; once again,
265
those rights are now held by the foreclosure purchaser. Finally, the
omitted party, if it is owed a liquidated sum, can seek to recover that
amount from any surplus foreclosure proceeds in the hands of the
mortgagor—obviously a long shot at best.266

262. See Downstate Nat’l Bank v. Elmore, 587 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding
that when a comortgagor was omitted as a party to the foreclosure action, the foreclosure was
ineffective as to his interest and a junior mortgagee’s claim on his interest).
263. See, e.g., W. Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 806 P.2d 1048, 1052–53 (N.M. 1991)
(preserving a junior mortgage when the junior mortgagee was not a party to the foreclosure);
United States Bank of Wash. v. Hursey, 806 P.2d 245, 247–48 (Wash. 1991) (permitting a first
mortgagee to bring a reforeclosure action against a junior mortgagee who was inadvertently
omitted from receiving notice of the first foreclosure); Patel v. Khan, 970 P.2d 836, 839 (Wyo.
1998) (finding that a junior mortgagee’s interest survived the foreclosure of a senior mortgage
because the junior mortgagee was not made a party to the proceeding). For a thorough
discussion, see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 572–80.
264. See Diamond Benefits Life Ins. Co. v. Troll, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 586–87 (Ct. App.
1998) (entitling an omitted junior easement holder to redeem from the foreclosure purchaser);
Akeley v. Miller, 264 So. 2d 473, 473–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (entitling an omitted junior
lienholder to redeem from a foreclosure purchaser); Kuehl v. Eckhart, 608 N.W.2d 475, 477
(Iowa 2000) (same); W. Bank, 806 P.2d at 1052 (same).
265. See Lenexa State Bank & Trust Co. v. Dixon, 559 P.2d 776, 783–84 (Kan. 1977) (finding
that holders of mechanics’ liens omitted from the foreclosure of the senior mortgage could
foreclose against the purchaser at the senior sale); Pease Co. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 495
N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (“Where a senior mortgagee forecloses his mortgage and
sells the property without notice to the junior mortgagee, the purchaser acquires title subject to
the rights of the junior mortgagee, which remain unaffected by the sale.”).
266. See Caito v. United Cal. Bank, 576 P.2d 466, 469 (Cal. 1978) (“[S]ubordinate liens . . .
attach to the surplus proceeds [of foreclosure] in order of their priority.”); Soles v. Sheppard, 99
Ill. 616, 621 (1881) (holding that a junior encumbrancer who was omitted from a senior
mortgage foreclosure could participate in the surplus from the senior sale).
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The foreclosure purchaser, on the other hand, has several
options: The purchaser can exercise the rights of the original
mortgagor, redeeming the omitted junior interest (if it is a mortgage
267
or lien). Alternatively, the purchaser can exercise the rights of the
original mortgagee, reforeclosing the mortgage but this time making
the formerly omitted interest holder a party.268 Yet another option for
the foreclosure purchaser is to seek a judicial decree of “strict
269
foreclosure,” cutting off the omitted interest entirely.
Despite their complexity, these rules are fair and work well. They
have the advantage of not “throwing the baby out with the bath
water”—that is, they do not void the entire foreclosure proceeding
because of the omission of a subordinate party; instead, they preserve
the rights of such parties while validating the rest of the procedure.
The problem of the omitted party also arises in designing power
of sale foreclosure procedures. In power of sale foreclosures, giving a
notice of foreclosure serves the same purpose as does service of
process in judicial proceedings. What is the result of failure to give
the statutorily required notice to a junior interest holder? In roughly
half of the existing power of sale statutes, the question does not arise
because there is no requirement that the holders of junior interests be
270
given any notice at all. In those states, the concept of omitting a
267. See Portland Mortgage Co. v. Creditors Protective Ass’n, 262 P.2d 918, 922–25 (Or.
1953) (affirming a foreclosure purchaser’s right to redeem property from an omitted junior
lien); Murphy v. Farwell, 9 Wis. 97, 103–04 (1859) (same).
268. See Diamond Benefits Life Ins. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585–86 (entitling a foreclosure
purchaser to foreclose against an omitted junior easement holder); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, 1340–41 (Okla. 1992) (entitling a foreclosure purchaser to foreclose
against an omitted property lien).
269. But see Miami-Dade County v. Imagine Props., Inc., 752 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that a senior foreclosure purchaser’s suit for strict foreclosure of an omitted
junior lien held by the county was subject to preemption by the county’s redemption of property
from a senior purchaser). Strict foreclosure should be available only upon a showing that the
junior lien has little or no value. See Miles v. Stehle, 36 N.W. 142, 143 (Neb. 1888) (approving
strict foreclosure when the property was worth no more than the other liens against it);
Mesiavech v. Newman, 184 A. 538, 539–40 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.1 cmt. b (1997) (acknowledging a presumption against “strict
foreclosure” remedies).
270. Jurisdictions that do not require notice to subordinate interest holders in power of sale
foreclosures include Alabama, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota
(unless the junior interest holder is in possession, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.03 (West 2000)),
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah (although notice
posted on the property may come to the attention of junior interest holders in possession, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-1-25(1)(b) (Supp. 2004)), West Virginia (unless the junior interest holder has
notified the foreclosing creditor of the interest, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-1-4 (Michie 1997)), and
Wyoming. In some of the jurisdictions mentioned, the absence of required notice is mitigated by
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junior party is meaningless. The drafters of UNFA quickly rejected
this approach. It is questionable in terms of fundamental fairness and
hard to justify in comparison with the protection provided to omitted
juniors in judicial foreclosure. Moreover, the UNFA drafters wished
to produce a statute that would be constitutional when applied in
foreclosures by government agencies, and it seemed quite likely that a
statute lacking a provision for notice to the holders of subordinate
interests that would be cut off by foreclosure would fail the due
process standard.271
For this reason, UNFA requires that notice of foreclosure be
given not only to debtors and their agents, but also to junior interest
holders known to the foreclosing creditor or identifiable through the
public records.272 It also requires notice to persons who have recorded
a request for notice in the public records and places no restrictions on
273
who can record such a request. There is no provision for notice to
holders of interests senior to the security instrument being foreclosed.
This is consistent with the current practice in judicial foreclosure,
which ordinarily does not require joinder of senior parties because
their rights are unaffected by foreclosure. In all of these respects,
UNFA establishes rules closely analogous to those governing judicial
foreclosure.
A power of sale foreclosure statute that, like UNFA, requires
notice to junior parties must consider what consequences should flow
from failure to provide the required notice. It appears that only one
existing statute in the United States directly addresses this
274
question —a rather surprising drafting lapse. In effect, the great
majority of statutes provide a list of persons whom creditors must
notify, but they contain no information about what results ensue if a
creditor fails to give the statutorily required notice. The one
exception is Washington state, which adopted a statute addressing the
results of failure to notify junior parties in response to Glidden v.
the statutory right of any person, including the holder of a subordinate interest, to record a
request for notice of the foreclosure of a particular security interest and thereby become
entitled to receive one.
271. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 138 (D. Me. 1976) (“To be adequate,
notice ‘must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.’ The newspaper
foreclosure notices, which the [mortgagors] did not see, plainly failed to meet this standard.”
(citations omitted)).
272. UNFA art. 2, § 203(c).
273. Id. § 205.
274. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.040(7) (West 2004). See infra notes 275–78 and
accompanying text.
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275
Municipal Authority of Tacoma. In Glidden, the trustee of a deed of
trust held by the municipal authority commenced a nonjudicial
foreclosure proceeding. The trustee failed to notify Old Stone Bank,
which held a junior deed of trust on the property, although she
advised the municipal authority on several occasions that she had sent
notice to all of the junior interest holders as required by the statute.276
The municipal authority purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale, and the foreclosure deed recited that all junior interest holders
had been notified. An unsuccessful bidder, joined by the trustee,
subsequently brought a suit to set aside the sale.
The court approached the case by referring to the Washington
statute that imposes a conclusive presumption in favor of bona fide
purchasers that the foreclosure procedure has met the statutory
277
requirements. For the court, the issue was whether the municipal
278
authority was a bona fide purchaser, and the court ultimately
remanded the case for a finding of fact on that point. The court did
not clarify whether the sort of “omitted junior” analysis that would
have applied to a judicial foreclosure should apply similarly in the
power of sale context if the foreclosure purchaser was not found to be

275. 758 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1988).
276. The Washington statute requires that notice of foreclosure be given to “[t]he
beneficiary of any deed of trust or mortgagee of any mortgage, or any person who has a lien or
claim of lien against the property, that was recorded subsequent to the recordation of the deed
of trust being foreclosed and before the recordation of the notice of sale.” WASH. REV. CODE
§ 61.24.040(1)(b)(ii).
277. Glidden, 758 P.2d at 490 (referring to WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040(7)). The
presumption in Washington applies only if the foreclosure deed recites compliance, as it did in
the Glidden case.
278. What power of sale foreclosure purchasers must do to qualify as bona fide purchasers is
debatable. If the purchasers have obtained their own title examination reports (as purchasers at
judicial sales are always expected to do), it is then a simple matter for the purchasers to compare
the names of the parties listed in the report with those to whom notice was actually given, as
reflected in the pleadings. However, it may not be customary for bidders at power of sale
foreclosures to make a similar examination of the notices that have been issued. As one highly
experienced Washington practitioner reported to the authors:
As a practical matter one [who is planning to bid] must (should) inspect the trustee’s
files. Whenever I represent a purchaser, I inspect the trustee’s file to review the
trustee guarantee (title foreclosure report) and the supplemental (post lis pendens—
Notice of trustee sale) and then I check for evidence of service on the correct parties.
On foreclosures we conduct, prospective purchasers often ask for copies of our
trustee reports, but rarely do they take the extra step to see if we have done our job
and actually served all the necessary parties.
E-mail from John Gose, Senior Counsel, Preston Gates & Ellis L.L.P. Seattle, Wash. to Grant S.
Nelson & Dale A. Whitman (Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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279
a bona fide purchaser. This oversight motivated real estate lawyers
in Washington to seek an immediate statutory amendment, enacted in
1989, providing:

[T]hese recitals shall not affect the lien or interest of any person
entitled to notice under RCW 61.24.040(1), if the trustee fails to give
the required notice to such person. In such case, the lien or interest
of such omitted person shall not be affected by the sale and such
omitted person shall be treated as if such person was the holder of
the same lien or interest and was omitted as a party defendant in a
280
judicial foreclosure proceeding.

Hence, the Washington legislature ultimately made the rules for
nonjudicial and judicial foreclosure identical with respect to omitted
junior parties, an entirely sensible result.
However, without a clear statutory statement on the issue, other
state courts have been unwilling to reach the same conclusion in the
context of nonjudicial foreclosure. Three other jurisdictions,
281
282
283
Nevada, Minnesota, and Missouri, have concluded that when no
notice is given to a party who is entitled by statute to notice, the
entire foreclosure is void. This result reflects a sort of mindless logic,
disregarding the parties’ needs and necessitating more work than is
really necessary to balance the interests of foreclosing creditors and
284
junior interest holders. Analogizing power of sale foreclosures to
judicial foreclosures, as UNFA does, makes much more sense.

279. Glidden, 758 P.2d at 490.
280. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.040(IX)(7).
281. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Nev. 1981) (holding
that when a vendee under a long-term installment purchase contract was a “successor in
interest” of a trustor and therefore entitled to notice of nonjudicial foreclosure, the failure to
give such notice rendered the foreclosure void).
282. Ledgerwood v. Hanford, 214 N.W. 925, 926 (Minn. 1927) (voiding the foreclosure when
the purchaser failed to give notice to the holder of a subordinate lease).
283. Williams v. Kimes, 996 S.W.2d 43, 45–46 (Mo. 1999) (finding null and void a power of
sale foreclosure by deed of trust without notice to the holders of a contingent remainder in the
property). Missouri does not require notice of foreclosure to subordinate interest holders. MO.
REV. STAT. § 443.325(3) (2000). However, the omitted party in Williams was the holder of a
contingent remainder in the property, and thus was entitled to notice as an “owner.” 996 S.W.2d
at 45–46. See also infra notes 306–10 and accompanying text.
284. It appears that in these cases both the attorneys and the court were unfamiliar with the
analogy of the omitted junior party in a judicial foreclosure; there is no indication in either
opinion that such reasoning was argued or considered.
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B. Preserving Junior Leases
The ability to omit a junior party is particularly useful to a
foreclosing creditor when the junior interest is a subordinate lease
that the creditor wishes to preserve from the extinguishing effect of
foreclosure. Junior leases are essentially different from junior liens
because they represent both a burden (the continuing possession of
the tenant) and a benefit (the rent that the tenant is obligated to pay).
A lease may be highly advantageous and add significantly to the
property’s value, particularly if its rent is at market level or above and
the tenant is solvent and pays reliably. If the continuation of such a
lease can be assured, the property is likely to sell in foreclosure for
more than if it were vacant. Thus, the ability to preserve junior leases
is potentially advantageous to the foreclosing creditor, other junior
lienholders, and the debtor. By comparison, junior liens are only a
burden, and every foreclosing creditor wants to pass title in the
foreclosure sale free of them.
In the judicial foreclosure setting, American jurisdictions are
about equally divided as to whether the foreclosing creditor can
preserve a junior lease against the will of the tenant. The creditor may
285
intentionally fail to serve the tenant as a party to the foreclosure,
but in about half of the states courts nonetheless consider the lease
terminated automatically or allow the omitted tenant to intervene in
order to be terminated by the foreclosure.286 States following this
approach are known as “automatic termination” jurisdictions. The
states that do not recognize such automatic termination or
intervention, therefore allowing the foreclosing creditor to decide

285. See Como, Inc. v. Carson Square, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 1247, 1249–50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a junior tenant who is not made a party to a judicial foreclosure is unaffected by
it). The Indiana Supreme Court divided equally on the issue, leaving the court of appeals
opinion as the law of the case. See Como, Inc. v. Carson Square, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 725, 726 (Ind.
1997).
286. See, e.g., Beach v. Beach Hotel Corp., 156 A. 865, 866 (Conn. 1931) (finding a lease
extinguished after a property sale); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987) (same); Hembree v. Mid-Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 580 N.E.2d 1103, 1109
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (same). See also National Bank of North America v. Gloucester Equities,
Inc., 372 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348–49 (Sup. Ct. 1975), which apparently requires foreclosing
mortgagees to name and serve all subordinate tenants in a judicial foreclosure action. The
ruling, if a correct statement of New York law, effectively prevents mortgagees from “picking
and choosing.”
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whether a particular lease will be terminated or not, are usually
287
termed “pick and choose” states.
There is nothing unfair or inefficient about permitting the
foreclosing creditor to make this decision. If the landlord is not in
default under the lease, there is no reason to permit the tenant to
escape the lease merely because the landlord has failed to pay its
obligations to a mortgage lender. Although it is in the nature of being
subordinate in priority that the tenant is at risk of having the lease
288
terminated in the event of foreclosure, it does not follow that the
tenant should be able to demand to have it terminated. To allow the
tenant to do so might give the tenant an unanticipated windfall, while
at the same time significantly devaluing the real estate and depriving
the creditor of its bargained-for security. To forestall this result,
mortgage creditors sometimes negotiate “attornment” agreements
with junior tenants in which each tenant covenants not to attempt to
terminate the lease in the event of a mortgage foreclosure.289 These
agreements are very helpful to lenders in “automatic termination”
states, but they are far from universal.
In the context of nonjudicial foreclosure, a creditor’s ability to
preserve junior leases is often impossible to predict, because in many
states neither the case law nor the foreclosure statutes provide clear
answers. However, one undesirable effect of holdings like those
mentioned above in Nevada, Minnesota, and Missouri—that failure
to name all parties specified by the foreclosure statute renders the
foreclosure void—is to make “picking and choosing” impossible in

287. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Bros. Constr. & Mfg., Inc., 859 P.2d 394, 396–97 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1993) (requiring the joinder of a junior leaseholder before the leaseholder’s interests could
be terminated and thereby permitting the mortgagee to avoid termination by failing to join the
leaseholder); see also Robert D. Feinstein & Sidney A. Keyles, Foreclosure: Subordination,
Non-Disturbance and Attornment Agreements, PROB. & PROP., July–Aug. 1989, at 38, 39–40
(describing agreements made by tenants to avoid the risk of lease termination in “pick and
choose” jurisdictions).
288. A tenant who is unwilling to accept the risk of termination can attempt to negotiate a
“nondisturbance” agreement with the senior creditor, assuring the tenant that the lease will not
be terminated upon foreclosure. Such an agreement was upheld in KVR Realties, Inc. v.
Treasure Star, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (1983).
289. See, e.g., Miscione v. Barton Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Ct. App. 1997)
(enforcing an attornment agreement in a lease). Whether such agreements should be necessary
is questionable. See Joshua Stein, Needless Disturbances? Do Nondisturbance Agreements
Justify All the Time and Trouble?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 701, 732 (2003) (suggesting
that there should be no need for an attornment agreement in the foreclosure context, because it
is clear that a tenant must attorn to an outright purchaser of the landlord’s interest whether the
lease contains an attornment clause or not).
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those jurisdictions. In effect, a state following that approach and
requiring notice to junior tenants says to the foreclosing creditor,
“You must send notice to the junior lessors and therefore terminate
their leases, whether you want to do so or not. If you don’t, we’ll
make you do it again until you get it right.”
As we have already noted, states that do not require notice to
junior parties create similar problems for creditors seeking to
preserve specific junior leases. In those states, there is simply no way
for a foreclosing creditor to omit a junior lease in order to preserve it,
because no notice need be sent to junior parties in any event. Even in
states like California, which requires notice to recorded junior
290
tenants, omitting notice to a tenant may not have the desired effect
of preserving the lease. This is illustrated by the decision of the
California Court of Appeal in Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form
Products, Inc.291 In Dover, the lease, by virtue of a subordination
agreement, was junior to the deed of trust. The purchaser at the
foreclosure sale regarded the lease as desirable and wanted to
preserve it, but the court held that it was terminated automatically by
the foreclosure. Indeed, the court seemed to say that termination is
always the result in a California nonjudicial foreclosure, and that it is
impossible for a creditor to foreclose without terminating all junior
leases.292 There is nothing in the California statute to contradict this
result, which is inefficient and represents an undesirable policy.
C. UNFA’s Flexible Approach
As UNFA illustrates, the inflexibility of the Nevada, Minnesota,
Missouri, and California nonjudicial foreclosure statutes is entirely
unnecessary. Under UNFA, the recording of the foreclosure deed
transfers title subject to “interests of persons entitled to notice of

290. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b(c)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
291. 270 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1990).
292. “A lease which is subordinate to the deed of trust is extinguished by the foreclosure
sale. A foreclosure proceeding destroys a lease junior to the deed of trust, as well as the lessee’s
rights and obligations under the lease.” Id. at 186 (citations omitted). Missouri and Texas
apparently agree, although in neither state is the relevant case particularly clear. See Kage v.
1795 Dunn Rd., Inc., 428 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Mo. 1968) (“[F]oreclosure of leased premises, under
a mortgage antedating the lease, nullifies and extinguishes the lease . . . .” (quoting Roosevelt
Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 56 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933))); Peck & Hills Furniture Co.
v. Long, 68 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (“The sale under foreclosure gave the right to
the purchaser to either terminate the lease or to continue it in force with the tenants’ consent.”
(emphasis added)).
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293
foreclosure . . . that were not given notice of foreclosure.” Because
junior lessees are generally entitled to notice under UNFA,294 all a
foreclosing creditor need do to omit a junior lessee intentionally and
preserve the junior lease is to refrain from sending notice of
foreclosure to the lessee. Because the affidavit that must be recorded
coincident with the foreclosure deed requires “identification of the
persons to which [sic] notice of foreclosure was given and the
recording data for documents reflecting their interests in the
collateral,”295 it is a simple matter for anyone checking the public
records to determine whether a particular lease or other interest was
omitted.
If a junior tenant is omitted, the tenant will remain bound under
the lease even though the purchaser at the foreclosure sale will be
substituted for the original landlord. No attornment agreement from
the tenant is necessary to preserve the lease. From the tenant’s
viewpoint, the situation is the same as if the landlord had simply
assigned its rights or had sold the property subject to the lease. The
tenant has no choice about whether to attorn; the duty arises
automatically.
UNFA also recognizes that, even after instituting a foreclosure
and giving notice of foreclosure to the full gamut of junior interest
holders, the foreclosing creditor may reverse its position and decide
to preserve an interest (typically a lease) whose holder has already
been sent notice. Such a reversal of position might result from the
creditor’s further investigation of the facts underlying the lease and
the discovery that retaining it would be economically advantageous.
This could probably be accomplished simply by sending a written
revocation of the notice, for UNFA permits the revocation of any
notice “unless the recipient materially changed its position in reliance
296
on the notice before receiving the revocation.” This provision would
probably accommodate such changes of position by a foreclosing
creditor in many circumstances.
However, that approach might also become bogged down in
litigation about the materiality of a tenant’s change of position. To

293. UNFA art. 6, § 603(2).
294. With one exception: unrecorded junior lessees are not entitled to notice unless the
foreclosing creditor has actual knowledge of them. UNFA provides an alternate method for the
creditor to preserve unrecorded junior leases, as described infra notes 297–99 and
accompanying text.
295. UNFA art. 6, § 602(a)(2)(E).
296. UNFA art. 1, § 111.
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avoid that situation, UNFA also provides that the foreclosing creditor
can give any junior interest holder a “notice of preservation” that will
preserve its interest from termination by the foreclosure even if a
297
notice of foreclosure has already been sent. There are, however, two
restrictions on the use of the “notice of preservation.” The first
restriction is that a notice of preservation ordinarily must be sent at
least thirty days prior to foreclosure,298 a provision intended to give
the junior party reasonable notice about its status when the
foreclosure is completed. The other restriction is that, having once
given a notice of preservation, the creditor cannot thereafter revoke
it. This provision prevents the creditor from manipulating the junior
party with a series of contradictory and confusing notices. If a notice
of preservation is given, this fact must be stated in the affidavit that is
recorded with the foreclosure deed299 so that parties who acquire
interests in the property later will be able to determine the status of
the leases. Through these provisions, UNFA gives foreclosing
creditors great latitude in deciding whether to terminate or preserve
junior leases, while at the same time ensuring that junior lessees are
fairly informed of their standing.
D. Unrecorded Leases
The discussion above assumes that junior leases are recorded, so
that the foreclosing creditor can discover them by a title examination.
In most jurisdictions, however, leases that do not exceed some stated
term—typically one, two, or three years—are not within the scope of
the recording acts.300 Moreover, as a practical matter, it is common to
have unrecorded leases of much longer terms. The question arises
whether the foreclosing creditor is bound by the doctrine of
“constructive notice” from possession by an unrecorded lessee. In
other words, if a tenant is in possession, does that possession give the
creditor sufficient notice so that the creditor, to terminate the lease,
must give notice of foreclosure to the tenant?
297. UNFA art. 2, § 210.
298. A later notice of preservation is permitted if, in a foreclosure by negotiated sale or by
appraisal, the foreclosing creditor receives a notice of objection to the sale from the holder of a
subordinate interest and wishes to preserve that interest to obviate the objection. UNFA art. 4,
§ 404(a)(2); art. 5, § 504(a)(2).
299. UNFA art. 6, § 602(a)(2)(G).
300. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18(a) (2003) (addressing leases not exceeding three
years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.08.060(3) (West Supp. 2004) (addressing leases not
exceeding two years).
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UNFA rejects the notion that a tenant is entitled to notice based
solely on the tenant’s possession. Such an entitlement would be
problematic from a practical perspective, because it can be very
difficult for an observer to detect whether persons in possession of
real estate are agents or employees of the owner or of a tenant.
Consider the case of a commercial warehouse, some portion of which
has been leased by its owner to a tenant. There are loading docks,
forklifts, and containers being moved about by various personnel.
Even if a foreclosing creditor visits the site and observes this activity,
the creditor has no information from which to discover that a lease
exists and that some part of the activity is being carried out by the
tenant’s personnel. Such a discovery depends on the creditor’s
fortuitously asking the right questions to the right people. Analogous
situations arise in office or retail store settings. In the view of
UNFA’s drafters, discerning whether a tenant is in possession is a
burden that cannot reasonably be imposed upon foreclosing lenders.
This policy decision manifests itself in the language of UNFA.
The Act provides that if foreclosing creditors know of a junior
interest and wish to terminate it, they have an obligation to notify the
301
interest holder of the foreclosure. Ordinarily, the doctrine of
302
constructive knowledge would apply under UNFA, because the Act
imputes knowledge of a fact if, “from all of the facts and
circumstances known to the person at the time in question, the person
has reason to know the fact exists.”303 But UNFA adopts a special rule
with regard to knowledge gained from visiting or viewing the
property: “If a foreclosing creditor would have reason to know a fact
only through an inspection of the collateral, knowledge of the fact is
imputed to the creditor only to the extent that the creditor has made

301. UNFA art. 2, § 203(c)(4).
302. The doctrine is usually termed “constructive notice.” See, e.g., Citgo Petroleum Corp. v.
Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 706 So. 2d 383, 385–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the
construction and operation of a pipeline gave the property's purchaser constructive notice of the
pipeline easement); Gordon v. Madison, 9 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (determining
that the owner’s possession of property, residence there, and collection of rents gave the
purchaser of the property constructive notice of the owner’s rights); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK &
DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 883–86 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing issues stemming
from constructive notice requirements). However, the drafters of UNFA were concerned about
the potential for confusion between “notice” as meaning the imputation of knowledge and
“notice” as referring to a document providing information to a recipient. To avoid the
confusion, they used the term “knowledge” rather than “notice” in the imputation context.
UNFA art. 1, § 112.
303. UNFA art. 1, § 112(a)(3).
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304
an inspection.” Hence, UNFA does not expect creditors to visit or
inspect the real estate before foreclosing. The creditor is held to have
knowledge of a lease or other subordinate interest from a party’s
possession only if the creditor in fact makes an inspection and actually
discovers facts indicating the existence of that interest.305
UNFA’s treatment of unrecorded junior interest holders is
consistent with some existing nonjudicial foreclosure statutes, but
those statutes paint a mixed picture. As noted in Section A, about
half of the statutes make no provision at all for notice to junior
interest holders. Of the statutes that do require notice to juniors,
many provide for such notice to be given only to those whose
306
interests are recorded. Some require notice, not only to junior
interest holders of record, but also to those of whom the creditor has
actual knowledge.307 A few also require notice to parties in possession,

304. Id. § 112(b).
305. Of course, the creditor may have knowledge of the junior lease from other information
sources, such as correspondence received from the borrower or the junior tenant. If the creditor
has such knowledge, it must give the tenant notice for the foreclosure to terminate the lease.
306. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-809B(2) (West Supp. 2003) (mandating notice
“to each person who . . . appears on the records of the county recorder . . . to have an interest in
any of the trust property”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b(c)(2) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring that
notice be given to “[t]he beneficiary or mortgagee of any deed of trust or mortgage recorded
subsequent to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38101(7)(a) (2003) (requiring notice “to each person who appears to have acquired a record
interest in the property described in such notice of sale subsequent to the recording of such deed
of trust”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-22(c)(2) (Michie 2002) (mandating notice to “[a]ny
prior or junior creditors having a recorded lien on the mortgaged property before the
recordation of the notice of default”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 45(A) (West 1996) (directing
notice to “any holder of a prior mortgage or other lien of record, and any person having an
interest, claim or lien of record in the property”).
307. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070(c) (Michie 2002) (requiring notice “where the lien
or interest appears of record or where the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice of the lien
or interest”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-104(b)(3) (Michie 2003) (requiring notice to “[a]ny
person having a lien or interest subsequent to the interest of the mortgagee or trustee when that
lien or interest appears of record or when the mortgagee, the trustee, or the beneficiary has
actual notice of the lien or interest”); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(2) (Michie 2003) (requiring notice
when “the beneficiary has actual notice”); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740(1)(b) (2003) (requiring
notice to the “successor in interest to the grantor whose interest appears of record, or of whose
interest the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice”). Virginia requires notice to
(i) the present owner of the property . . . (ii) any subordinate lienholder who holds a
note against the property secured by a deed of trust recorded at least 30 days prior to
the proposed sale . . . (iii) any assignee of such a note . . . (iv) any condominium unit
owners' association . . . (v) any property owners’ association . . . and (vi) any
proprietary lessees’ association which has filed a lien. . . .
VA. CODE. ANN. § 55-59.1(A) (Michie Supp. 2004).
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whether or not recorded or within the creditor’s actual knowledge.
New York provides for notice to those of whom the foreclosing
creditor has “constructive notice,”309 but offers no explanation of that
term’s meaning. Still other states provide for notice to juniors but
leave the reader to speculate about what steps are necessary to
identify the juniors.310 Overall, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the treatment of unrecorded leases was not a subject to which the
drafters of the existing foreclosuure statutes gave serious thought.
UNFA’s position is a reasonable compromise in light of the
difficulties faced by creditors in sending notice to persons in
possession whose interests are unrecorded. Well-advised tenants who
are concerned about getting foreclosure notices can eliminate the
problem by recording their leases or memoranda of their leases.
UNFA’s requirement that the foreclosing creditor post a conspicuous
sign on the property stating that foreclosure has commenced and
identifying the creditor also mitigates concern that persons in
311
possession may fail to discover the foreclosure.
Assuming that foreclosing creditors do not make preforeclosure
inspections that reveal the presence of unrecorded junior leases, that
they have no other knowledge of such leases, and that they therefore
send no notice of foreclosure to tenants, how do foreclosures affect
the leases? Such leases are terminated by foreclosure even absent
notice to the tenants in question. UNFA provides that title passes in

308. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 655A.3(2) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring that notice be
served “on the person in possession of the real estate, if different than the mortgagor, and on all
junior lienholders of record”); MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (West 2000) (requiring notice “upon the
person in possession of the mortgaged premises, if the same are actually occupied”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.040(1)(b)(vi) (West 2004) (mandating notice to persons with recorded
interests and “occupants of property consisting solely of a single-family residence, or a
condominium, cooperative, or other dwelling unit in a multiplex or other building containing
fewer than five residential units, whether or not the occupant’s rental agreement is recorded”).
309. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1402(1) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (repealed
effective July 1, 2005), requiring notice
to any person or entity having a lien of record upon the mortgaged property, or
interest in the mortgaged property subordinate to the mortgage that the mortgagee
seeks to foreclose, at the time of the filing of the notice of pendency of which the
mortgagee has actual knowledge or is on constructive notice.
310. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(c)(2) (2003) (requiring notice “to the
holder of any subordinate mortgage, deed of trust, or other subordinate interest”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-6.1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring service of notice “on the mortgagor
and any lien holder or encumbrancer whose interest in the property being foreclosed would be
affected by the foreclosure”).
311. UNFA art. 2, § 203(e). The sign must be posted within ten days of recording the notice
of foreclosure. Id.
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foreclosure subject to “interests of persons entitled to notice of
312
foreclosure . . . that were not given notice of foreclosure.” Because a
tenant whose lease is unrecorded and unknown to the creditor has no
entitlement to notice, the title passing out of foreclosure is not subject
to the tenant’s lease, and the lease is cut off. This rule effectively
imposes upon all tenants wishing to assure themselves notice of future
foreclosures the obligation to record their leases, to record requests
for notice,313 or in some other way to notify senior lenders of their
leases.
Suppose a foreclosing creditor wishes to preserve an unrecorded
subordinate lease which would otherwise be terminated automatically
by the provisions just discussed. Here again the “notice of
preservation” authorized by UNFA can come into play.314 The
creditor can reverse the usual result—termination of the lease—
simply by sending the tenant a notice of preservation up to thirty days
before foreclosure. Of course, a creditor cannot send a notice to a
tenant of whom the creditor is unaware. Hence, a creditor suspecting
that there may be unrecorded leases worth preserving has an
incentive to investigate the possible presence of such leases promptly.
V. POSTFORECLOSURE MEASURES
In this Part we focus on how UNFA deals with a variety of
postforeclosure issues that can undermine the efficiency and
predictability of the foreclosure process. First, we deal with UNFA’s
treatment of a foreclosure surplus—the amount by which the
foreclosure proceeds exceed the mortgage obligation and costs of
sale.315 Often competing claims to a surplus by the foreclosed
mortgagor and other junior interests can result in protracted
litigation. UNFA’s solution to these surplus disputes, however, may
itself be problematic and, consequently, is the subject of substantial
scrutiny in this Part. Next, we explore UNFA’s handling of deficiency
judgments and its special treatment of residential debtors.316 Our
focus is on the extent to which adoption of UNFA would impact
current state deficiency regulation. Third, we explore how UNFA
deals with one of the thorniest power of sale dilemmas—the fact that
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

UNFA art. 6, § 603(2).
UNFA art. 2, § 205.
Id. § 210.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
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power of sale foreclosure titles have traditionally been considered
more error-prone than those produced by judicial foreclosure. In this
context, we examine how UNFA’s “presumption” section deals with
317
title stability. Finally, we consider a very practical and sometimes
troubling postforeclosure question—how a foreclosure purchaser
obtains possession if the former owner refuses to leave the
premises.318 The UNFA approach to this issue is twofold. First, it
properly eschews the use of “self-help” by the purchaser. Second, it
makes it clear that the purchaser may obtain possession by invoking
the summary proceedings commonly used in the landlord-tenant
context. We conclude that this summary remedy is not the proper
forum for foreclosed parties to challenge the validity of the
purchaser’s foreclosure title.
A. The Disposition of Foreclosure Surplus
Sometimes a foreclosure sale yields a surplus amount in excess of
what is needed to satisfy the mortgage obligation and the expenses of
sale. In essence, when a surplus results, it represents what remains of
the debtor’s ownership or “equity of redemption” and is conceptually
a substitute res.319 As such, the surplus stands in the place of the
foreclosed real estate. The liens and other interests that previously
attached to that real estate attach to the surplus in the order of
priority that they enjoyed prior to the foreclosure.320 Even when
statutes or mortgage language purport to give the surplus to the
holder of the equity of redemption or the holder’s “legal
representative or assigns” and make no mention of junior interests,
courts interpret such statutes to give junior interests rights to the
surplus and priority over the holder of the equity of redemption.321

317. See infra Part V.C.
318. See infra Part V.D.
319. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 643.
320. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 (1997) (“[T]he surplus is applied
to liens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of their priority and the
remaining balance, if any, is distributed to the holder of the equity of redemption.”); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 643–47 (describing generally the rules of surplus).
321. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 643–47; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-10-14
(Michie 2002) (directing payment “to the mortgage debtor, mortgage debtor’s heirs, or other
persons assigned by the mortgage debtor”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.10 (West 2000) (mandating
that the surplus be paid to “the mortgagor, the mortgagor’s legal representatives or assigns”);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.150 (West 2004) (directing that “the surplus shall be paid to
the mortgage debtor, his heirs and assigns”); Cruse v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 91 B.R. 57, 59–60
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (finding that the language in a senior deed of trust purporting to give
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Thus, the claim of the foreclosed holder of the equity of redemption
is junior to all liens and other interests destroyed by the foreclosure.
These “other interests” are not limited to liens. “[Junior easement
holders and lessees] are entitled to receive, in order of their preforeclosure priority, the fair market value of their interests as of the
date of foreclosure.”322 Fair market value is determined in the same
323
manner as in eminent domain proceedings.
UNFA, however, may exclude such nonlien interests. Section 604
of UNFA provides that, after paying the obligation being foreclosed
and the costs of sale, the foreclosing creditor is directed to pay the
remaining proceeds in the following order: “in the order of their
priority, the amounts secured by all liens terminated by the
foreclosure; and . . . to the person that owned the collateral at the
324
time of foreclosure.” On its face this language could mean that the
holders of nonlien junior interests, such as easements and leases, have
no substantive claim to any surplus created by an UNFA foreclosure.
A more plausible interpretation, however, is that section 604’s
primary purpose is to provide the foreclosing creditor with an
efficient mechanism for disposing of the surplus and bringing the
foreclosure process to a prompt termination. Under this view, section
604 is procedural in nature and not intended to alter established

the senior surplus to the mortgagor over the junior lienors did not deprive the junior lienors of
priority to the surplus over the mortgagor); Boedeker v. Jordan, 79 B.R. 843, 843–44 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo 1986) (same); First Colonial Bank for Sav. v. Bergeron, 646 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (“[The statute] requires a foreclosing mortgagee to pay any surplus proceeds to
the ‘mortgagor, or his heirs, successors or assigns.’ The junior mortgagee, of course, is
considered to be a successor or assignee of the mortgagor, and therefore is entitled to surplus
proceeds under the statute.”); Fuller v. Langum, 33 N.W. 122, 122 (Minn. 1887) (finding a junior
lienor an “assign” of the mortgagor); Brown v. Crookston Agric. Assoc., 26 N.W. 907, 907–08
(Minn. 1886) (same).
Similarly, when the foregoing language is not statutory, but is contained in the
mortgage itself, courts favor junior interest holders over the holder of the equity of redemption.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 644. Under the Restatement, even “where mortgage
language directs that surplus be paid to the ‘mortgagor’ . . . . foreclosed junior lienholders and
other junior interests simply will be treated as ‘successors’ or ‘assigns’ of the mortgagor for
surplus disposition purposes.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 cmt. d.
Moreover, the Restatement continues to favor junior lienholders against the mortgagor even
where the senior mortgage makes it crystal clear that “surplus shall be paid to the mortgagor
and not to the holder of any lien or other interest subordinate to this mortgage.” Id. § 7.4 illus. 8.
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 cmt. d, illus. 3; see also
Anderman v. 1395 E. 52nd St. Realty Corp., 303 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (affirming an
easement holder’s valid claim to the surplus).
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 cmt. d, illus. 3.
324. UNFA art. 6, § 604(a) (emphasis added).
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norms governing terminated parties’ substantive rights to share in any
surplus. Language in the UNFA commentary to section 604
buttresses this position. The only reason articulated in the
commentary for excluding foreclosed easement holders and lessees is
325
the difficulty of establishing the value (if any) of such interests.
Thus efficiency, rather than hostility to the interests of foreclosed
lessees and easement holders, seems the dominant theme of the
section. The value of nonlien interests, unlike liens, is not liquidated,
and the holders of nonlien interests can still protect their interests by
other means. Therefore, omitting distribution to holders of such
interests avoids the administrative inconvenience of determining their
value.
Interpreting section 604 to omit nonlien interests would be
fundamentally unfair to junior easement holders and lessees, and
would radically upset fundamental property law norms. The notion
that a surplus represents what is left of the foreclosed real estate and
that foreclosed interests share in that substitute res in order of their
priority is a fundamental maxim of mortgage law.326 One cannot easily
assume that most legislatures adopting UNFA would contend that
valuation difficulties alone justify awarding the surplus to the former
equity of redemption holder as against the substantive claims of
former lessees and easement holders. This conclusion finds further
support in judicial decisions favoring foreclosed lienors and other
junior interest holders over the former equity of redemption holder
when courts are called upon to interpret statutory or mortgage
language purporting to grant exclusive surplus rights to the latter
party.327
There are other, more fundamental reasons to favor an
interpretation of section 604 supporting surplus rights of nonlien,
junior interests. Consider, for example, the plight of a foreclosed
commercial lessee who had a substantial bonus value (the fair market
value of the lessee’s remaining interest in the lease exceeded the
lessee’s rental obligation) in a terminated lease. Every lease contains
an express or implied covenant of quiet enjoyment that prohibits a

325. Id. § 604 cmt. The fact that section 604 is aimed primarily at making the foreclosure
process efficient for the foreclosing lender is also manifest in its language protecting lenders
from liability if they act “in good faith and without actual knowledge of the invalidity or lack of
priority of the claim of a person to which [sic] distribution is made.” Id. § 604(b).
326. See supra notes 319–21 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
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landlord from interfering with the lessee’s possession. When a
landlord-owner defaults on the mortgage obligation and allows
foreclosure to terminate a junior lessee’s possession, the covenant of
quiet enjoyment is violated.329 To permit the former landlord-owner’s
claim to surplus to trump that of the foreclosed lessee rewards the
former for violating his lease obligation, a result that hardly comports
with public policy.
Similarly, it is fundamentally unfair to deprive foreclosed
easement holders of their substantive right to a surplus. When
foreclosure destroys an easement that includes the usual warranties,
the grantor violates the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment,
which are designed to compensate the grantee if the grantee is later
330
evicted because of defective title to the easement. As in the junior
lease context, permitting the former equity holder to acquire any of
the surplus to the exclusion of the foreclosed easement holder would
reward the former for violating his contractual obligation—surely an
undesirable outcome.
Foreclosed lessees and easement holders also can assert other
policy arguments to trump the former equity holder’s claim to
surplus. For example, it is a fundamental norm of mortgage law that
“[a] holder of the equity of the redemption who purchases real estate
at a foreclosure sale . . . acquires title subject to any lien or other
interest that was junior to the foreclosed lien.”331 Thus, the mortgagor
cannot use the foreclosure to “cleanse” the title of the previously
created interests. Of course, if the equity holder is personally liable
on a junior lien or the junior interest contains the usual warranties of
title, it would be inequitable to enable the mortgagor to benefit by
violating those obligations. But even if the debt is nonrecourse and
title warranties are nonexistent, there are still sound policy reasons
for keeping those interests alive against the equity holder who is a
foreclosure purchaser:
Even where the mortgage obligation is completely “non-recourse,”
the mortgagor agrees to the satisfaction of that obligation out of the

328. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 302, at 281–84 (discussing the common law
right of quiet enjoyment).
329. Id. at 281; GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, & DALE A. WHITMAN,
CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 420 (2002) (“[T]he covenant promises the tenant . . . that no third
person who has a better right of possession than the tenant will disturb the tenant’s possession.”).
330. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 55, at 680.
331. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.9(a) (1997).
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mortgaged real estate. Thus, actions by the mortgagor that
undermine the ability of the mortgagee to realize on the benefits of
that agreement should be discouraged. Strong policy considerations
also compel the application of the same rule to transferees of the
mortgagor who take subject to the mortgage, but who do not assume
liability on existing liens. In this type of transaction, the purchase
price paid by the transferee is almost always reduced by the value of
any liens that the transferee agrees are to remain on the real estate.
To permit the transferee under such circumstances to acquire title
through a senior lien foreclosure and, in so doing, to destroy junior
liens, would enable the transferee to acquire the real estate for less
than originally contemplated. Such unjust enrichment of the
332
transferee should be discouraged.

Even if equity holders do not act affirmatively to purchase at a
foreclosure sale, the same considerations mitigate against taking any
of the surplus so long as other junior interests are not fully satisfied.
Whether the junior interest is a lienor, a lessee, or an easement
holder, the equity holder, in creating those interests, agrees that they
should be satisfied out of the mortgaged real estate. Moreover, when
the equity holder is a transferee, the purchase price of the real estate
is typically reduced to reflect the extent to which such encumbrances
reduce its value. To allow that transferee to benefit from the surplus
at the expense of those junior interests results in unjust enrichment.
Assuming that section 604 is intended simply to be an efficient
procedural mechanism for the foreclosing lender and not to alter
traditional norms governing the rights of foreclosed parties in surplus,
how should foreclosed lessees and easement holders proceed to
protect their interests? One possible remedy for holders of junior
interests is to file suit to enjoin the distribution of the surplus to the
former equity holder. In the context of such a suit, the lessee or
easement holder could make a substantive claim to priority in the
surplus as against the former equity holder. The problem with this
approach is that it interferes with the efficiency objective of section
604—to allow the foreclosing creditor to liquidate the real estate
without being entangled in protracted litigation. Thus, it is unlikely
that courts will entertain actions for injunctive relief instigated by the
holders of foreclosed junior interests.
A foreclosed lessee or easement holder is more likely to succeed
in filing suit against a former equity holder after the latter has
332.

Id. § 4.9 cmt. b.
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received surplus funds from the foreclosing lender. In filing such an
action, the interest holder would attach the surplus funds received by
the former equity holder. The suit would not interfere with the
foreclosure process and thus should be permitted to proceed. The
problem, of course, is that if, as is likely, the former equity holder
were also beset by the claims of other creditors, the former junior
interests could wind up recovering little, if anything, from those
surplus funds. Once the surplus is paid out and commingled with the
former equity holder’s other assets, there would no longer be a res or
remainder of the mortgaged real estate to which a lien could attach.
An alternative approach, however, could prevent the
commingling of the surplus. The former junior interest holder, after
filing suit, could seek a writ of garnishment against the former equity
holder. The effect of such a writ would be to intercept the funds
coming to the former equity holder, ordering the foreclosing creditor
to pay those funds into court to satisfy the junior interest holder’s
claim. Under this approach no commingling would occur. In addition,
the foreclosing creditor would have no concern about the time and
expense required to establish the value of the junior interest—that
would be a matter for decision in a suit between the junior interest
holder and the former equity holder. Thus the concern for
administrative inconvenience to the foreclosing creditor would not be
implicated. The garnishment should take priority over the claims of
the general creditors of the former equity holder, because the
foreclosure proceeds would not yet have been commingled with the
former equity holder’s other assets and the junior interest holder
would have a special and unique claim to those proceeds under the
substitute res theory described above.
Section 604, even if interpreted most favorably to junior lessees
and easement holders, is still substantially and unjustifiably
prejudicial to those parties, forcing them to file lawsuits to get what is
theirs. In our judgment, it would be preferable to amend section 604
prior to its adoption by any jurisdiction to clarify that surplus should
be paid to all junior interests in order of their preforeclosure priority.
After all, in the rare instances in which valuation questions arise and
the junior interests fail to act in their self-interest to resolve the
dispute among themselves, the foreclosing lender can resort to
interpleader, a remedy that section 604 already makes available.
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B. Deficiency Judgments and Personal Liability
In many cases, however, the foreclosure sale does not result in
any surplus. Instead, the proceeds fall short of satisfying the
foreclosed obligation, and the question arises as to whether the
foreclosing creditor can recover a judgment against the mortgagor’s
other assets to cover the deficiency. UNFA is generally friendly to
creditors seeking such deficiency judgments. First, UNFA does not
mandate a “one-action” or “security-first” rule, which, as we
described in Part I.A,333 requires a creditor to foreclose on the
mortgaged real estate before bringing any personal action against the
debtor on the mortgage obligation.334 Second, a creditor who
forecloses under UNFA may, in general, obtain a deficiency
judgment against any person who is personally liable on the mortgage
obligation.335
1. The Safe Harbor for Residential Debtors. Only residential
debtors are protected from this “prodeficiency judgment” rule.
Residential debtors are not subject to deficiency judgments unless a
court finds that they did not act in good faith and that their conduct
“caused significant loss or damage to the foreclosing creditor or the
336
collateral.” According to the UNFA commentary,
Lenders generally believe that the threat of a deficiency judgment,
even if it will rarely be enforceable as a practical matter, provides a
useful inducement to borrowers to behave responsibly. The Act
adopts that principle; under the “good faith” concept here, the risk
of deficiency liability may dissuade a residential debtor from
committing waste or fraud, or engaging in other acts detrimental to
337
the foreclosing creditor’s interests.

On the other hand, a court will only infrequently find an absence of
good faith. Not only does a creditor seeking a deficiency judgment
have the burden of establishing an absence of good faith, but UNFA

333. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
334. UNFA art. 1, § 103 cmt.
335. UNFA art. 6, § 607(a). UNFA imposes no limitations period for deficiency actions
against debtors other than residential debtors. Such actions are governed by the adopting state’s
general statutes of limitation. Id. § 607 cmt. In states permitting deficiency actions against
residential debtors, an action must be commenced within ninety days of foreclosure. Id. § 607(f).
336. Id. § 607(b)(2).
337. Id. § 607 cmt.
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also affords a safe harbor against deficiency liability to a residential
debtor who:
(1) peaceably vacated the real property collateral and relinquished
any personal property collateral within 21 days after the time of
foreclosure and the receipt of a notice demanding possession by the
person entitled to possession by virtue of the foreclosure;
(2) did not engage in activity, unauthorized by the foreclosing
creditor, that significantly reduced the value of the collateral as of
the time possession was relinquished . . . ;
(3) did not commit fraud against the foreclosing creditor;
(4) did not permit significant uncured damage to the collateral by
other persons or natural causes as a consequence of the debtor’s
failure to take reasonable precautions against such damage; and
(5) provided reasonable access to the collateral for inspection by the
338
foreclosing creditor and prospective purchasers.

Moreover, because the foregoing rules represent only a safe
harbor, a finding of good faith is possible even if there were minor
violations of the rules, at least if the violations did not cause
significant damage to the creditor’s security interest.339
Unfortunately, this feature of UNFA may also protect a
residential debtor who, for perfectly rational reasons, chooses default
and foreclosure as an escape from what has developed into an unwise
housing investment. Consider, for example, an upscale homeowner
with substantial assets and income who owns a house in an area
suffering from a weak economy and a substantial decline in real
estate prices. These conditions existed, for example, in southern
California in the early 1990s and in Texas during the mid-1980s.
Suppose this homeowner paid $800,000 for a house at the peak of the
market. Three years later, the house is worth $500,000 and the
mortgage on it has a balance of $590,000; the owner thus has
“negative equity” in the property. Not wanting to “throw good money
after bad,” the owner, who has the financial ability to make further
payments, chooses to default. So long as the owner complies with the
five “safe harbor” elements delineated above, UNFA appears to treat
338.
339.

Id. § 607(c).
Id. § 607 cmt.
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this defaulting debtor, who has the ability to pay, as being in “good
faith” and therefore immune from a deficiency judgment. There is a
persuasive argument that “choosing to default” when one has the
ability to pay should be treated as strong evidence of “bad faith” even
though the safe harbor elements are satisfied. An adopting
jurisdiction might want to modify UNFA’s language to clarify that
such strategic behavior can subject a residential debtor to deficiency
liability.
2. The “Fair Value” Limitation on Deficiencies. When a
deficiency judgment is permitted under UNFA, it is defined as the
difference between the foreclosure amount (the sale price less the
340
expenses of foreclosure) and the mortgage obligation. However,
when the foreclosure is by auction sale (or, in the case of residential
debtors, by any of the three types of foreclosure authorized by
UNFA), a debtor may require that the deficiency judgment be subject
to a “fair value” limitation.341 As described in Part I.A, states utilizing
this statutory approach measure a deficiency judgment as the
difference between the foreclosure price and the fair market value of
the property.342 Two policy justifications are articulated for this
limitation on deficiency judgments:
This approach enables the [foreclosing creditor] to be made whole
where the mortgaged real estate is insufficient to satisfy the
mortgage obligation, but at the same time protects against the
[foreclosing creditor’s] purchasing the property at a deflated price,
obtaining a deficiency judgment and, by reselling the real estate at a
profit, achieving a recovery that exceeds the obligation. Thus, it is
aimed primarily at preventing the unjust enrichment of the
[foreclosing creditor]. [It] also protects the [debtor] from the harsh
consequences of suffering both the loss of the real estate and the
burden of a deficiency judgment that does not fairly recognize the
343
value of that real estate.

UNFA’s formulation utilizes a “90 percent of fair market value”
approach. Thus, a debtor against whom such a judgment is sought
“may offer proof that the foreclosure amount was less than 90 percent
of the fair market value of the collateral as of the time of the

340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. § 608(a).
Id. § 608(b)(2).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a (1997).
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344
auction.” The court, if convinced by the debtor’s proof, “shall
substitute 90 percent of the fair market value of the collateral for the
foreclosure amount” in determining the amount of the deficiency.345
UNFA adopts this approach to “approximate the probable cost to the
foreclosure purchaser of holding and liquidating the collateral, and to
reflect the sense that it is usually unrealistic to expect foreclosure
346
amounts significantly higher than 90% of fair value.” This fair
market value limitation is available to debtors irrespective of whether
the foreclosure purchaser is the foreclosing creditor or a third party.347
The following example helpfully illustrates the impact of a fair
market value limitation. A mortgage with a current balance of
$200,000 (the only lien on the real estate) is foreclosed at a public
auction sale. The successful bid price at the foreclosure sale is
$140,000. Valid expenses of sale are $3,000. In the absence of a fair
market value limitation, the proceeds of sale would be distributed as
follows: First, $3,000 would be used to pay the expenses of
foreclosure. Next, the remaining amount, $137,000, would be paid to
the foreclosing creditor. The deficiency judgment would be $63,000
($200,000 minus $137,000).
Assume instead that the UNFA fair market value limitation is
applicable. A court determines that the fair market value of the real
estate at the time of foreclosure was $175,000 and that 90 percent of
the latter amount is $157,000. Because the foreclosure amount
($140,000) is less that $157,000, the court treats $157,000 as the
foreclosure amount. The foreclosing mortgagee then distributes the
funds as follows: $3,000 would be allotted to pay the foreclosure
expenses and $154,000 would be credited to the amount owing on the
foreclosed mortgage. The UNFA deficiency judgment would be

344. UNFA art. 6, § 608(b)(2).
345. Id. § 608(c).
346. Id. § 608 cmt. The Restatement endorses the “fair market value” concept for measuring
deficiency judgments, but it does not use the 90 percent figure. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4(d) (“If it is determined that the fair market value is greater than the
foreclosure sale price, the persons against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are entitled
to an offset against the deficiency in the amount by which the fair market value . . . exceeds the
sale price.”). However, the Restatement recognizes that “[w]here the mortgagee is the
foreclosure purchaser, after the fair market value is determined, the court must deduct from
that amount the mortgagee’s anticipated reasonable costs of resale. This amount will include a
reasonable broker’s commission, seller’s title expenses and related costs.” Id. § 8.4 cmt. Hence,
applying the Restatement will produce a result roughly similar to UNFA’s.
347. UNFA art. 6, § 608 cmt.

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1493

$46,000 ($200,000 minus $154,000). As this example shows, UNFA’s
fair value rule can result in a significantly reduced deficiency liability.
3. Fitting UNFA into Existing State Law. We turn now to
consideration of the extent to which adoption of UNFA would
change current state law governing deficiency judgments and debtor
personal liability. Generalizations are difficult, however, because this
area of mortgage law not only lacks national uniformity, but, in a few
348
jurisdictions, can be fiendishly labyrinthine in its complexity. At one
doctrinal pole are states that currently follow the traditional, common
349
law approach to deficiency judgments and personal liability. In
these jurisdictions, unless the mortgage obligation is by its terms
nonrecourse, a mortgagee
may first obtain a judgment on the personal obligation and later
foreclose on the mortgaged real estate for any part of the judgment
that is not satisfied from [the] mortgagor’s other property.
Alternatively, it may . . . foreclose against the mortgaged real estate
and if the sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the mortgage
obligation, it may then obtain a deficiency judgment for the
350
balance.”

Whether the foreclosure proceeding is judicial or by power of sale, a
deficiency judgment is normally measured by the extent to which the
mortgage obligation exceeds the foreclosure sale price.351 In those
common law states, UNFA’s impact would be relatively predictable
and straightforward.
UNFA’s adoption would have a significant impact only in the
context of nonjudicial foreclosure. If a foreclosing creditor chooses to
foreclose under UNFA against a residential debtor who is in good
faith, no deficiency judgment is allowed. If the UNFA foreclosure is
against some other debtor, a deficiency judgment is available, but the
debtor has the right to have it measured by the “90 percent of fair

348. Consider, for example, the description of the California antideficiency legislation:
“Perhaps more than any jurisdiction, California has a complex and pervasive anti-deficiency
legislative scheme. It not only frequently creates bewilderment among lawyers from other
jurisdictions, it often proves perplexing for California practitioners as well.” NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 667.
349. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
350. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a.
351. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 653.
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market value” limitation. Note, however, that UNFA does not
purport to change a debtor’s personal liability status; it does not
transform a recourse obligation to nonrecourse status. This is the case
even with respect to a residential debtor. Thus, for example, if
mortgaged real estate is worth only a small portion of the mortgage
obligation, but the residential debtor has a substantial net worth, the
creditor may choose to pursue judicial foreclosure rather than
foreclosure under UNFA, and to seek a traditional deficiency
judgment in the context of the judicial proceeding. In this scenario,
the “90 percent of fair market value” limitation would be
inapplicable. Alternatively, the creditor could simply sue on the note,
attempt to collect the judgment out of the debtor’s other assets and, if
those were insufficient, foreclose on the mortgaged real estate either
judicially or nonjudicially for the balance of the obligation still owing.
Of course, if the creditor’s last collection step were nonjudicial
foreclosure under UNFA, the fair market value limitation would be
applicable to determine the extent to which the mortgaged real estate
could be used to satisfy the remainder of the mortgage obligation.
At the other doctrinal extreme is California, which has adopted
virtually every deficiency and personal liability restriction known to
humankind. California’s “one-action” and “security-first” principles
require that lenders foreclose on the real estate before seeking a
deficiency judgment.352 Moreover, a California lender may not obtain
353
a deficiency judgment after a power of sale foreclosure. Most
importantly, California has a broad prohibition on deficiency
judgments for purchase money mortgages. Under section 580b of the
California Code of Civil Procedure this prohibition extends to all
vendors who take back real estate security and to third-party lenders
who take a mortgage to secure all or part of the purchase price for
purchaser-occupied dwellings accommodating fewer than five
families.354 Not only are deficiency judgments barred in the foregoing

352. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West Supp. 2004) (“There can be but one form of
action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon
real property or an estate for years therein . . . . ”).
353. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West Supp. 2004) (“No judgment shall be
rendered for any deficiency . . . in which the real property or estate for years therein has been
sold by the mortgage or trustee under power of sale . . . . ”).
354. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West Supp. 2004) provides:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after a sale of real property . . . under a
deed of trust or mortgage given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the
purchase price of that real property . . . or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a
dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a
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purchase money situations, but California’s statute has been judicially
interpreted to bar personal liability in purchase money situations as
355
well. For example, even a home seller who takes back a second
mortgage or deed of trust and suffers its destruction by a senior lien
356
foreclosure may not recover on the underlying obligation. As a
result, there are relatively few situations in which a California lender
can obtain either a deficiency judgment or a personal judgment on a
mortgage obligation. Only when the loan is by a third-party lender on
commercial real estate or on residential property containing five or
more dwelling units may a deficiency judgment be obtained.357 Even
then, the foreclosure must be by judicial action.358 Finally, in the rare
instances in which a deficiency judgment is available, it is limited by
359
“fair market value” legislation.
California’s adoption of UNFA’s deficiency provisions would
mark a radical departure from its existing antideficiency structure.
First, although UNFA generally permits deficiency judgments after
360
California does not. Second, whereas
nonjudicial foreclosure,
California bars both personal liability and deficiency judgments in a
wide variety of purchase money mortgage contexts, UNFA prohibits
deficiency liability only after nonjudicial foreclosure against
361
residential debtors. Under UNFA, a lender may still recover a
loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of that dwelling
occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser.
355. See Brown v. Jensen, 259 P.2d 425, 426–27 (Cal. 1953) (holding that no action may be
brought on a purchase money note even though the deed of trust securing it was destroyed by
the foreclosure of a senior deed of trust); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 673–74 (“In
Brown v. Jensen, the California Supreme Court held that section 580(b) barred a junior
purchaser money lender, the vendor, from recovering a personal judgment from the vendeeborrower even though his security had been lost through foreclosure by the senior purchase
money deed of trust.”).
356. Ironically, the non–purchase money junior lienor whose lien is destroyed by a senior
foreclosure is in a stronger position than the lienor’s purchase money counterpart. See Bank of
Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 290–94 (Ct. App. 1996)
(establishing that a foreclosed non–purchase money junior lienor holds security that is valueless
and therefore may sue directly on the note).
357. See supra note 354.
358. See supra note 352.
359. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(a) (West Supp. 2004) (“The court may render
judgment for not more than the amount by which the entire amount of the indebtedness due at
the time of sale exceeded the fair market value of the real property.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 726(b) (West Supp. 2004) (“[T]he court shall render a money judgment against the defendant
or defendants for the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest and
costs . . . exceeds the fair value of the real property.”).
360. See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 335–37 and accompanying text.
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deficiency judgment against a residential debtor after a judicial
foreclosure or may simply obtain a judgment on the mortgage
362
obligation without resorting to foreclosure at all. Unlike UNFA,
however, California’s legislation incorporates a broad “one-action”
363
Finally, UNFA’s fair market value
and “security-first” rule.
limitation, which applies only to nonjudicial foreclosure,364 does not
exist in California.
California legislators, in considering UNFA, would be compelled
to reevaluate the state’s entire antideficiency regime. They would
have to confront numerous policy questions. For example, should
deficiency judgments continue to be barred after nonjudicial
foreclosure? Should antideficiency protection be available only to
residential debtors? Does it make sense to continue to protect a wide
variety of commercial purchase money borrowers from both
deficiency judgments and direct personal liability? Do the “oneaction” and “security-first” principles continue to make sense? Why
should a lender be required to proceed first against the real estate
security when it is relying mainly on the personal credit of the
borrower and the real estate may be an incidental factor in the loan
transaction? Given the serious policy questions and complexities that
UNFA would raise, it seems highly unlikely that California could or
should adopt the Act’s deficiency and personal liability approach
without a thorough reexamination of its current antideficiency and
personal liability structure.
Most states fall between the two doctrinal poles described above.
These jurisdictions typically have adopted one or two of the common
mechanisms for limiting deficiency judgments. For example,
numerous states impose a “fair value” limitation on measuring
365
deficiency judgments. For these states, the “90 percent of fair

362. See UNFA art. 1, § 103(e); id. § 103 cmt.
363. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text.
365. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(A) (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-8-06(1)
(2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-14 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(b) (2002);
IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (Michie 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2415(b) (1994); ME. REV. STAT
ANN. tit. 14, § 6324 (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3280 (West 2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.30(5) (West Supp. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 40.457 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (2000); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-19-06 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 2000); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a)
(Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-700 (Law. Coop. Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2147-16 (Michie Supp. 2003); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE
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market value” limitation that UNFA imposes on deficiency would not
represent a substantial change from their current practice. For the
handful of states that impose a “one-action” or “security-first” rule,
UNFA poses a dilemma because it does not mandate such a
limitation, and its structure assumes that lenders are free to proceed
on the debtor’s personal obligation before or in lieu of foreclosing on
366
the real estate. Several states bar deficiency judgments after any
nonjudicial foreclosure.367 For these states, UNFA represents a
significant change because it permits deficiency judgments after this
type of foreclosure except in the case of residential debtors.
Finally, several states bar deficiency judgments in a variety of
368
residential purchase money mortgage contexts. Courts in some of
these states interpret their statutes, as discussed in the case of
California above, as barring not only a deficiency judgment, but all
borrower personal liability as well.369 In states where such
interpretations prevail, the obligation is treated as nonrecourse. In
such situations, the lender may neither (1) bring an action on the
obligation, attempt to collect any ensuing judgment out of the
debtor’s other assets and foreclose on the mortgaged real estate for
the balance; nor (2) waive the security in its entirety and simply bring
an action on the obligation. Were these states to adopt UNFA,
deficiency judgments would be barred on loans to residential debtors
ANN. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (West 2004); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 846.165(2) (West 1994).
366. See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text.
367. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.30(2)–(9);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.100.
368. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-729(A) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-21.38 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.070 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 44-8-20 to -25
(Michie 1997). These statutes have been criticized. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at
665:
To deny such vendor-mortgagee deficiency judgments in the event of a foreclosure
may deter the use of socially useful financing. Moreover, it is also undesirable to deny
a deficiency judgment to a third party purchase money mortgagee. Indeed, it is
especially anomalous to penalize the person or institution who enabled the mortgagor
to obtain the real estate in the first place.
369. See Baker v. Gardner, 770 P.2d 766, 772 (Ariz. 1988) (ruling that the holder of a
purchase money note is not permitted to waive security and sue on the note); Mid Kan. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dynamic Dev. Corp., 804 P.2d 1310, 1313–17 (Ariz. 1991) (confirming the
rule in Baker, but holding that the mortgagor-developer was not protected by the applicable
statute); Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 250 S.E.2d 271, 272–75 (N.C. 1979)
(stating that when legislation barred deficiency judgments on vendor purchase money notes, the
legislature also intended to bar personal liability on the notes); Barnaby v. Boardman, 330
S.E.2d 600, 601–04 (N.C. 1985) (maintaining that the holding in Ross applied even though the
mortgaged real estate was commercial and the mortgagor was a “sophisticated” businessman).
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irrespective of their purchase money character. In that sense, UNFA
would afford broader protection to residential debtors than current
state legislation. On the other hand, because UNFA does not confer
nonrecourse status on such debtors, legislatures in these states would
be forced to determine whether they wanted to give residential
debtors simple antideficiency protection or broader immunity from
personal liability.
C. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Titles: The Quest for Finality
Although power of sale foreclosure is clearly more efficient and
less costly than judicial foreclosure, the titles it produces have
traditionally been considered less stable than those produced by its
370
judicial counterpart. There are several reasons for this outcome.
First, court supervision of foreclosure prevents many defects. In the
power of sale setting, the mortgagee or trustee normally controls the
foreclosure process. Judicial foreclosure, on the other hand, entails
judicial supervision both prior to and after the sale. Indeed, the mere
presence of a judge probably deters many overt and intentional
defects and otherwise encourages regularity in the foreclosure
process.371 Second and more importantly, because judicial foreclosure
is an adversarial proceeding, the opposing parties aid the court in
identifying potential defects—a restraint on the mortgagee absent in
the power of sale context.372 Finally, even if defects in the trial process
go uncorrected, they will ultimately be obviated by the concept of
judicial finality. If an aggrieved party fails to challenge the trial
court’s foreclosure decree within the time period for filing trial court
motions or for appeal, there is little likelihood a subsequent collateral
attack will succeed. Moreover, if there is a timely appeal and the
foreclosure decree is upheld, finality is even more firmly
373
established.

370. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 580, 584. Both of the authors, on different
occasions, spoke at meetings of the Oklahoma Bar Association’s Real Property Committee on
the Oklahoma nonjudicial foreclosure statute, 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws 319 § 1 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 46, § 43 (2004)), which was adopted in 1986. On both occasions, the lawyers present
expressed significant concern as to the reliability of titles flowing from nonjudicial foreclosures.
371. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 584.
372. Id.
373. Id. Probably the only defect in the judicial foreclosure process that the rules of civil and
appellate procedure do not inevitably cure is the failure to make the holder of a junior interest
in the mortgaged real estate a party defendant. As a necessary party, an omitted junior interest
holder is not bound by the foreclosure and can collaterally attack its application even after the

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1499

These principles of judicial finality are of little benefit to the
power of sale foreclosure purchaser. Although time rapidly heals
most wounds in the judicial foreclosure setting, title stability has
proved more elusive in foreclosure by power of sale. The passage of
time undoubtedly strengthens power of sale titles, but it does so
largely by the invocation of such variable and less reliable
mechanisms as statutes of limitation, adverse possession, laches,
374
estoppel, and related notions.
A unique terminology and system of classification have
developed to analyze defective power of sale foreclosures. Typically,
courts recognize three types of defects. Some defects are so
substantial and prejudicial as to render the foreclosure sale void. In
this situation, no title, legal or equitable, passes to the sale purchaser
or the purchaser’s subsequent grantees, except ultimately through
375
adverse possession. Even if a bona fide purchaser purports to
acquire title through the foreclosure, the court will set the sale aside
and the bona fide purchaser will be deprived of title. Sales are
typically void when, notwithstanding mortgagee compliance with the
prescribed statutory procedure, the mortgagee lacked a substantive
right to foreclose.376 Examples of such defects include a forged
mortgage or a power of sale exercised when the underlying mortgage

time periods for direct review have expired. Id. at 572; see also supra notes 262–69 and
accompanying text.
374. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 581.
375. See, e.g., Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N.W.2d 544, 552–56 (Neb. 2003) (stating that when a
defect renders a foreclosure void, no title, legal or equitable, is transferred to the purchaser);
Henke v. First S. Props., Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (stating that if a defect
renders a foreclosure sale void, title cannot pass to the purchaser); Deep v. Rose, 364 S.E.2d
228, 232 (Va. 1988) (noting that when a defect renders a sale void, “no title, legal or equitable,
passes to the purchaser”); HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 637 (3d ed.
1939) (“The original purchaser at the sale under the power is charged with notice of any
irregularities in the actual exercise of the power.”); Larry D. Dingus, Mortgages—Redemption
After Foreclosure Sale in Missouri, 25 MO. L. REV. 261, 277 (1960) (“[W]hether a foreclosure
sale will be set aside in a particular situation may depend upon whether a [sale] is held to be
void or voidable.”).
376. See Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778, 783–84 (Alaska 1986) (“[O]nly substantial
defects such as the lack of a substantive basis to foreclose in the first place will make a sale
void.”); Graham v. Oliver, 659 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that when there is
no underlying right to foreclose, the foreclosure is void); Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d at 554 (pointing
out that defects rendering a sale void generally occur when the trustee conducts the sale without
the right to exercise the power of sale). But see Bottomly v. Kabachnick, 434 N.E.2d 667, 669–70
(Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding the sale void despite default when the notice failed to identify
the holder of the mortgage).
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377
obligation was not in default. A sale is also void when the
foreclosing party did not own the note378 or when a trustee under a
deed of trust foreclosed without authorization from the noteholder.379
Moreover, failure to comply with certain fundamental procedural
requirements may result in a void foreclosure. This can occur when a
notice of sale omits a portion of the mortgaged real estate,380 or when
there was a failure to send written notice to the mortgagor or another
381
party as required by statute. A sale under a deed of trust is also void
if conducted by someone other than the named trustee382 or by a

377. See, e.g., Bradford v. Thompson, 470 S.W.2d 633, 634–36 (Tex. 1971) (holding a
foreclosure void when the second lien note was deemed not in default at the time of
foreclosure); Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 720–23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
void a foreclosure sale that was conducted despite the mortgagor’s having tendered late
installment payments pursuant to an agreement mortgagee); TIFFANY, supra note 375, at 637
(“The power of sale is ordinarily conditioned upon a failure to pay the debt at a time named,
and consequently a sale before that time would, it seems, ordinarily be invalid for any purpose,
even in favor of an innocent purchaser from the purchaser at the sale.”).
378. See Williams v. Kimes, 996 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Mo. 1999):
There are numerous circumstances that may render a foreclosure sale void: (1) where
the foreclosing party does not hold title to the secured note; (2) where there has been
no default by the mortgagor at or before the first publication of notice for the sale; (3)
where the secured note has been paid; and (4) where the deed of trust authorizes sale
upon request of its holder and no such request has been given.
See also Cobe v. Lovan, 92 S.W. 93, 96–98 (Mo. 1906) (concluding that a foreclosure is void
when the person directing it does not hold the note); Graham, 659 S.W.2d at 603 (holding that
when there is no underlying right to foreclose, the foreclosure is void).
379. See Lustenberger v. Hutchinson, 119 S.W.2d 921, 926–27 (Mo. 1938) (explaining that
when the trust deed conditions foreclosure on the request of the holder of the note, foreclosure
without such a request is void); Graham, 659 S.W.2d at 604 (holding that a sale should be voided
“when the deed of trust authorizes sale upon the request of the holder of the secured note and
there has been no such request”); see also supra notes 281–83 and accompanying text (listing
states where foreclosure is void because of failure to adhere to statutory notice requirements).
380. See Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d at 554 (“[E]ven if there is a right to exercise the power of sale,
an egregious failure to comply with fundamental procedural requirements while exercising the
power of sale will render the sale void.”).
381. See Little v. CFS Serv. Corp., 233 Cal. Rptr. 923, 924–27 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that
the failure to send notice of sale to the trustor and junior lienors rendered the sale void);
Williams, 996 S.W.2d at 45–46 (opining that the failure to provide notice to the remaindermen
rendered the sale void); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. App. 1988)
(declaring that the failure to send notices as required by the deed of trust and statute rendered
the sale void); see also First Nat’l Bank Mansfield v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 134 B.R. 838, 847–48
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that giving notice by certified mail twenty-one days before the
sale did not constitute notice of twenty-one days, rendering the sale void); Deep v. Rose, 364
S.E.2d 228, 232 (Va. 1988) (deeming void a sale held on the last day of advertisement, in
violation of the statute).
382. See Citizens Bank of Edina v. W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo.
1987) (holding void a foreclosure sale conducted by the trustee’s son and law partner without
the trustee’s presence or a provision authorizing a delegation of the trustee’s function).

NELSON-WHITMAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

REFORMING FORECLOSURE

12/20/2004 3:30 PM

1501

383
successor who was not validly appointed. Conversely, a foreclosure
is void if it is conducted by the original trustee after the appointment
of a successor-trustee.384
Most defects, however, render a sale voidable rather than void.
When this is the case, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser,
subject to the right of those injured by the defective foreclosure to
have the sale set aside. Such defects, which are normally irregularities
in the execution of a foreclosure sale, must be “substantial or result in
a probable unfairness.”385 A common example of a voidable sale in
many jurisdictions is a purchase by a trustee under a deed of trust at
the trustee’s own sale.386 Additional examples include the publication
of the notice of sale for slightly fewer than the statutorily prescribed
387
number of times or the sale at the wrong door of the county
courthouse.388
An inherent feature of a voidable sale (as opposed to one that is
void) is that all rights to set aside the sale will be cut off if the land
passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value.389 When this

383. See Winters v. Winters, 820 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding the sale void
when the successor trustee had not been validly appointed).
384. See Dimock v. Emerald Props. LLC, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 262–63 (Ct. App. 2000)
(declaring that the original trustee lacked authority to sell the property).
385. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 586. In a number of jurisdictions, the aggrieved
party will be required to tender the balance due on the mortgage obligation as a condition
precedent to attacking the sale. Id. at 605–10.
386. See, e.g., Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (Va. 1974) (“Generally,
a trustee cannot be both a seller and a buyer at his own auction sale.”); Dingus, supra note 375,
at 276–77 (“If [a trustee in a deed of trust] does in fact become the purchaser, he takes the
chance that in some circumstances the transfer may be set aside.”).
387. See, e.g., Jackson Inv. Corp. v. Pittsfield Prods., Inc., 413 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987) (pronouncing that a defect in notice renders a sale voidable, not void); Kennon v.
Camp, 353 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Mo. 1962) (deeming a sale voidable when the trustee failed to
advertise the sale for the prescribed period of thirty days).
388. See Wakefield v. Dinger, 135 S.W.2d 17, 21–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (holding that a sale
at the west door of the courthouse—as opposed to the east door, as required by the deed of
trust—was merely voidable, not void).
389. See Patricia J. Warren, Note, Rosenberg v. Smidt: Dramatic Ramifications for
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales in Alaska?, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 357, 371 (1988) (“[A] foreclosure
sale made to a bona fide purchaser will not be set aside by a court if it was merely voidable
rather than void.”); see, e.g., Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778, 784 (Alaska 1986) (“[W]here a
defect in a foreclosure sale makes it merely voidable . . . sale to a bfp cuts off the trustor’s ability
to set aside the sale.”); Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N.W.2d 544, 554 (Neb. 2003) (holding that when a
defect renders a sale voidable, bare legal title passes to the purchaser and the sale may be set
aside only if the legal title has not passed to a bona fide purchaser); Steward v. Good, 754 P.2d
150, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that sale to a bona fide purchaser results in a valid title
notwithstanding procedural irregularities in the sale process). Either a foreclosure sale
purchaser or a subsequent grantee may qualify as a bona fide purchaser.
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occurs, the purchaser’s title is immune from attack and an action for
damages against the foreclosing mortgagee or trustee may be the
390
aggrieved party’s only remedy. This is the critical difference
between void and voidable foreclosures, because in the former even
bona fide purchasers are subject to the risk of having the sale set
aside.
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential as to have no effect
on the validity of a foreclosure sale. Such defects commonly involve
minor discrepancies in the notice of sale. For example, when the first
two of four published notices of sale omitted the place of sale, a court
held that because there was “substantial compliance” with the
requirements specified by the deed of trust and the parties were not
affected in a “material way,” the sale was valid.391 Similarly, a sale was
deemed valid when the notice of sale was sent by regular mail rather
than by the statutorily required certified or registered mail, and when

It would seem that a mortgagee-purchaser would rarely, if ever, qualify as a bona fide
purchaser. Indeed, it is normally the mortgagee or his attorney who manages the
power of sale foreclosure proceeding and who would be responsible for defects that
arise. Moreover, even where a deed of trust is involved, while the trustee presumably
is in charge of the proceedings, it is not unlikely that, for purposes of determining
BFP status, he will be treated as an agent of the mortgagee. If the sale purchaser has
paid value and is unrelated to the mortgagee, it would seem that he should take free
of voidable defects if: (a) he has no actual knowledge of the defects; (b) he is not on
reasonable notice from recorded instruments; and (c) the defects are not such that a
person attending the sale exercising reasonable care would have been aware of the
defect. Where a subsequent grantee is involved, BFP status would seem slightly easier
to achieve. If that grantee did not attend the sale, he should be treated as a bona fide
purchaser unless he had actual notice of the defect or was on reasonable notice from
the recorded documents. Where, however, the sale purchaser or some later purchaser
is a BFP, but he conveys to a person such as the original mortgagee who would not
otherwise qualify for such status, what should be the result? Most jurisdictions would
probably refuse to confer BFP status on the mortgagee (or any intervening purchaser
with notice of the defect), since such persons could not reacquire the property in good
faith.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 587–88.
390. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 586.
391. See Williams v. S. Cent. Farm Credit, ACA, 452 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(refusing to set aside the sale where the first two publications contained “two substitutions of
‘southeast’ for ‘southwest’ in describing an outparcel, and the omission of one line of text
referring to a land lot identified immediately below” but the errors “were corrected in the third
and fourth publications”); see also Tarleton v. Griffin Fed. Sav. Bank, 415 S.E.2d 4, 5–6 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992) (rejecting the claim that a foreclosure was legally defective when it incorrectly
referred to the security deed as being at page three rather than page two of county records,
because a potential purchaser would not have been misled); Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty
Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987) (refusing to hold a sale invalid because of a
typographical error relating to the year of the sale).
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the mortgagor had actual notice of the sale for longer than the
392
statutory period before the sale.
Against the backdrop and uncertainty of the foregoing
classification system, states have attempted to enhance the stability of
power of sale foreclosure titles through the enactment of a variety of
presumption statutes. Though these statutes vary significantly, they
nevertheless seem to fall into three general categories. The first type,
which we characterize as “rebuttable presumption” legislation, is
exemplified by the Missouri statute: “[T]he recitals in the trustee or
mortgagee’s deed concerning the default, advertisement, sale or
receipt of the purchase money, and all other facts pertinent thereto,
shall be received as prima facie evidence in all courts of the truth
393
thereof.” This type of statute, which is found, with minor variations,
in over a dozen states,394 contains neither “conclusive presumption”
language nor any specific protection for bona fide purchasers. Indeed,
a few of these statutes claim to deal only with the notice requirements
of the foreclosure and not with other aspects that might be carried out
395
improperly. At most, the recitals create a rebuttable presumption
that there was a valid basis for foreclosure and that the necessary
procedural requirements have been satisfied. These statutes seem to
do little more than restate the common law notion that the party
attacking the validity of a foreclosure sale has the burden of proof.
Presumably the rights of a bona fide purchaser under this type of
statute would be no greater than those afforded under the common
law “void-voidable” classification of power of sale foreclosure defects
392. Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). So too, a
notice of default that misstated the number of months of payments in default did not render a
sale invalid when the “number of months” information was not required by statute or by the
deed of trust. See Goffney v. Family Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 512–15 (Ct. App.
2000) (unpublished decision) modifying 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (Ct. App. 2000). For a complete
catalogue of defects deemed “insubstantial,” see Graham v. Oliver, 659 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Mo.
App. Ct. 1983). See also Burrill v. First Nat’l Bank of Shawnee Mission, 668 S.W.2d 116, 117
(Mo. App. Ct. 1984) (concluding that a notice of default did not affect the validity of the sale of
default although it incorrectly stated the date of the note).
393. MO. REV. STAT. § 443.380 (2000).
394. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-99 (1995); id. § 35-10-5 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-504
(2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-B (West 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 244, § 15
(Law. Co-op. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3264 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 479:26 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-16 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-13-3 (1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-23 (Michie Supp. 2004); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon
Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389 (2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103 (Michie 2003).
395. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-13-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-23; TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 51.002; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103.
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considered above. Such statutes probably contribute only slightly to
the stability of power of sale foreclosure titles.
In the second category of statutes, the inclusion of appropriate
recitals creates a conclusive presumption in favor of bona fide
purchasers, but this presumption extends only to notice requirements
396
of the sale. We label this type of statute “conclusive presumption for
bona fide purchasers—notice only.” The California statute is typical; it
states:
[A] recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of
compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of
copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default
or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the
posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy
thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with
these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona
397
fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.

As noted earlier, in the absence of such a statute, the failure to mail a
statutorily required notice to a mortgagor renders the foreclosure sale
398
void. That the property is sold to a bona fide purchaser is irrelevant.
No title, legal or equitable, passes at the sale. The statute, however,
reduces the impact of the notice defect. In effect, the notice defect is
deemed to render the sale only voidable. Consequently, a foreclosure
sale purchaser or subsequent grantee who qualifies as a bona fide
purchaser will hold an indefeasible title despite the failure to give
proper notice.399
On the other hand, it is unclear whether the “conclusive
presumption for bona fide purchasers—notice only” statute will
benefit a bona fide purchaser when the defect in the sale process is
procedural but does not deal with the statutory notice requirements.
For example, suppose the person who conducts a foreclosure sale
under a deed of trust was improperly replaced as trustee by another

396. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.090 (Michie 2002); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West Supp.
2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.4 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.17A (2003); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 38–1–4 (Michie 1997).
397. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 2004).
398. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
399. See Homestead Sav. v. Darmiento, 281 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (Ct. App. 1991):
A sale is voidable where there is a notice defect and conclusive presumption language
and there is no bona fide purchaser for value. Where the evidence establishes that the
trustee conveyed title to a bona fide purchaser and the trustee’s deed contains the
language specified in [the statute], the sale is not voidable.
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person a few days prior to the sale. Under the traditional analysis, the
sale is void regardless of the sale purchaser’s being a bona fide
400
purchaser. The California statute does not appear to aid the
purchaser in that context because a sale by an unqualified trustee
does not constitute the type of notice defect that is within the literal
purview of the statute. Nevertheless, California cases have left this
401
question unresolved.
The third category, which we characterize as “conclusive
presumption for bona fide purchasers—all aspects of foreclosure”
affords the greatest protection for bona fide purchasers. At least
402
fourteen states have this type of legislation. Washington’s statute
typifies this category. It requires the foreclosing trustee to issue the
foreclosure purchaser a deed that
shall recite the facts showing the sale was conducted in compliance
with all of the requirements of this chapter and of the deed of trust,
which recital shall be prima facie evidence of such compliance and
conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and
403
encumbrancers for value.

UNFA follows this approach. Recording of the proper documents
under UNFA “conclusively establishes compliance with this [Act] in
404
favor of purchasers of the collateral in good faith for value.”

400. See supra notes 375–84 and accompanying text.
401. Compare Garfinkle v. Super. Ct., 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 217–18 (1978) (stating that
presumptions apply only to the propriety of notice and are inapplicable to the other
requirements of the sale process), with Moeller v. Lien, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 783 (Ct. App.
1994) (“If the trustee’s deed recites that all statutory notice requirements and procedures
required by law for the conduct of the foreclosure have been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption
arises that the sale has been conducted regularly and properly; this presumption is conclusive as
to a bona fide purchaser.”). A recent California Court of Appeal decision noted the Moeller
language but declined to decide whether the statute was applicable to “all significant procedural
defects.” Residential Capital, LLC v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 174
n.4 (Ct. App. 2003).
402. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811 (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN § 18–50–111
(Michie 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 667-5, -8, -32, -33, -35 (Michie 2003); IDAHO CODE
§ 45-1510 (Michie 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.19 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1318 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 107.030 (Michie 2001);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-14 (Michie 1995); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1411 (McKinney
Supp. 2004) (repealed effective July 1, 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 47 (West 1996); OR.
REV. STAT. § 86.780 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-28 (Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 61.24.040(7) (West 2004).
403. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.040.
404. UNFA art. 6, § 605.
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The literal language of this type of statute is breathtakingly
broad in its impact on bona fide purchasers. Not only does it purport
to protect a bona fide purchaser from notice and other procedural
defects in the foreclosure process, it is arguably applicable even when
the mortgagee had no substantive right to foreclose. Under the
UNFA language, the conclusive presumption is that the foreclosure is
in compliance with the Act. Because section 201 states that a
mortgagee “has a right to foreclose under this [Act] if all conditions
required by law and the security instrument as prerequisites to
405
a court could “bootstrap” the
foreclosure are satisfied,”
presumption statute to cover every conceivable defect in the
mortgage, the obligation, or the right to foreclose. Suppose, for
example, that a mortgage is foreclosed even though the obligation
that it secures is not in default, or that the mortgage was forged.
Under traditional state law, the foreclosure would be void in either
instance, and would be set aside even against a sale purchaser who
was a bona fide purchaser.406 The literal language of UNFA and
similar “category three” statutes suggests a different result.
However, the comments to UNFA reject this conclusion:
[Section 605] does not ensure that there are no defects in the
security instrument or the creditor’s right to foreclose. For example,
if the security instrument is a forgery or was procured by fraud in
the execution, the courts typically hold that any foreclosure under it
will be void. This section does not change that result. Similarly, if the
secured obligation was not in default, or had been fully paid, the
secured creditor would have had no right to foreclose. In that case,
407
the conclusive effect of this section will not validate the foreclosure.

The foregoing language suggests that UNFA was intended to protect
bona fide purchasers against defects that arise in connection with the
mechanics of power of sale foreclosure but not defects relating to the
408
substantive right to foreclose. Limiting the conclusive impact of
UNFA and statutes like it to procedural defects in the foreclosure
process clearly makes sense. To allow a bona fide purchaser to prevail
over a mortgagor who was not in default or a person who never
executed a mortgage to begin with would be fundamentally unfair, a
405. UNFA art. 2, § 201.
406. See supra notes 375–84 and accompanying text.
407. UNFA art.6, § 605 cmt. (emphasis added).
408. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 605 (discussing the types of
problems that can arise regarding the rights of bona fide purchasers).
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normative result that legislatures adopting “category three” statutes
409
probably did not intend.
D. Obtaining Possession after Foreclosure
Once foreclosure has occurred, sale purchasers sometimes have
difficulty obtaining physical possession of the real estate from those
whose rights the foreclosure has terminated. Of course, in the case of
judicial foreclosure, the court entering the foreclosure decree may
also enter an order directing the sheriff or other court officer to
remove the previous owner and put the purchaser in possession.
However, if foreclosure is nonjudicial, the purchaser faces a dilemma
when possession is not surrendered voluntarily. Self-help, peaceable
or otherwise, generally may not be used to acquire possession.410
Indeed, use of this nonjudicial remedy may subject the foreclosure
411
purchaser to both criminal and civil liability. In many jurisdictions, a
summary proceeding (usually termed forcible entry and detainer,
unlawful detainer, or summary ejectment) is available to landlords
seeking possession from defaulting tenants and may be used by
foreclosure purchasers as an efficient dispossession remedy. In a
number of states, however, this option may be unavailable to
foreclosing parties because it is restricted to use in the landlordtenant context.412
UNFA takes a twofold approach to the possession problem.
First, it makes clear that the purchaser “may not dispossess persons in
413
possession . . . without a judicial order or judgment.” The self-help
remedy is barred. Second, it extends the availability of state summary
proceedings to foreclosure purchasers. It provides that the purchaser
“may gain possession . . . by an action under the [forcible entry and
414
detainer statute of the jurisdiction].”

409. Id.
410. See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a
Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 777–78 &
n.79 (1994) (“The majority of states, either by express provision in [a forcible entry and
detainer] or [unlawful detainer] statute or by judicial interpretation of that legislation, forbid a
landlord from using any form of self-help and require the landlord to resort to the judicial
remedy in evicting a tenant.”).
411. Id. at 780–81.
412. UNFA art. 6, § 606 cmt.
413. Id. § 606.
414. Id.
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To what extent should foreclosed parties be able to attack the
validity of an UNFA foreclosure in such summary proceedings?
Usually there are a variety of monetary and subject matter
415
jurisdictional limitations on such proceedings. Of course, in the
landlord-tenant context, the variety of issues that may be raised in
summary proceedings has expanded substantially over the past
several decades because of judicial and legislative recognition of the
implied warranty of habitability and other tenant protections.416 Even
in this context, however, questions of title or the validity of the lease
417
usually cannot be litigated. In the nonjudicial foreclosure context,
the issues or defenses that foreclosed parties can raise in a summary
proceeding should be even more circumscribed than in the landlordtenant setting. The foreclosed debtor should be permitted only to
show that no UNFA foreclosure of any kind took place; it should be
impermissible to litigate in any manner the validity of such a
foreclosure. Even substantive claims that normally render a
foreclosure void, such as a forged mortgage or no default in the
mortgage obligation, should not be considered in a summary
proceeding. To do so would inevitably trigger questions of title, given
that passage of title is necessarily related to any foreclosure
proceeding.
Moreover, the purpose of the summary proceeding in the
foreclosure context is only to avoid potential violence by using a
sheriff or other law enforcement agent to effectuate a transfer of
possession. Summary possession proceedings are often conducted in
courts of limited jurisdiction that are poorly equipped to hear
arguments based on the subtleties of compliance with the UNFA
foreclosure process. Any attacks on the validity of the foreclosure,
either substantive or procedural, can and should be raised in a suit to
enjoin the foreclosure or in a separate suit for damages or to set aside
the sale. To permit challenges to validity in a summary proceeding
would encourage persons facing foreclosure to refuse to relinquish
possession voluntarily and to raise all of their claims and defenses in

415. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 302, at 394.
416. Id. at 395.
417. See Puget Sound Inv. Group, Inc. v. Bridges, 963 P.2d 944, 946 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that unlawful detainer actions do not afford the opportunity to litigate title issues);
Andrew J. Wiegel, Unlawful Detainer: Preparing and Filing the Action, in CALIFORNIA
LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE § 9.6 (Cal. Continuing Educ. of the Bar, 2d ed. 2002) (“[T]he
issues that can be raised are strictly limited to possession and closely related to ancillary matters
such as recovery of back rent, damages, and attorney fees.”).
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the summary possession proceeding. Every UNFA foreclosure might
then become a judicial proceeding, and its purpose of providing a fair
and efficient nonjudicial foreclosure mechanism would be thwarted.
This is hardly what UNFA’s drafters intended or what any enacting
legislature would desire.
VI. SHOULD UNFA BE ENACTED BY CONGRESS?
This Article demonstrates, we believe, that UNFA represents an
innovative, flexible, and efficient foreclosure procedure. As such, it
should be especially appealing to lenders. At the same time, however,
it carefully assures fairness to borrowers. Residential debtors are
afforded a variety of safeguards including substantial grace periods
and, if they act responsibly, immunity from deficiency judgments. In
short, UNFA reflects a careful balancing of the legitimate interests of
both lenders and debtors and represents a major advance in
conceptualizing the foreclosure process.
What then is the likelihood of UNFA’s adoption by the states? If
the past provides any indication, its chances are slim indeed.
Although we fervently hope otherwise, it seems highly likely that if
the quest for uniformity is left to the states, UNFA will suffer the
same fate as its ULSIA predecessor.
We suggest that UNFA’s future may lie with Congress. In view
of the enormous impact of mortgage financing on the national
economy and the dramatic growth of the secondary market for
mortgages, the current hodgepodge of state foreclosure law and its
attendant inefficiencies make a compelling case for national
uniformity. This view, of course, is not universal. Professor Michael
Shill, for example, has taken the position that the case for uniformity
418
has yet to be convincingly made. In his view, “non-uniform
mortgagor protection laws in the context of residential real estate
419
[are] likely to generate only modest costs.” He concluded in 1999

418. See Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and
Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 286–87 (1999) (critiquing uniform laws governing real
estate foreclosures and the wisdom of federal preemption).
419. Id. at 286. Professor Schill summarizes that, in two earlier articles, he found “that the
effect of anti-deficiency laws was statistically insignificant and that an eleven month statutory
right of redemption was associated with an increase in interest of only seven basis points.” Id.;
see Schill, supra note 47, at 1292 (finding “the costs attributable to [such] laws quite modest”);
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 498,
512 (1991) (“With respect to the legal variables, a law prohibiting deficiency judgments is
estimated to increase home mortgage loan interest rates by 6.7 basis points.”).
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that “even if the laws were costly and inefficient, there [would be] no
reason for the federal government to supplant the judgment of the
citizens of states [that had enacted these laws], at least in the absence
420
of significant externalities.” However, an impressive 2003 study by
Karen Pence for the Federal Reserve System points to significant
externalities.421 Even though she concludes that statutory redemption
422
laws “do not appear to affect the mortgage market substantively”
and her findings about the impact of deficiency prohibitions are
inconclusive, she establishes “a robust inverse relationship between a
judicial foreclosure requirement and mortgage loan size.”423 Overall,
she finds that “defaulter-friendly” foreclosure laws are correlated
with a 4 to 6 percent decrease in loan size.424 This result suggests that
“defaulter-friendly” foreclosure laws “may assist homeowners
experiencing hard times, but they also impose costs on a much larger
pool of borrowers at the time of loan origination.”425 We are
convinced that national uniformity would be highly desirable.
Congressional adoption of UNFA could take a variety of forms.
The most far-reaching approach would be for Congress to make it
applicable to every mortgage transaction in the United States. Every
lender in the country would then have the option to utilize UNFA as
a nonjudicial foreclosure remedy. Note that this approach would
mainly affect state foreclosure procedure and would not alter
substantive mortgage law. For example, such a congressional
enactment of UNFA would have no impact on local law governing
priorities, subrogation, mortgage modification, future advances,
payment and discharge, or countless other substantive law issues. A
less sweeping approach would be for Congress to make UNFA
applicable to the foreclosure of mortgages sold on the secondary
market. An even less dramatic option would entail applying UNFA
only to the foreclosure of mortgages held by federal agencies and the
government-sponsored secondary market entities (Fannie Mae,

420. Schill, supra note 418, at 286–87.
421. PENCE, supra note 20, at 5.
422. Id. at 27.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1.
425. Id. at 27–28. Other studies have found higher interest rates in defaulter-friendly states.
See CLAUDIA E. WOOD, THE IMPACT OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAWS ON SECONDARY
MARKET LOAN LOSSES (1997); Mark Meador, The Effect of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage
Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 143–48 (1982) (studying the effects of state foreclosure laws on
regional mortgage rates).
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Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae). That approach would assure
secondary market investors that the time and cost of mortgage
foreclosure would not vary by the location of the mortgaged real
estate.
Another course of action would invoke a variation on the “states
426
as laboratories” concept. Under this view, uniformity imposed by
Congress is dangerous because unwise legislation would harm the
entire nation until it is repealed or amended. By contrast, when
legislation is adopted one state at a time, the harm is localized and
can be corrected before the country as a whole is injured.427 Applying
this philosophy to UNFA would require waiting several years to see if
it is adopted by at least a handful of states. If this were to occur, then
there could be careful analysis of its impact. A favorable assessment
would support adoption by Congress. A less positive evaluation
would point to its rejection or substantial amendment by Congress. If,
as seems more likely, state enactment of UNFA does not occur,
further delay by Congress would not be justified and prompt federal
action would be appropriate.
Congressional adoption of UNFA in any of the above variants
would be appropriate under the Commerce Clause. Under current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress can reach “those activities
428
that substantially affect interstate commerce.” To be sure, unlike
the UCC, which focuses on the sale and mortgaging of moveable
property, UNFA deals with real estate, which, by its very nature,
remains in one place. Nevertheless, under the Court’s current
approach, although any individual mortgage foreclosure may not
substantially affect commerce in more than one state, “a rational

426. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), in which a dissenting
Justice Brandeis noted:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
427. Id.
428. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995); see also, e.g., Nelson, supra note 35, at
1249 (“Congress could reasonably conclude that the total impact of such mortgages and their
foreclosures substantially affect commerce in more than one state.”); Grant S. Nelson & Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 168
(1999) (“In view of the enormous impact of mortgage financing on the national economy . . .
[s]uch a [mortgage] statute would survive a commerce clause challenge . . . .”).
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Congress could conclude that the cumulative impact of such
429
transactions on the national mortgage market does so.”
Some may argue that congressional adoption of a uniform act
threatens the underlying values of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference). The
Conference’s main raison d’etre since the late nineteenth century has
been to “promote uniformity in the law among the several States on
430
subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.”
Nevertheless, because of our substantial involvement with the
431
Conference, we can attest to the fact that, however desirable the
goal of uniformity, it is secondary to a more compelling concern—the
threat of federal preemption. Conference members commonly argue
that “unless we act, Congress will do it for us.” This view seems to
reflect an underlying federalist ideology, dictating that uniformity
should only be achieved by the individual assent of each of the several
states.
Our intuitive reaction, on the other hand, is much more
pragmatic. At least as to commercial issues, if uniformity is so
important, why not let Congress do it? After all, with the exception of
such major projects as the UCC, acts are rarely adopted by all of the
states. Even well-received products such as the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, and the Uniform
432
Probate Code have failed to achieve unanimous adoption. Thus, the
promulgation of most so-called “uniform” acts fails to achieve the
desired uniformity.
Perhaps it is time for the Conference to adopt a new perspective.
There is a strong case that uniform acts dealing with commercial
transactions ought to be enacted by Congress under its Commerce
Clause power. Under this paradigm, future versions of the UCC
would be enacted by Congress. So too would UNFA. The Conference
would continue to produce only acts dealing primarily with local
429. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 428, at 168. See also the discussion of the federally
sponsored secondary mortgage market at supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
430. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. LAWS, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS
§ 1.2, available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18.
431. Grant Nelson was a Commissioner from Missouri from 1982 to 1991 and Dale Whitman
served as Reporter for UNFA from 1999 to 2002.
432. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (2002), has been adopted by
thirty-nine states, the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 8C U.L.A. 1 (2002), by forty-eight
states and the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U.L.A. 1 (2002), by sixteen states. Even the UCC,
although adopted by all of the states, is not totally uniform. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 7 (3d ed. 1988).
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social and cultural concerns, such as the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act and the Uniform Probate Code.
This “bifurcated function” approach for the Conference is hardly
a radical suggestion. Uniform acts involve a time-consuming,
deliberate, multidraft process that generally takes at least three or
four years, and the result is almost always a high-quality product—at
least equal in quality to typical acts of Congress. State influence on
uniform acts is substantial. They are drafted and considered by a body
of commissioners that draws its financial support largely from state
433
governments. Perhaps more importantly, the membership of the
Conference is comprised of leading lawyers, judges, and academics
434
who are appointed by a political process in each of the states.
Indeed, uniform acts probably receive much more local and state
input than the usual legislation enacted by Congress. Consequently, if
uniformity in commercial matters is desirable, why not let it come in
the form of a congressionally enacted uniform act produced by the
Conference’s careful deliberative process that substantially reflects
state concerns? If the Conference and Congress adopted this
cooperative approach, the Conference could achieve an impact in the
new millennium that would far exceed its influence on the
development of the law in the twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
UNFA represents the first effort in the modern era to formulate
a foreclosure statute that creatively addresses the manifold problems
of nonjudicial foreclosure.435 Some of its concepts are admittedly
untested, but they represent the best thinking of a highly qualified
and experienced group of lawyers who worked on the project for four

433. http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp#financial (last visited June 5, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The major portion of financial support for the Conference comes
from state appropriations. Expenses are apportioned among the states by means of an
assessment based on population.”).
434. Although the method of appointment of commissioners to the Conference varies
among the states, three patterns are discernable. In some states, they are appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the senate. In other states, the sole appointing authority is the
legislature. In a third approach, some states give both the governor and the legislature the
exclusive authority to appoint a fixed number of commissioners. Telephone Conversation
between John M. McCabe, Legislative Director and Legal Counsel of NCCUSL, and Grant S.
Nelson (June 4, 2002).
435. The Oklahoma statute, adopted in 1986, is perhaps the closest analogous effort. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 40–49 (West 1996). It was carefully crafted but did not attempt to
provide alternatives to the traditional auction sale.
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436

years. UNFA is remarkably thorough, dealing with many issues that
most other foreclosure statutes gloss over. It is straightforward and
relatively easy to follow. It represents a reasonable balance of
lenders’ and borrowers’ interests, and it grants substantial protections
to residential borrowers. Most importantly, it vastly increases the
probability that foreclosures will bring prices that approach market
value. We think that it deserves to see the light of legislative day,
either by state or congressional enactment.

436. The initial meeting of the drafting committee was held on September 17–19, 1999. The
final draft was approved by the Commissioners in August 2002.

